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PREFACE

In an era when there is so much interest in the revolutionary goals and

tactics of socialist parties, the role of the Bolsheviks in the upheaval of

1905 against the Tsar deserves notice as an example of the goals and tactics
of a Marxist party in a revolutionary struggle.

Therefore it is the aim of

this study to explain such aspects of Bolshevik revolutionary activity in

1905 as the objectives of the Bolsheviks in a democratic revolution, their
revolutionary tactics and strategy, their methods of propaganda and agitation,
their attitudes toward the proletariat and other classes in Russitbsuch as the
peasantry and the armed forces, their relation to other revolutionary groups,
their organization and implementation of armed uprisings against the government, and the reasons for their failure in 1905.
In dealing vith this topic I have consulted such primar,y sources as

memoirs of men of various parties, leaflets, newspaper articles and tracts
vritten by the leading revolutionaries, and army and police reports.

The sec-

ondary sources consisted mostly of vorks on the Revolution of 1905 published
within the Soviet Union and a number of Menshevik and western secondary

source~:

which I consulted to check the accuracy and interpretation of the Soviet sources. Most of the materials used in this study are located in the Harper
Library of the University of Chicago, though many valuable sources were also
found in the Deering Library of Northwestern University and the Cudahy Library
of Loyola University.
Throughout the fooimotes, the Libraey of Congress system of transliteration of slavic languages has been used. All the dates in the text and the
ii

footnotes, unless otherwise indicated, are given in the Julian calender then
current in Russia.

The Julian calendar is thirteen days behind the Gregorian

calendar now current in the West 1 and since 1918 1 in Russia.
I would lilte to express my gratitude to Dr. Franklin A. Walker who
suggested the topic and whose class lectures were a great aid to me in this
study.

To Dr. Silvestro for her critical analysis of the manuscript and for

her helptul cOI!IZllents and further suggestions in the course of its writing,
and Miss Laurel Tossing who bas been of great assistance in the typing of
the final copy of the manuscript.

At the turn of the century, 1n e period wen constitutional and parliamentary limitations on royal power and mass participation in government were
becaning vide spread in Europe 1 Russia vas still under the rule of an autocrat.
The power that Tsar Nicholas II wielded O"''er his 123 million subjects was

limited only by the inefficiency of his bureaucracy, of which the most effi·
cient arm was neither the f1nanc:ial 1 judicial, nor military branch, but the
police. Although ideas of self-government and social reform had already
made their entrance into Russia, the Tsar was determined to preserve both the
autocracy and the hierarchic structure of Russian society. Nicholas' outlook
an life and his canception of his duty as head of the state were deeply in•
fluenced by his adviser and former tutor 1 the procurator of the Holy Synod
and the most articulate representative of Russian-official-conservative though 10 ,
Konstantine Petrovich Pobedonostsev.

L1la!t Pobedonostsev 1 Nicholas thought of

society as an organism in which each
tion to fulfill.

ma~or

division had a definite fixed ftmc•

The Church was to preach the true faith and lO)'alty to the

state. The nobility vas to aid the Tsar in administering the state by provid•
1ng the personnel necessary to staff the bureaucracy and the officers' corps.
The peasants, meanwhile, were to work the soil end fight the wers.

Unlike

Peter the Great 1 Nicholas had little use for the urban middle class. He mis-1-

understood and mistrusted canmerce, banking and industr;r as infiltrated by
foreigners and Jevs.

Nicholas considered it his duty as head of state to

preserve the social structure and was determined to prevent any change 1n it
by the use of his autocratic powr.

Inf'luenced by Pobedonostsev' s philosophy

which held man to be essentially evil and unable to govern h:lmsel:t, Nicholas
mistrusted and opposed any attempt at self•govemment 1n Russia. He grudgingly tolerated the zemstvoa, the elected organs ot local-self-government which
had the duty of administering local l.otJer and middle education, hospitals,
prisons, and asylums, mai.lta.in:tng roads and bridges, and advancing pUblic
health., relief of the :poor, camnerce, industry, and scientific agriculture,
but he severely restricted their f'reedan of action throughout his reign.
As for selt•government on the national level, Nicholas was convinced that the
Russian peoplA 1 espedially1 were incapable of governing themselves.

He was

therefore determined not to share his power with any organ of self-government.
Shortly after his coronation in 1894 1 in a speech widely held to be vritten
by Pobedonostsev 1 Nicholas crushed the hopes of the zemstvo leaders that they
might participate :ln the general administration of the internal affairs of
the state by enn.atmcing that he would uphold the p.rlneiple of autocracy as
fimly as did his father, Alexander III, and by calling the notions of the
zemstvo leaders "senseless dreams." The Tsar thought of' his subjects as his
children and though he was deeply interested :ln their vel:tare he expected
frau them the obedience due to a patriarchal father and was canpletel.y insen-

sitive to public opinion and the demands of his subjects for self-government.
While the Tsar expected docile obedience tran his "chUdren" the ecanomic situation during his reign gave rise to an increasing restlessness through·
out the country. Due to primitive methods of farming the Russian peasant had

always barely managed to subsist and usually lived :tn dire poverty.

Shortly

before the turn of the century the agricultural situation~ worsened.

The

lands wh.ich the serfs had been granted with their treedan in 1861 were in
many regions barely adequate to sustain the families that wrked them while
payments required by the state to canpensate the nobles for these lands were

more than most peasants could attord. At the same time the 1890's witnessed
a rapid increase in the agricultural population. Russian industry ws still
in its 1ni'ancy and could absorb only a 3!!Sll segment of this surplus popula-

tion.

Consequently1 the

;,."U%'81

areas of Russia which had alw:rs suffered from

a low yield fran the soil now had the added problem of having more mouths to

feed than could be supported by the soil and more laborers than were needed to
actuall;y' work the soil.
farming and frequent

Nor vas there much hope of :lmprovement.

.~distribution

The cOOillli.Ulal

of the land by the village camnunes

stifle~

individual initiative depriving the peasants of a:ny desire to improve the land
on which they did not have a secure and permanent hold.

To aggravate tbe sit •

uatian 1 canpetition fran Prussia, Canada, and the United states considerably
lowered the profits of Russian grain exports. Finally, the plight of' the
Russian peasantry was worsened by foul weather which helped bring on the fam•
ines of 1891-2 1 1897 1

1898 1

and 1901.

Tbe undernourishment caused by these

famines and the primitive hygiene which prevailed in the Russian countryside
made the populatian more susceptible to upidemics such as the cholera epidemic
which broke out in 1893 following the famines of previous years and dragged
on for several years adding to the woes of the population.
The econQllic strife :1n Russia produced not only physical hardship but

social strife as well.

'l'he rapid growth of a surplus 1'1..1J."Ql population toward

the end of the century gave rise to a large agricul.tural proletariat and the

more numerous this class became the lowr the wages of the day laborers on
large estates dropped.

The increasing poverty and ec:ploitaticm. of the rural

:proletariat intensified the hate which members of that class felt toward
large landowners, especially in the Baltic region 'Where the

emplo~nt

of the

rural proletariat ws especially widespread and where there was the added
national hostility of Lithuanian, Lettish, and Estonian farm laoorers toward

German and Russian landlords.

In other regions the proportion of the land

held by the nobles varied and ws ste'.>c1U.y decrea.s:t.ng as impoverished nobles
sold or leased their la:tJs to more prosperous peasants.

Yet in the midst of

economic distress most peasants imagined that the acquisition of the nobles'
estates as well as the state and church lands vou.ld solve their ecananic
problems by i<'"l.creasing the landholding of the peasants and ridding them of
the burden of

pe.~

heavy rents.

!b.eref'ore the pea.sant class viewed the

nobles' estates in the Baltic provinces, Georgia, and southern Russia, as
well as the large church and state lands with increasing greed. Already in
1902 the increasing restlessness of the peasantry was manifested by the plun•

dering of estates in the Kharkov and Poltava prcwinces and by the camnem.ce•
ment of a guerilla war in Western Georgia. ot course, almost every region
had a. history of peasant unrest and revolts but the disorders of 1902 boded

ill for the twentieth century.
While the agrarian crisis in Ruscla was making the peasant class in•

creas:tngly restive, the developnent of Russian industry gave rise to a ne·\.,
d.issat1sf1ed class, the urban proletariat.
teenth century, industrial centers

sprang~

In the last decade of the ninewith heavy concentration in the

St. Petersburg, Moscm.r, and Don Basin regions.

By 1900 more than two and a

h.alf million workers were concentrated in these areas.

Since Russian industry

was still in its infancy the workers were exposed to a
The

average yearly'

wage

g:~.-oeat

deal of. abuse.

for a man at the turn of the century

'-'US

l/38 rubles

or less than 95 dollars, while the average American worker in 1900 earned

490 dollars or about 2 1 000 dollars in today1 s cu.rrency. Russian women were
paid half' as much while cllildren earned only' a third of the reg-\llar wage •
The working day averaged eleven to fourteen hours in length not including

the overtime work which workers were frequently canpelled to tmdertake either
by lack of money to support tnemselvch•

o.c by pressure fran the factory

mana.•

gers. Working and sanitary conditions were deplorable while 1-101.•kers "'rere
further degraded by frequent searches for illegal literature, weapons, or

stolen parts and tools in the factories as well as in their

OV.'Il.

living qutilrt•

ers. F:tnes for inefficiency not CXIl.ly presented another form of degradation

tor

the workers but made their pitiable earnings even snaller.

The workers'

living quarters, often provided by the canp&.ny they worked for, were badly
built, crowded 1 unsanitary, and expensive.

Tbrougb.out the 1890's the govern-

ment attempted to mitigate the hardships of the wat"kers by ;passing tactor.r
leg1sla.tic:m. regul.ating woman and child labor, lilaiting the work day to eleven
and a half hours and setting a limit on overtime worlt along with other mea sure ~.

However 1 these laws vere
help to the workers.

poor~

enforced and often evaded proving little

Labor was not al.lowed to organize except; for the unions

created by the government in 1900 and uupervised by the :t>..ead of the Moscow
security police 1 SE!rgei Zubatov.

The workers 1 most powerful wapan 1 the

strike, was forbidden and many unauthorized strikes occurring in Siberia, the
Urals, and southern Russia in the earl¥ 1900's were crushed by volleys fran
military detacbments.

To make things even worse 1 the period juS"ii after the

turn of the century was marked by a series of depressions ivhich forced oany

workers to return to their native villages and wile the poverty of those
who rema 1ned increased.
All in all the harsh condition in which the workers found themselves
made them a dissatisfied class and therefore a fertile field for revolutiona.r;y
propaganda. Furthermore, their concentration in large industrial areas made
agitation among them that much easier.
usual~

Final~ 1

the workers themselves were

just literate enough to absorb new ideas while at the same time they

were ignorant and gullible enough to

uncritica~

accept any utopian and rad-

ical ideas offered by the revolutionaries as solutions to the social and
economic problems of the working class.
Efforts to improve the econcrnic situatian in Russia further increased
the burdens of the peasants and industria 1 workers.

The efforts of Count

Witte 1 the minister of Finance, to base Russian currency on the gold standard,
finance the ccm.strueticm. of the Trans-8iberian Railroad, and to accelerate the
growth of Russian industry thrOugh subsidies to industrialists increase the
taxes of all the classes of societ,-. At the same time his maintenance of a
high tariff raised the prices of imported articles and maintained the high
prices of Russian manufactured goods thus placing an additional burden the
lower class.
While it is true that their harsh economic condition made the peasants
increasing~

restive 1 more than poverty and dissatisfaction is

needed for a revolutian.

Neither econanic hardship nor rebellion were un•

and workers

lmow:n. in Russia.

.aowe.wer 1 previous pee sent risi:DsJI '.8Mh .aa

~;···iet!"'1:t7

1
BGlatnilmv and Pugachev

~~·

.

l,}GOrly led and orc;an1zed and had no definite

and the begirming ot the twentieth, however, there was a class tn Russia which

was willing and able to give the restless masses leadership and organization.
This class was the "intelligentsia~ which included professional men such as
doctors, law,ers, professors, engineers, journalists, and students 1n the
urban areas sa well as teachers, agt"QD.aaists, botanists, veterinarians,
econcaists, and statisticians empl())fed by the zematvos in the rural areas.
Loosel.7 applied, the term "intelligentsia" included not cm.ly people of higher
education but also those Who had a middle school education and were aware ot
national and world eftnta and new ideas through the reading ot newspapers and
scientific and eccmcmic jOUl'DBls. Such a class bad not

anq enough education

to know that political, ecCIIl.CBl1c, and social cOIDditions in Russia could be
improved but also that idealistic cCDCept;ion that it is the dut7 of mtellec•
tuals to lead the rest ot societ7 in achievirlg a better wa7 of life tor all
its members. M8Dy' ot the "intelligentsia" strove to improve the conditions
of

Ute in Russia through scientific diacover7, eeonanic reform, and humani-

tarian efforts while others aS..d at political end social chenge. Due to the
impetuosit7 and the powrt7 Vhich

forced~

ot them to work at other oceupa-

tian.s while atucl71ng for their desrees at the uniftrsities, the students as a
whole were prone to support revoluticmary ideas, though, at course, the7 had
no monopoq on radicaliaa.
1
Ivan BolotllikOT terrorized the ares arotmd Moscow in 1607 and lbilian
Pugachev led a revolt ot the peaaants and DCIIIltls ill the Ural and VoJ.aa areas
in l'T73·1774. Both aS..d to exteminate the gentJ7 and bureaucrac7 and dis-.
tribute their possesaions 8IIOD8 the peasants. Howewr, neither could defeat·
a vell•led al'Dl7 and both were eventuall7 executed.

Some members of the "intelligentsia," and especially the students, had
already been taking part in the Populist revolutionary movement 'Which had been
active since 1870. The socialist ideals of this movement vere so vague that
the members themselves rerely agreed on vh.at the structure of the ideal soci•
ety or their mm revolutionary tactics should be. A rev resorted to ind.ivid•
ual acts of terrorism against government officials 1n order to attain their
ends but the ineffectiveness of this method was shmm by the fact that the
assassination of Tsar Alexander II, contributed nothing toward the overthrow
of the autocracy. Probably the basic cause of the failm-e of the Populists
in the nineteenth century is that though the1 dedicated all their energy to

the good of the people, they neglected to obtain the participation of the
masses in their revolutionary efforts.
The tm.on of the century, however, vitnessed the rise of organized

opposition to the autocracy, carried out by parties with definite platforms
and seeking the support and membership of the messes to attain their objec•
tives.

Of these parties the one vh.ieh strictly adhered to l.farxist ideas vas

the Russian Soeial·Demoeratic labor Party.

Its beginnings 't-rere modest.

Towerd the end of the nineteenth century numerous marxist discussion circles
sprang ~ among the "intelligentsia" in the industrial centers.

Marxism

appealed to many intellectuals because it seemed to provide a clear end
definite blueprint toward the attainment of social justice.

Eventually many

of these circles merged into larger bodies sueh as the Unian of Struggle for
the Liberation of the Working Class, founded by Vladimir Il1ch Ulie.nov (Lenin)
and Julius Me.rtcnr in 1895, vhich aimed at spreading Marxist propaganda among

the workers and rejected the use of 1ndiv1dusl terrorism as a waste of effort.
Besides maintaining contaet with each other, these groups also kept in 'tiouch

with exiled Russian. Marxists., concentrated nostly in Switzerl.end, ond frequent
ly received letters and pamphlets on Marxist ideology and tactics fran such
theoreticians as Georgi Plekhanov, Vera Zasuliclt 1 end Pavel .1\kselrod.
The first attempt of the Marxist socialists to create an all-Russian

:party w s for the most part a failure.

Due to police harasfl!'lent, only nine

delegates representing the st. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, and Ekaterinoslav
Unions of Struggle, The General Jewish Workers• Union, and the editors of the
l\iarxist Newspaper, Rabocha1a Gazs1ip. 1 met in Minsk 1n

1898.

Beyond agreeing to

tmite in a single Russian Social-Democratic IBbor Party and approving a
manifesto draw up by Peter stru.ve declaring the proletariat to be the only
truly revolutionary force in Russia, the congress did not accan:plish much.

No party program or constitution was drawn up and soon after the close of
this First Congress most of the leaders were arrested or fled into exile.
l'he Second Congreos of the party, held in Brussels and London during

1

the S'Ur.1111er of 1903 can be said to mark the real begim'ling of the funetioni."lg
of the Social•Democrats as a party.
1."1 a clear platform.

The objectives of the party were stated

The Minimum Program outlined the party's i.."'!!!ediate aims:

the establishment of the eig.ltt•hou:r day throughout the land, the restitution!
to the peasants of the "cut-off'" lands that should have been given to them at
the time of their emancipation 1n 18611 the destruction of all surviving
traces of feudalism, such as tithes and rents to nobles, the overthrow of the
autocracy, and the establishment of a democratic regublic.

The ultimate

goals . .~re declared to be the socialist revolution, the destruetian of cap!•
talism, and the establisbmen of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

On.

Q.uestions of party organization, however 1 the Social-Democrats split into
tvo factions at the very creation of their party. When a resolution asserting

the po'-rer of the Central Committee over loeel organizstions and thus denying
the autonany of the Je1:rl.sh Workers' Union was passed, the delegates or the
Union walked <nxt of the congr-ess. An argument ryver the def'i.'lition of' party
membership brought out an even more basic split in t.b.e -party.

Leni!l and h&s

followers, known as the "hards" sought to construct a centralized eonspirator:tal party.

Since 1902 when Lenin had written his pamphlet, Wha;t i,s

~o

Be. D!Jl!.?, he had been emphasizing the necessity of a secret conspirt:ttorinl

organization since ccmditions prevailing 1:n the tssrist state did not allat,r
the existence of an open, demoera.tically chosen party. Furthermore, accordin

to Lenin, centralism was necessary 1n a party which was to be the vangusrd
of the revolutionel"Y' proletariat to keep its ideology pure and free from
"reformism" and "trade tmionism." with which the socialist parties of western
Europe had already been tni"ected.

L!nin 1 s opponents, Julius Martov, Pavel

Akselrod, Vera Zftsulich, Leo Deich, and A. Potresov did not oppose party
centralism as such, but only' Lenin's high•hended methods at the congr.-ess.
However, due to the defection of the Jevtsh Workers' Union they lost control

ot the Central C<Xmllittee and the party organ,

Ism,

(the Spark).

Since

Lenin's taction had temporarily obtained control of the party machinery and
a me.~ority of the votes at the congress, they called themselves "Bolshevik!"
(members of tbe majoritY') and dubbed their opponents "Mensheviki" (members of
the minority).
The rift in the ranks of the Social•Democrats continued long a:f'ter the

Second Congress and videned into the practical crea.tion of two separate parties.

The basic objectives of the two factions were still the same: the

creation of a democratic republic, the esta'111abment of the dictatorship of
the proletariat, and the construction of a socialist state. The differences

betwee.u them were rarely as absolute as Lenin made them seem in his articles
and pamphlets.

Veey often the differences between the two factions were those

of' personality and temperament.

One subject of dispute was the question of

party organization. 1!he Bolsheviks insisted on the necessity of giving the
Central Canm.ittee strict control over the local canmittees. 1!he Mensheviks,
meanwhile posed as defenders of "party democracy," "f'reedan of discussion,"
and "workers participation" in the pert;r organizations and decisi~ favoring

the right of the rank and file of the part;r and the workers themselves to
participate 1n forming major policies. As is characteristic of many of the
Bolshevik-Menshevik quarrels, l'Mlither side consistent:cy maintained its po•
sition on the question of part,- organization.
Q.uestions of revolutionaey- tactics divided the tvo factions more clearly
1'he

Mensheviks were more ree.d7 to cooperate with the middle-class liberals

in overthrowing the autocrae,-.

Not that the Mensheviks bore any love tor the

middle class but it was good tactics to use cme's
enemies.

enem~es

against one's other

Lenin and the BolsbeViks reJected the ccm.cept of an alliance with

the bourgeois liberals. Their middle-class interests did not pemi'tjthem to
work for a real rlctaey- of' the people.

The,- merely wanted to limit the auto-

crac,- to seize power tor themselves and protect their interests fran both the
aristocrac;r and the proletariat. To the Bolsheviks an alU.ance with the
bourgeoisie would onl.7 contuse the proletariat and sabotage the movement

toward a true peoples' revolution.
In other tactical questions the disagreements betwen the Bolsheviks

and Mensheviks wre the results of mere difference 1n emphasis. Mensheviks
such as

Ma.rt~ov

did not oppose violent revolution but feared the use of

radical slogans which might frighten a.way liberal allies.

The Bolsheviks,

on the oth.er hand, constm1t!J'" emphasized that the autocracy could only be
overthro;m by a violent UJ?heaval and devoted more energy th.o.."'l the Menshevilts
in preparing the masses for an amed uprising.

closely adhering to Marx's teachings,

'Were

Furthermore, t:r..e Mensheviks,

preoccupied in. agitating the urban

proletariat ·while relati-vely ignoring the peaoontrJ which they considered
to be too ignora.."'lt 1 primitive, and apathetic to constitute a truly revolutionary force.

The Bolsheviks, on the other han.d 1 contended that the peasants•

de sire for land made them a truly revolutionary force and that since the
Russian proletariat vas still so
crru::y

~with

mnal~.,

it could hope to CM!rthrow the auto•

the aid of a revolutiane.ry peasantry.

Therefore, they urge.d

the necessity of spreading propaganda in the rural areas to form an alliance
between the pr!llctflr.i:ef.;,_;nnJl tl>..e

;pcsoa..'lt~:-·

All these differences between the

Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks provoked bitter polem:tcs on both sides. Though
~~

party remained nan:tnally united,

:tt vas practically split in two and its

efforts were therefore weakened by producing disorganization and confusion
among the masses the party preached to.
The other socialist party ill. Rwasia was the Socialist-Revolutionary

Party.

This grou.p ws in

~

vays a"l. outgrowth of the populist movement and

many of its d.deas had been derived fran the nineteenth-century populists,

Ie:vrav and Mikhailovskii. After failures in attempts to create a party in 1897·

l.898 the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was f'ounded at a congress

of several

revolutiona.r-,r organizations held in Kbarkov in 1900. '1'b.e party included
several notable revolutionaries such as Victor Chemov, its leading ideologist 1
Michael Goetz, G.A. Gershtmi, and Catherw Bresbkov-Breshkovskaia.
had its Central COOJm.ittee and party newspaper,

The party

Rftot4t*firef!'!!!!Jtte,

(Revol.utic:m.Et.ey Russia,) but was poorlJ organized and did not have a complete

1st organization 'Which included s-<1eh famous assassains as Boris Savinkov and
Evno Azef 1 who was at the sa.."tle time a police agent.

Thou.gh

most of the party

oembership did not actually carry out acts of violence themselves, the party
as a 'Whole recognized terroriEm as a useful weapon aga..inst the autocracy

both as a means of reprisal against the government and as a course of action

to sustain the revolutionaey feeling

or

the people.

As far as an alliance vith the bourgeois liberals ws concerned, the
Socialist-Revolutionaries, as socialists, sc:orned and hated the bourgeoisie.
However, they considered the middle class in Russia too snall and weak to be
a real obstacle to the progress of socialia:n. Consequently,

t~y

were pre•

pared to accept the liberals, as well as any revolutiaoaey group which opposed

the autocracy, as a temporary aJ.4r.
The Soc1allst•Revolutio.n.ary Party ws never able to take full advantage
of its position as the party with the

most munerous following in Russia.

vas not nearly as well organized as the Soc:lal-Democrat:tc Party.

It

It lacked

a clear platform and much of its program was derived fran conflicting articles
in the party news}Xiper.

Ideological and. tactical disputes among the members

were frequent but sel.d(E settled.

Contact between the Central Camnittee and

local com:nittees as well as party discipline were poor. Finally, the Socialist,Revoluticmaries concentrated more of their effort on agitating and organizing the masses 1n the rural areas than did the Soc:tal-Democrats 1 although

they by no means neglected the urban proletariat as the Social-Democrats
accused them of doing.

'l'h.is preoccupation. with the Russian peasant made it

much more difficult to build effective party organizatioos due to the illi•

tera.cy of the peasantry and the scattered state of the population.
It took longer for liberal:Lm to becane an organized force of political

opposition to the autocracy than it did for socialian.

Liberal aet$.vity 1n.

the nineteenth centuey took the form of petitions fran zemstvo congresses to
the Tsar for ecananic and educational refoms.

Sane, like D.E. Sb.ipov, the

president of the executive board of the Moscow Zemstvo, went so far as to
suggest that a national

asaemb~

be elected by the zemstvos for the purpose

of being consulted by the Tsar :ln forming his policies regarding the internal
administration of the :&apire. 'fhe tsarist govemnent answered these petition
and s-uggestions by limiting the power of the zem.stvos to raise local taxes,

controlling the appointments of members to the zemstvo executive boards, and
forbidding the discussion of matters oatside zemstvo Jurisdiction betften
zemstvo congresses.

Irritated by such stubborness o:o. the part of the tsarist

government 1 m.any liberals became mare radical in their thought and carried
their opposition underground.

!n

1902 Peter struve began to edit

Osvobo!jl.d~e, (Liberation) a liberal newspaper which had to be printed in

stuttgardt and Slluggled into Russia.

In 1903 the Union of Liberation was

founded under the leadership of Ivan Petrmlkevich and the historian Pavel
Miliukov.

This first organization of the Russian liberals as a political

force aimed at the establishment of a constitutions. government elected by
universal suffrage.

Though the Union of Idberation was an illegal group its

activity remained non-violent rendering the liberals a relatively harmless
group for the time being.

While socialia and libel"tllism constituted most of the opposition to
the autocracy in Russia, the growing natianal consciousness of many of the
nan-Russian nationalities within the Russian ».tlpire increased the numbers of
the opponents of the tsa.risn.

Of the Pmpire' s population of

123 millions

at the turn of the cent'U1'71 c:m1y about 55 million were Russians and another

35 million were non-Russian Slavs. The rest of the population was canposed
of Baltic, Finn..Ugric, Caucasian, Turkic, and Mongol grou:ps.

2

Deeply in:f'lu•

enced by the thought of Pobedanostaev and the sl.a.vophile journalist, M. N.
Katkov, Nicholas was convinced that the surest way of holding the :&npire
together was to follow a policy of centralization and Russitication.

Both

national and religious minority groups were targets ot persecution. The
printing of the Ukrainian language was forbidden.
lated.

Finnish autonan)" was vio•

Conversions fran the Orthodox to the Catholic faith were £orbidden

and the children of' Orthodox and Catholic parents wre autcna.t:tcally consid·

ered as Orthodax.

The five million Jews in the Empire made up the most per•

secuted minority.

They were forbidden to settle beyond their pale in Poland

and we stern Russia.

Only a limited quota

ot them was admitted to Russian

schools and, on top of' everything, periodic pogrCI!ls were organized against
them.
Around the turn of the century 1 the minority groups in the Russian
Empire began to organize political parties in defense of their national

existence. Most of these national paj:'ties did not stand for secession. fran
the Russian Empire but for the establishment of cultural and territorial
autonany for national minorities, equal personal and political rights for the
members of national minorities, and sane of the more radical parties favored
the e stablisbment of a federal republic in Russia.

Among the most powerful

of the national parties were tbe Armenian Dashnakatsuntiun (Federation) and
Hncha.k (Clarion) parties, the Georgian Party of' Socialist-Federalists, end

the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party •

...
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Tha national parties by no means neglected social issues. Tl.te social
objectives of the f",.eorgian Party of

Socialist~ederalists

those of the Russian Sod.alist-Revolutiona.ries.

greatly resembled

The Ukrainian Revolutionary

Party fell apart in 1903 because it vas a coalitian. of sepa:ratists, anarchists,
Marxists, Populists, and liberals tmo could not agree on social issues.
Other national parties such as the General Jewish Workers' Union and the
Lettish Social-Democratic labor Party were concerned mainly with social
issues end used the language and culture ot their respective minorities as
vehicles ot propaganda.
'l!b.e weaknesses of the national parties lay in that they were primarily

movements of intellectuals having little support fran. the masses of the
national minorities 'Which were just beginning to acquire national consciousness. Also, there ws otten a great reluctance emcm.g the leaders to cooper•
ate with other national parties. As an extreme example of this, in 1903 the
separatists within the Ultrainian Peoples' Party declared all men to be brothers to the T.Jkrainian people except Muscovites, Poles, Jews, Magyars, and
Rumanians.

Each of the natiane.l parties was by itself too emall to be a real

threat to the tsarist government, but if they affiliated themselves to the
main revolutionaey parties in Russia they' could add considerable power to the
opponents of the autoeaacy.
As if' the autocracy did not have enough enemies, it added to the
of its opponents by the creation of government labor tmions.

nlmlber~

Tb.ese unions

vere instituted in st. Petersburg, Mosew, Kiev, Kh.arkov, and other cities
under the supervision of Sergei Zubatov 1 the head ot the r.bscow security
department.

The purpose of this "police socialism," as it was called by

critics, w.s to provide cooperative self-help to the workers, f'umish them

with recreation and opportunities for cultural wprovement, and divert the
workers' energies from strikes and other revolutionary activities by having
them participate in :religious and patriotic demonstrations.

The tmions were,

however, easily infiltrated by agents of radical parties and the entire movement only concentrated and organized the workers; making the task of the rev•
olutionarie s that much easier.
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War brought on a wave of revolutionary activity.

Ever since his tour to the Fer East in 1890•1891, the Tsar had

been fascinated by that part of the world.

Influenced by such advisers as

A. M. Bezobrazov, tbe Minister of Foreign Affairs, Admiral Alekseev, Plehve,
the Minister of the Interior, and Prince Ukhtcmski, a very articulate proponent of Russia 1 s Asiatic mission, Nicholas II followed a policy of expansion
1n the Far East.

China was forced to concede to Russia the lease of the

Liaotung Peninsula as well as the r1ght to extend the Trans..Siberian Railroad
through Manchuria to

shorten the route fran Chita to Vladivostok.. Tile Russian

authorities extended their privileges in Menehuria to policing the e.rea around
the

rJu~e

from Chits to Vladivostok, exploiting Manchurian mines and fur•

bearing animals, cutting wood in the forests of Northern Korea, end excluding
all foreigners except Russians from Manchuria.

Such an eldiension of Russian

power collided with Japan's interests on the Asian mainland and in February of
1904 Japan attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.
The population of Russia was for the most pert indifferent to a war

which was so far away, did not pranise
Russia's national existence.

a~

clear reward or seriously threaten

Though socialist parties condemned the war as a

capitalist venture, liberals expressed their support of the government against
a foreign enemy.

Eventually, hovever, the Japanese siege of Port Arthur and

other Russian defeats in Manchuria revealed the ineptitude of the tserist
govermuent and disgusted even its liberal supporters.
As news of Russian defeats catle frcrn the l!iist and the Russian government
mobilized the reserves, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats
increased their propaganda and e.gitation among all classes but especially 1n
the armed forces.

Soldiers, sailors, and especially resenists became the

special targets of socialist propaganda.

Leaflets vrere throvm at pass ...ng

soldiers and forbidden discussion circles were organized within military units
either by agents fl'CI11 outside the army 'Who formed contacts with the soldiers
or by D.Enrly r.:obilized reservists who were themselves members of socialist parties.

The soldiers wre told that the war was being fought to increase the

profits of Russia's capitalists, 'Who 1n the meant:tme 1 saddled the Russian
people with the burden

or

hardship, casualties, and taxes.

The Tsar was de•

clared to be the peoples' worst enemy and the soldiers were urgec to turn theil:
weapons against him and join the Russian people in their str<1ggle for a democratic republic and socialism. For the most part, however, the amy remained
loyal to the Tsar in
show.

1904 though signs of dissatisfaction were

beginning to

In Georgia sane reservists deserted and Joined the peasant guerrillas

who had been active since 1902. Near Moscow, the 7th Reserve Cavalry Regiment

displa.yed armed resiste.nce against their officers and other units Which had
been sent to pacify them. Most C!f the disciplinary problems for the time
being,

hov~ever,

consisted of refusals to obey orders rather than active re•

sieta.."lce to authority.
The liberals, entirely disgusted ,-1-th the Tsar's mis:.vmegement of the

v:ar, gradually withdrew their support fran the government.
autumn of'

In the ee.rly

1904 the leaders of the Union of Liberation, struve

and Miliukov,

attended a congress of socialist and national parties, held in Paris and
attended by delegates frau the Socialist Revolution.ary Party and Polish, Lettish, and Armdian national parties.

The liberals pledged their support of the

demands of the other revolutionary parties even as far as the overthrOW of
the autocracy, the establishment of a democratic republic, based an universal
suffrage, the right of aelfoodeteminatian and the removal of all diser:!mina•
tory restrictions agamst national minorities.
Idberal unrest also increased within Russia.

The

new Minister

of the

Interior, Sviatopolk-M!rski, wb.o had succeeded Count Plehve, recently assassinated by Socialist Revol.,utiaoaries, tried to a.ppease revolutionary f'eel:t.ng in
Russia by pranising administrative reforms, releasing a. few political priscmers,
and ignoring relatively harmless manifestations against the autocracy.

J.lovember and December of'

1904

In

the libera:;j took advantage of this "political

spring" to hold meetings of zemstvos and professional unions and political
banquets demanding a legislative assembly, freedm of speech, press, and
reli.gian., and autona:ay for naticmal minorities.
The end of

1904 was also marked by a growing wave of strikes. The most

serious of these 'Strikes broke out 1n the oil-fields
other industries in the area.

or

Be.ku and spread to the

The revolutionary parties urged the workers to

support the general strike and demand the eight-hOur day, a constituent assem•

bl7 1 end a democratic republic.

Though the workers ended the strike when the

work day was shortened, socialists held

the strike

up as an example of what

could be achieved through proletarian solidarity and the Baku strike did
foreshadow the general political strikes of 1905.
So it was that the

disorder.

~ar

1905 in Russia was ushered in amid 1ncreas1:ng

CHAPrER I
THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOW'.riOif
In contrast to the strikes and disorders 1n Baku, the situation in

st.

Petersburg toward the end of 190'+ was fairly calm. Although Zubatov' s government-sponsored unions had been dissolved in 1903 because of their infiltration
by radicals, "political socialism" was gi'fen another chance 1n 190ll.. The
Assembl\Y' of st. Petersburg Factory Workers was approved by the Minister of the
Interior, Plehve 1 and organized under the leadership of an ex-prison chaplain,
Father Georgii Gapon. Membership was confined to vormrs of Russian natian.e.lity and Christian faith.

The workers vere all.owed to organize group recreation

such as lectures, ccmcerts, and tea roans.

Besides creating mutual aid f'lmds

they could even discuss their material needs and publicly declare their real
grievances. Political 4iscussian, howeVer, as well as the right to mike
were not allowed by the government. The purpose of the Assembl\Y' ws to pre•
vent the contamination of the workers fran radical socialism by providing an
atmosphere of Russian patriotism and Orthodox piety.
Nevertheless, infiltration by radicals could not be completely prevented.
Furthermore 1 given the econ.cmic condition of the working class 1 docility could

not be expected from the workers. Even Father Gapon who maintained contact
with the police by sending reports and receiving directives and contributions

fran the prefect 1 Ivan Fullon, sympathized with the workers and gradually came
-21-

to see tb.e workers' need of the right to strike and the gra.d'Wll attainment of
self •government •

Trouble started when four members of the Assembly were dismiseed fran
the Putilov ironworks on December 27 1 1904.. When the managers of the factory
refused to recognize the right of the Assembly as a Union, the workers' dele•
gates demanded that the four difJllissed workers be restored to their positions,
the work day shortened to eight hours, and the pa:s- be raised to ane ruble per
day for men and seventy-five kopeks per day for women.

While these demands

,;ere bei:ng formulated, it was suggested that workers in other plants 1n St.
Petersburg support the Pu:lilov strike by' sta:pping vrork throughout t..he city,
thus creating a general strike.

Though the actual membership of the St:.

Petersburg Assembly of at. Petersburg Factory Workers was only 9 ,ooo 1 Father
Ge.pon and his lieutenants had the sympathy end support of another 100,000.

Withi:r.1. a week after the dismissal of the four workers the number of strikers
had reached 25,000, including 13,000 workers of the Putilov Enterprises.
January 6, 150 1 000 of

st. Petersburg's 175,000 workers wre on

By

strike thOugh

the operators of such utilities as steam, gas and electricity plants as well
as the streetcar drivers remained aloof fran the movement.

Mean,mile, Father Gapon proposed that the workers present their grievances before the Tsar.

The petition draw up on January 6 to be presented to

the Tsar on the coming Stmday, iucluded not only measures which would improve
the econanic vell•be:t.ng of the workers but demands of a political nature as
well.

Besides being asked to decree the eight hour day in Russia and recogn::l.zE

the workers' right to organize, the Tsar vas also petitioned to convoke a con•
stituent assembly, grant civil rights, separate Church and State, and end the
war.

It was decided to present these :petitions, signed by thousands of'

worker~,

by marching to the Winter Palace on the bank of the

!~eva

River in st • Peters•

burg, in a religious processioo attended by thousands of workers and their

families.

The date set for this fateful march ws &mday, January 9.

1

Meammile, the revolutionary opposition, includhlg the Bolsheviks, did

not approve of the spontaneous movement ot the workers of St. Petersburg.

It

is true thst the Bolsheviks saw the strike as an opporttmity to increase
proletarian solidarity and they spread numerous leaflets throughout the city

st. Petersburg Corrnittee of the Social-Democratic Party calling all

by the

1-10rkers to support and join the general strike. Furthermore, the workers
were urged to demand self-government and political liberty as well as economic

cancessicms for no benefits that the working class could obtain vould be safe
e.n.d permanent lmder an autocratic government.

2

It was partly due to tll..e in•

fluence of the Bolsheviks and other socialists who had infiltrated the Assembly

or

8t. Petersburg Factory Workers that political demands were included in the

petition to the Tsar. Yet there were man:y things about Father Gapon's movement
of which the Bola.'l-t.eviks did not approve.

A letter fran

s.

I. Gusev, a member

of' the st. Petersburg Committee, to Lenin, who was then in exile in Switzerland
and editing the Bolshevik paper, Vpead, (Forward) iB indicative ot the Bolshe-

vik attitude toward Father Capon's movement.

Ousev saw Father Gepon as a

bourgeois adven.turist or, at best, as a well-meaning id.ealist. He canplained
that the priest was dre:wing the masses away fr<:ll'l the Social..,Democratic revolu•
1

~ history of the Gaponist movement is well presented in Sidney Har•
eave's F~st Bl;9od: The Russ!9 &tyoJ.aY&on. ot 1905, (Nev York, McMillan Canpaey, 19 ) pp. 39JiOO, M:73.

?

-Akademia Iiauk SSSR, Revoliutsiia l2Q5•19Q7 M• v. Rosgii. DokHinent:r 1
yateria]J, Vol, I: Nacbp,lo Pepo1 Russko~ Hevol;iu;tsii. ;tanyari;l!rt 1995 gods
Moscow, Akademia Uauk, SSEI\ 1 1955.) p. 11,

and requested tl'J.St

:t..'lO"Ii'l~ment

t~Titten

condemning bourgeois edventurian and emphasizing that such aims as

the

creation of

a

rlo:re

brochures a:.1.d article3 ill

Vwrep, be

"!':ionary

democratic republic could only be achieved through revolu-

tion under the leadership of an independent proletari.an party.

Gu.sev

admitted~

however, that for the sslte of the reputation of the Social-Democratic Party
the Bolsheviks could not afford to stay aloof from a movement Which could
reach the proportions of a general strike or sauething even more grandiose. 3
As fer as the march itself was concerned, the BolSheviks considered all
attempts to petition the Tsar futile.

Either the masses wuld receive illusorj

pranise s which would serve onl.y to lead them astray fran the only method by
which the people could acquire their rights•-revolution•-or the crowds on
their way to the TSSJ:" would be met by violence on the pe.:t of the police and
the army.

On Saturday1 January 8 1 the at. Petersburg Cam:littee issued a

leaflet warning the people that to ask the 'l'sar to grant a constituent assembly based on tmiversal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, popular control

ot

the administration, the equalitY' of all before the law, civil rights such

as freeda:n of expression and association and the inviolability of the person
and his hcxne, 811ID.esty to politica.l prisoners, and the ending of the war was

to ask him to voltmtarily abolish the autocracy a.nd turn the privileged
classes out of power.

The people would receive only lies.

They were told

that they could only win liberty by their own efforts and not as a gift fran.
the Tsar,
!~ot to beg fran the Tsa.r 1 nor even to demand of him, nor to
lower ourselves before our swom enemy, but to cost him f'rorn. the
throne 1 and chase out the autocratic band with him•-mly in this way
is it :possible to win liberty.

3

Ibidt

pp. 8-10. Gusev to Lenin, January 51 1905.

The liberation of' the workers can anly be the achievement of
the workers themselves and you will receive your liberty neither from
priests nor tsars. On Sunday, before the Winter Palace, if they even
let you get that far, you will see that you can expect nothi.TJ.g fran
the !tsar. Then you will see that no outsider will bring you help,
but that only yoll yourselves can win liberty for yourselves.

4

Despite their efforts, the Bolsheviks could not prevent the march to
the t![inter Palace.

H~rever,

they could not afford to stay aloof from a sit-

u.!ltion 'tmich offered such opporttmities for agitation. A clash with. the police
was expected and the Bolsheviks as wll as other :revolutionaries joined the

procession to the Winter Palace with furled. red banners which were to be dis•
the police took action against the crowd and created a revolution

played

~rhen

mood.

Orators of ell revolutionary parties participated in the march, awit-

ing their chance to be&in anti-government agitation as soon as the crowd had

been attacked e:nd the people disillusioned in their father 1 the Tsar.

Sane

radicals such as the Socialist Revolutionaries hoped to start the revolution
right then and pJ.anned to break into nearby gunshops as soon as the fighting

started.5

The Bolsheviks, however, only planned to use any ensuing violence

es an opportunity for anti-tsarist agitation, probably because they considered

the masses still too disorganized to begin e serious revolution.
What happened on January 9 shocked even the Bola.l:tevi.'l(s 'Who had been ex•

pecting saneth:lng of the sort. The Tsar w.s not even in the Winter Palace that
day.

The Mi.uister of the Interior, Sviatopolk-Mirski, and the Prefect of st.

Petersburg, Fullon, had decided

Ol1

the eve of' the march to teach the crowds a

lesson and. had not informed the Tsar of their plans.

The crowd, marching in

processicm lrlth national flags, portra.its of the Tsar, and religious icons,
w s met on the S<ltU.U'e of' the Winter Palace by eight rifle volleys and a cavalry charge.

About the 88me thing happened 1n other parts of the cit;r such

as the Alexander Garden, the Neva Arch, and the Troitsld Bridge where llll8ller
processions, also headed f'or the Winter Palace, were met by

tl"O'~ps

and police.

By the end of' the da;r the authorities succeeded in dispersing most of the
people.

The only resistance was of'f'ered by a f'ew :revolutionaries, wottkers,

and students, who fired occasional revolver shots or made isolated attacks an
lone policemen\i.. Figures can.cerning the number o£ dead vary.

The government

admitted that 96 people were killed while sane Journalists claimed to have
obtained the names of' 4,6000 'Who had perished that d.ay. All that is certain
6
is that two policemen were killed.
It is true that the Tsar had not been
in

st. Petersburg that day

and was tminformed of' what his bureaucrals were

planning and thus cannot be held directly responsible f'or the tragedy.

But

who would believe him or accept this as an excuse? Many now ceased to believe
1n the benevolence of' the Tsar.

Previously the tm.educated masses ha.d held

the Bureaucracy responsible f'or all the abuses of the gowr.mnent, but after
peaceful workers end their families had been met by gunfire in front of' the
Tsar's palace, they now lost faith 1n him personally and lost all loyalty to
any part of' the government. Father Gapon best expressed the disillusionment
of the Russian people 1n the Tsar when he said 1 "We no longer have a Tsar.

river of blood divides the Tsar fran the people."7

~arcave, First
7

Blood, pp.

88-94.

Q.uoted in Lenin • s article in VRS?red, Jan. J.8, 1905 •

A

The bloody events of January 9 had v1n4icated the

Bolshevil~

position

that liberty could be won only by revolution and not by petitions, ao they
took full advantage of the peo,les' anger against the Tsar to call the workers
to arms.

The day after "Bloody Sunday" the Bolshevik

Bt• Petersburg Camnittee

and its district committees 1n the city issued several stirring leaflets de•

signed to fire up the emotions of the masses.

One leaflet coodemned the wil-

full murder of workers by the government and asked for money in support of the

mot"e!llent, not specif'y1ng exactly what the movement was.

8

Another called on.

all to turn the present mike into a general one in order to canbat the autocracy and capitalism. The workers were urged to draw nan-strikers 1nto the
movement, especially those operating utilities such as gas and electrical
plants, telephones, telegraphs, railroads, streetcars, stables, and mail trans•

port. All were urged to wreck the gas and electrical plants, cut telephone
and telegraph wires, and even tear up rails.

It was hoped that the destruc-

tion of these utilities would weaken the enemies of the people by disrupting
their com:m:m.ications and rendering them unable to shift troops to where they
9
wre needed.
Other leaflets directly called the people to a:rms.
that revolution was the

~method

They emphasized

by which the working class could improve

its eondt.tion and reminded them of what had happened to petitioning workers 1n
front of the Winter Palace.
You wnt to the Tsar to obtain your rights and be met you with
rifles and gmd'ire, blows by spears, and the sharp swords of his
"Cprichniks."
You begged for bread and work and he welcomed you with hot lead.

8
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Didn't we Social-Democrats tell you that you 'WOUld get not~ing fran the
blood-sucking Tsar? Didn't we tell you that he is not a friend but an
enemy of the people and doos not concern himself with the good of the
people but with the good of his mistresses and attendants.
The people were then called to action •
• • •Now gather around our red banner. Rise. Go dawn the streets
and see that wrk. is stopped everywhere--that all citizens, as one man
rise with arms in their hands against the Tsar and the government, band
leaflets to soldiers and ask that they not shoot at the pe":'ple.
Down with the Tsar 1
Down with the autocracy!
long live the constituent assembly!
Long live Social-Demoeracy!
10
T'ne ~r vms also a target of Bolshevik agitation. Officers were :remindec
of their tiuty +o defend the people with their l:f:"-es and were urged to turn the r
weapons against tlte peoples' enemies.

11

Other leaflets aimed at the ran..lt a.nd

file reminded the soldiers that they were the brothers of the veey peoJle they
had fired on and called on them to turn against the government.

One very

stirring leaflet read,
Soldiers! yesterday with your guns and rifles you killed hundreds
o:f' your brothers. They didn't send you against the Japanese, nor to
protect Port Arthur, but to kill unarmed vanen and children. Your of•
f'icers turned you into murderers. Soldiers! Who did you kill'l Those
who wnt to the Tsar to demand liberty and a better life••liberty and
a better life for themselves and f'or you, f'or your fathers and brothers,
for your wives and mothers. Sbeme and disgrace 1 You•...a.ra our brothers.
You need liberty and you shoot at us. Enougll Pull yourselves together
soldiers! You•-are our brothers. Kill those officers who order you
to shoot at us! Refuse to shoot at the people! Come over to our side 1
Iet us go in canradely ranks again.st your enemies. Give us your weapons!
Dow. with the murdering Tsar!
Down with the executianer-of'f1cers1
1
Dow. with the e.utocracylLong live liberty!
12
long live socialism!
10
ll
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Similar agitation was carried out by Bolsheviks Cormnittees in all the
other major cities in Russia.

A leaflet of the Moscow Bolsheviks declared

the autocratic government and capitalists to be worse enemies to the people
than the Japanese were and urged all to arm themaelvev and demand a constitu1

ent assembly, civil rights, and separation of church and state. 3 Bolshevik
organizations in Transcaucasia issued similar calls to arms in the hope of
reviving the rioting vhich hed occurred in Baku the past month and intensify1n.g the peasant guerrilla war in western Georgia.

In Geneva Lenin, his wife 1 Nad.ezhda K'rupskaia, and other Bolshevik

exiles including V. V. Vorovskiiwept with emotion when the news of "Bloody
Stmday" reached them.

They wept not only from sorrow but from Joy for they

expected a revolution would surely begin after such a bloody act had been
11

committed by the government.. ·

In the wek following "Blood.y Sunday" Lenin

wrote several articles defining the tasks of the Social-Democratic Party at
such an important time: to arm and organize the proletarian masses and to
obtain the support of the army.

On

Januttry 18 he wrote in

~,a,

that the

government had put the people in a revolutionary mood, but
••• I remains for the Social-Democrats to see to it that the news of
the bloody days 1n St. Petersburg is spread as wide as possible 1 to
rally and organize their forces still better. and to popularize still
more energetically the slogan they had long since advanced: the
general armed uprising of the people "l:;i

13

~. p.

237·
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Nadezhda Krupskaia, Reminiscences of Lenin, (Moscow Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1959) pp. 110-112.
1
5v .I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow, Foreign Langt.1ages Publishing
11ouae, 1962) Vol. VIII, p. 113 •

...__________________________

If there was to be a revolution the masses needed organization and leadership.
According to Lenin, the January 9 gathering of workers was a mob incapable of
revolution.
tics.

A proletarian pa.rty was needed to give the masses goals and tac-

It was the duty of the Social-Democratic Party as the vanguard of the

:proletariat to provide leadership in all aspects of revolutionary preparation.
Lenin condemned the r,1ensheviks for merely heightening the ardor of the workers

through agitation.
step.

To give the masses the desire to arm was merely the first

It was also the duty of the Social-Democrats to guide the proletariat

1n such technical aspects of the revolution as obtaining and distributing

arms, organizing revolutionary caubat units, and training the workers in the
use of weapons and. tb.e tactics of street fighting and partisan warfare.

16

In the meantime 1 the Bolsheviks in Russia sought to take advantage of

the mass discontent and disvrders which followed January 9.

Large mmbers of

vorl-.ers struck in almost every maJor center in Russia in protest f.ig&inst the
government's action on January 9.

Revolutionaries of all parties encouraged

them to include political demands such as a constituent asr·embly and civil
rights along with their economic dera.ands.

student£ not belonging to
soldiers.

~·

Professors ceased lecturing and

particular party agitated workers, peasants and

But the Bolsheviks considered strikes ar..d a restless tnood on the

part of the people to be only the first ate.p toward revolution.

The second

step we s to be the turning of the sympathy strikes occurring in Russia vith

no cODrdination or clear goal into a general all-Russian political strike which
was eventually to be a n.ationtride clash between the people and the government

and result in revolution.

To achieve this it ws necessary to urge the con-

tinuance of the sympathy strikes throughout Russia and to draw non-strikes

16
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into the mo'V""emen·l; by urging them to quit work in support of the St. Petersburg
::rtrike.

:E}I'.ren if such ag1ta.t ion did not 1mmed iate ly bring on a genera 1 strike,

it- wm:tld brinr'3 eb out separate strikes which

~rould

draw the working class

closer to revolution by providing them with political education, showing them

the necessity of political liberty as well as economic advancement, making it
clear to the working class that its real enemies were the government and the

bourgeoisie with whom there could be no canpromise, and teaching the workers
the

need of organization and proletarian solidarity.

Thus, the proletariat

vould become class conscious and politically educated throu.$ experience.

The

vrorkers ,-rould learn the necessity of revolution throu.'!h the violence they wou.l.C
meet on the part of the government and they would acquire class consciousness
by seeing that no strike or revolution could succeed without proletarian solid·
1

arity and organization. 7
The Bolsheviks were nat uniformly successful in a.ll regions of Russia.
during the first three months of 1905.
ing the str:Um movement.
fy unrest and violence.

In some regions they succeeded in wide •

In others they managed to incite strikes and intensi
In some areas they met with no success at all.

In st. Petersburg the Bolsheviks of the St. Petersburg Committee and

members of the Menshevik Socia.l...})ernocrat Group agreed to sign their leaflets
1n common in order to set en exemple of' solidarity to the workers and to avoid

confusing the masses with intra-party disputes.

The agreement did not last

beyond the middle of January but at least both f'actions were able to concentra e
their energies on agitating the masses. Frequent demonstrations ""'re held wit
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S.K. Khammatov, Kazanskaia Or&a.ni_zatsi_ia Bolshevikov v Godakh Pervoi
Ru!akoi R~oliutsii. (Kazan, Tatknigizdat, 1955) P• 33• F.P. Bystrikh,

t;'ahevistskie C}.r&,B;aizatsii Urala v Revoliutsii 1~5·1997 gg. Sverdlovsk,
rdlovskoe Knizhnoe Izdateistvo, 1959) pp. 75•T7.

workers marching ml.der red bunners with socialist slogans and Bolshevik .and
Menshevilt orators calling on workers to support the strike and demand political
rights as well as economic concessions. At the same time, the workers already
on strike were urged to continue their strike, to organize strike committees
to gather funds and enforce the strike, and fi.nell.y, the 't-TOrkers "trere m-ged to
gather arms and prepare themselves for the coming rising.
However, to turn a series of strikes into a revolution was a difficult
task despite the fact that Father Gapon's organiZation of the workers had
given them a foundation for class consciousness and solidarity and that "Blood;y
Sunday" had

put

the workers 1n an angry mood.

olutionary discipline among the workers.

There was still a laclt of rev-

By January 20 the Putilov workers

were beck on their jobs and a total of 50 ,ooo had drifted back to work on their
own in other plants. As far as political demands were concerned, it seems
that most workers were not aware of their meaning.

Workers shouted revolution·

ary slogans and adopted Social-Democratic resolutions to rise 1n arms under

the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party. Yet they also petitioned the
government for a gradu.ated income tax, cheap loans to workers, and the gradual
transfer of state lands to the people •

It is true that many were tm.aware of

tb.e difference between a revolutionaey resolution and a petition to the govern·
ment but this is not the only explanation of the Social-Democrats• failure to
instigate a general strike.

It must also be remembered that both the BolshevU s

and t-iensheviks were 1n competition with Socialist-Revolutionary, non-party, ana

anarchist agitators and therefore many of the wrkers remained uninfluenced by
Social-Democratic leadership and tmimpressed by the Social•Democratic program.
Furthermore, the great majority of the workers still sought only to improve

thetr econanic condition and ignored political issues. As lenin wrote in

A fighting spirit prevails everywhere but it could. hardly be said to
be in favor of the Social-Democratic line. Most of the workers stand
for a put'ely economic struggle and against s political one.
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There were also other obstacles facing the Bolshevilts in their efforts
to L"lcite a general strike and an armed uprising.

It was one thing to call

the proletariat to arms but sanething else to actually arm. it.

Rifles and

rev·olvers which could be smuggled into the country or stolen from gun shops
were rare.

Th.e Socialist-Revolutionaries made so..-ne bombs for the vorkers but

most were amed with cold steel such as daggers or home-made piltes and lances.
A revolution

could not succeed with such euipnent.

Furthermore, the police was not idle.

Apartments 'Which served ao .Bol-

shevik meeting-places were frequently raided and many leaflets stored there
-were destroyed.

By the end of' January many of the lead 1ng Bolsheviks in 8t.

Petersburg wre behind bars and the Bolshevik effort was further disorganized.
By the beginning of February the strike movement threatened to die out.

To add to the Bolsheviks' difficulties Tsar Nicholas formed a commission headec
by Senator Shidlovskii to investigate the causes of the disaster of January 9

as well as exami..."l.e the grievances of Russian factory workers.

In order to re-

deem some of the government's popularity among the lower class, this commissior
was to include representatives elected by the workers as well as by members of

the bureaucracy and factory managers.

The Bolshevik st. Petersburg Committee

would have liked to urge the workers to boycott the elections to the commissirn •

An article appearing in Vpered in mid-February expressed the general attitude

ot the Bolshevilts toward the commission.

It reminded the lrorkers of' thtir
..tll!'llf""'

l.Bx.enin, Collected Works, VIII. p. 115.

_........._

experience in dealing with the government on January 9.

The Shidlovslti Com-

mission was condemned as an attempt on the part of the government to muddle
the workers, deflecting them fram their revolutionaey purpose 1 and to appear
as a frtend anxious to improve their condition. The remedy to the worlmrs'
ills was declared to be not cooperation with the government but the reaort to
arms under Social-Democratic leadersh1:p. 19
Ho'!'lever 1 the Shid.lovskii Cooamission vas so popular among the m:..jority
of the vrorkers that the st. Petersburg Committee did not dare boycott the
elections to the cOlllllission lest it out itself' off from the masses. Reluctant
ly, the Bolsheviks decided to make use of the freedast of expression sllowd

during the campaign to carry out increased ant1 ...govel'l'lll18nt agitation.

Both

Bolsheviks and Mensheviks demanded that the deputies be given immunity from
arrest freedom of assembly and off the press be all.owed 1n discussing matters
concerning the Shidlovskii Commission.

It these demands wre not met, the

Social-Democrats threatened to expose the commission as a fraud and scuttle it
by quitting it.

The government, of course, would not meet all of these demand

and the Social-Democratic electors refused to choose deputies for the commis-

sion and called the workers to a general strike. Though only eighty of the
four h\mdred electors were Social-Democrats 1 enough of the Gaponist and non-

party electors joined them in quitting the ccxmnission to make it unworkable,
so the Tsar ordered the Sh.idlovskii C emission dissolved on February 20. The
Social-Democrats succeeded 1n scuttling this attempt by the govel."'rrment 1n
reconciling itself' with the working class, but even more important, the worker
themselves gained political experience from campa1gn1ns and electing their

re]?l>esentatives and the Shidlovskii Commission proved to be a precedent for
later workers• representative bodies such as trade unions and soviets.

20

The Tsar made yet another attempt to calm the revolutionary feeling in

Russia.

On Feb~ry

18 he issued a manifest promising the formation of a

commission including popularly trusted notables which
1n matters of reform and agislation.

was

to advise the

~sa.r

Bolshevik orators and pamphlets were

quick to point out that this commission in no way limited the autocrs..:y and
was meant only to deceive the worl{Srs.
not satisfy even the liberals.

The creation of the coorniasion did

Unrest increased after the nevs of the Russian

defeat at Mukden, the revolutionaey agitetion againat the Sb.idlovski1 Commission, and the campaign against the Februaey 18 manif'est and strike activit,- 1n

st. Petersburg increased temporarily. However, by the end of February most
of the workers had tired of strikes and polltical agitation.

Though sporadic

strikes continued, most of the plants in St. Petersburg were back in operation

by March.

21

In Moscov the Bolsheviks carried on activities similar to those of the

st. Petersburg Committee • Att.er January 9 the workers in the area were urged
to cease work in protest of the massacre of "Bloody

Stmda.,-,"

howver, the strike was nowhere near being a general one.
out of the 170 1 000 in the city stopped work.

By January 18,

On.ly 1!.3,000 workers

\fuen the strike was called the
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lyor Bolshevik leatlets, correspondence 1n Vemd, workers• demands,
strike statistics, police reports, and other documents regarding the st.
PetersbU'I!"g "Bloody &mda7" and the consequent disorder see Nachalo Pervo1
Russkei Revoliqtsii pp. 3-225. For the Mensheviks' activities and point of
view on this period see 5. Somov' "Iz istorii sotsialdemokra tiaheskgo Dvizheiia v Peterburge v 1905 godu, (Liahnie Vospomi.naniia)" Bxloe April & May 19< 7.
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,mrkers uere taken by surprise and did not even have their demands worked out.
v1:'1en the demands were finally formulated, they turned out to be generally of

an econcmic nature--eight-hour day, higher pay, better vorking conditions,
abolition of fines, and searches, half pay in case of sickness, the right of
elected delegates to present grievances to the management, and free housing
for tartars as well as Russians.

To combat this disregard for political issue

tbe Moscow Camnittee issued several leaflets on the necessity of political
liberty as well as economic improvement.

One leaflet explained to the workers

You have put forward demands for the eight hour work day, a raise
in wages, and others. But these demands cannot be satisfied by one
factory owner or even severl. 'l'hey would have to be promulgated through
out all Russia. at once--it means it is necessary to do this in the legislative sphere. And can a law good for workers be passed if the workers themselves cannot send their representatives into a legislative
body. It means that it is necessary that the workers have the right
to send their freely elected deputies into a popular government, celled
a parliament, where they would pass laws for the good of the workers.
After reminding the workers of how much they su:t.rered "Without the freedom of
expression and association and the right to strike 1 the leaflet reiterated
the necessity of a political struggle.
For a free struggle against the masters, to secure for themselves
civil and political rights, the freedom of assembly, association, the
right to strike 1 and the freedom of speech and the press9, the workers
must inevitably enter into a political struggle, a struggle to the death
vith the autocratic government • 22
'1'he Bolsheviks intensified their agitation when the February 18 manifest was

issued.

street orators end leaflets warned the workers that the manifest did

DOt in any

vay limit the autocracy or grant self-government but ves only a

deception on the part of the government to prolong the war and the misery of
the working class.
22

The provision in the manifest which allowed workars to

Ibid. pp. 279-281.

b

Jt

present their grievances to the Tsar ws especially ridiculed.

'!.>That l'ltld hap-

pened when the people tried to petition the 'raar on January 9?

If the Tsar

really wanted to hear his people 1 why w s there euch a heavy censorship in

the land?

The Tsar would not grant the people anything.

Only by taking up

a:r::ns and establishing a democratic republic could the workers obtain w'hat
they demanded. 2"":.> 'rhe agitation continued into t-tarch.

Bolshevik agitators

provided workers with ready printed resolutions to be adopted at meetings.

The

resolutions most frequently declared the governme:.1t to be void of' any popular
trust 1 affirmed that the workers would refrain from petitioning the govermnent
for anything, and proclaimed that the factories and land in the nation tlould
fall into the hands of' the toilers onl;y through the resort to arms mder the
leadershiP of the Social-Democratic Party and the establishment of a democratic
republic.

24

The proletariat was not the onl;y target of Bolshevik agitation.

All citizens were reminded that liberty could only' be won. through revolution.
from below and not commissions appointed from above.

All classes were warned

that no one could be neutral in the present revolution and all were called
25
to support the revolution under the slogan, "People to arms. "
'rhe Bolsheviks managed to keep the wrking class in ferment by distributing leaflets, spreading runors about clashes between workers and soldiers

1n other cities, establishing secret reading and discussion circles, and hold-

26

1Dg meetings and demonstrations among vrorkers when they could get away with it.
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However, there ws no rising.

The workers were still

main~

interested in

economic questions and readily returned to work when their demands were par•
tiall~r

satisfied.

From the Bolshevik point of view, the workers needed more

political education before there could be a revolution.
In the Transcaucasian region it did not take much effort to make the
workers violent.

In Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, crowds carrying red ben-

ners destroyed shops and houses, tore d.own telegraph wires, stopped trains,
and fired revolvers at troops and police.
Poti and Sukhum in western Georgia.

Similar disorders took place in

Such disorganized efforts, however, were

of little use in overthrowing a government.

Th e Bolsheviks attempted to pro-

vide the terrorists and the mobs that followed them with some leadership end
tactical advice.

The Tif'lis Committee 1 of 'Which Iosif Dzugashvili (Kebe or

Stalin) was a member, called on the rebels to accept the leadership of' the
Social-Democratic Party so that the Transcaucasian proletariat might be organized into a revolutionary force and coordinate its efforts with the proletaria
in the rest of' Russia in one general attack against the throne.

27 Leaflets

offering t..actical advice called on all the people not to attack troops in largE
crowds but to use every building and window as a place for ambush by small
units.

All were urged to use firearms, bombs, and even roc1ts 1 but to concen ...

trate their efforts on disrupting comunicstions and tating the initiative
against the troops. 28
In Baku, the violence of the December strikes had never real~ stopped,

but the Armenian and l.foslem oilers now turned their weapons against each other

27 Ibid. pp. 609-611.
28
Ibid •

pp.

6o8-609.

tur!1:in.g e1e city and the oilfield into a battlefield in which una:rned. Russian
~mrlcers

were killed as well as Armenians and Tartars.

The

Bolsheviks accused

the poHce of igniting the latent feud between the two netionalities and urged
botlt sides to join the Russian proletariat in their struggle against the autocracy.

It ws a futile attempt, however, as both the Armenians and Tartars

29
forgot about the autocracy and the revolution and went on figh.ti.ng e·ach other.
Throughout the rest of Russia ·the Bolsheviks similar:cy made the slogan
of a popular armed uprising their main tactical directive.

In Reval, Estonia,

the news of January 9 brought on two clashes between troops and worl..:ers in
which several people were killed but no reel threat of revolution developed.
In Riga the Bolsheviks cooperated with the Lettish Social-Democra·ts in orga:~.t

izing demonstrations with red banners and revolutionary slogans, one o±' the
demonstrations resulting in about a hundred casualties.

In Riga, however,

Bolshevik activity was overshadowed by that of the Lettish Social Democrats.
The Bolsheviks' biggest failure was probably in southern Russia.

In Ekaterino-

slav 1 (today Dniepropetrovsk) there were instances of rock throwing at troops
and threats against non ... strikers, but the strikes were generally of an economic

nature and political egitators were sometimes turned in to the police by the
workers themselves.
strike movement.

Tn the Don area there was nat much enthusiasm for the

Generally, the workers would suddenly leave their work and

gather to formulate their demands.
vithout even bothering to stop work.

Sanetimes they presented their demands
Tn Saratov the news of January 9 caused

Cl'OVds to gather and threnten public buildings, but the presence of troops
PI'Oved to be su.fficient to quiet the situation.
1-
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Ib,±2.. pp. 578-579 •

Both the Social-Democrats and

the Socialist Revolutionaries urged the workers to support the St. Petersburg
strike by starting a general strike in Saratov but they soon found that the
'\vorkers could not even read the demands which were drawn uP by their more
enlightened comp!!.lnions.

Clearq, the population was for the most part still

too backward to comprehend political issues, much less revolt against the
30
autocracy.
In January Poland was already in turmoil for the Poles bad long been

demanding the use of their language 1n the schools and local administration
along with civil equality for Cathollcs.

The news of' "Bloody Sunday" brought

ermed rebellion to Warsaw and Lodz but here the Bolsheviks had too much com-

petition fran the PoUsh Social•Democratic Party, the Social-Democratic Party
of Poland and Lithuania 1 and the General Jewish Workers' Union to have any
real control of the situation and their propaganda was ·therefore mainly confined to the Russian garrisons in Poland.
It had always been a basic tactical principle of the Bolsheviks that
they could not overthrow the autocre.cy without the support of the peasantry.
"The interests of the working class," wrote Lenin, "demand the most energetic
support of the peasant revolution--more than that: its leading role in the
peasant revolution."

31

In lurch of 1905, he reiterated his belief in the

necessity .of an alliance between the proletariat end the peasantry against the
autocracy and the landowning nobility in order to establish a democratic
republic.

32

As unrest increased in

30

the cities, the Bolsheviks attempted to
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incite a simultaneous revolution in the countryside.

In Georgia the Menshevil s

and Bolsheviks attempted to i..'ltensify the guerrilla war which was being carried on by the peasants since 1902.
ing

The

Georgian peasants demanded the

lover~

of rents on large estates, the abolition of payments due to the state

since 1C)61 to compensate the l.andowners for the serfs' personal freedom, loca
self-government, and the use of the Georgian language in local schools.

To

heighten the revolutionary spirit in the eountrys:.de, the Tiflis Committee
issued leaflets calling on the peasants to join the workers of Russia under
the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party to win freedom for all.

Aimlese

destruction of property, however, was discouraged since these estates and
goods would SOOleday revert to the people.

Instead the peasants were urged

and encouraged to organize their forces and maintain contact with the Tiflis
Committee in order to provide a good founB.ation for the revolutionary move":l3
ment •..J
The Baltic region was also a scene of peasant dissatisfaction.

Here,

about half the land was owned by German landowners who hired Lithuanian and
Latvian day laborers at extremely low wages and extracted large rents and
from the local peasants for the use of their pastures and wooded areas.

fee~:

Here

as in th.e rest of' the l!Dpire, the Bolsheviks urged the peasants to join the
proletariat 1n its struggle for a democratic republic and promised their sup ..
port of the peasants• demands for tb.e abolition of feudal dues, fees for the

uae of pastures and woods, and all existing taxes along with the restoration
ot the lands the peasants believed the:y should have received with their freeclam in 1861.

3

The Baltic peasants were better educated and more orderly than

3rlachalo Pervoi Revoliutsii, pp. 670-671.

rtoat peasants in the rest of the :&o.pire.

'r!J.ey annotmced th.ay wul.d cut wood

'"'ithout paying fees to the l.andO'W'.O.ers 1 ceased paying feudal dues 1 and peti -

tio:.1ed the government to legalize their actions.

Agricultural laborers went

on strike and mobs gathered to threaten non-strU:ers but there v.."Bs little
violence and no attempt at revolution.
There 'tro s plenty of vio lance in central Russia 1 e spec 1~ lly L"l the pro ..

vin.ces of Kursk 1 Orel 1 and Cllernigov, but Bolshevi: influence
shevi...~

'li78S

vreak.

Bol-

leaflets and worl..ers returning to their families from Odessa 1 Ekater-

inoslav, and the Donetz Basin did not succeed in spreading the Soeial-Democratic ideas among the peasants but did make them more violent.

Independent

agitators fired up the peasants by- spreading rtnors that the Tsar had given
the land to the peasants but needed their help in taking it from disobedient

landlords. Rumors of revolts in other provinces wre spread about and it
was even said that the army was returning from Manchuria to chase the land•
lords off the land.

As a result agricultural laborers ceased working, peasant

mobs stole grain and livestock from the landlords, and robbed and burned several estates.

The motive for these actions was not revolution but robbery-

and revenge since peasants often returned their loot and turned agitators
'Who spoke against the Tsar in to the police.

34

The Bolsheviks could not

organize the violent peasantry- into a revolutionary force because they lacked

the popularity that the Socialist-Revolutionaries bad in that aren. Furthermore, the general ignorance of the peasantry mede peasants more a.pt to believe rumors about the Tsar giving the peasants land than to study political
issues and revolutionary tactics.

Many of the peasants om1ed no land and ..

lacked the sense of responsibility required to
lnndowning system in Russia.

c:ia~

T?:.tey seemed to be more

the social str.J.Cture or
conc~rned

with robbing

the landlords of a few tl&terial goods than with actually siezing tr.Le land
themselves or organizi.."lg local sel:r-e;ove:rnment.

T:"le lack of troops in the

area beeau.se of the war in l\ianchuria served only to an.courage the peasants to

greater violence rather than to
35
tl1eir own local govern.rnent.

utake

them see their opportunity to organize

Looking at the general situation in the begi:rming of April, the Bolshe-

viks could see that in th.e first three months of 1905 there had been much

uarest and even violJ.mce, but not revolution.
i:ng.

The autocrac;r was still stand-

All the revolutionary parties together did not provide the people 'rl.th

a clear revolutionary strategy which would unite all in a struggle against

the autocracy. The Social-Democrats themselves were split by a factional
strife 'Which served only to confuse their adherents and dampen the revolutionary ardor of the proletariat.

'lh.ere was also much violence in the country·

side but no real revolutionary movement. Finally, the a:my was still loyal
to the Tsar.

If some remedy were nat found for each of these problems, the

revolution could not succeed.

-

35Ib1d. pp. 61J.6-650.
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CHAPTER II
THE "THmDtt PARTY CONGRESS: THE ORGA.."'iiZATIOH OF THE

BOLSHEVIKS AS A Plffirri A!1D THE DEF:DJr:fiON
OF THE:m REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS

T:'le fsilure to bring about a general armed u;prising duri.."lg the first
three nont:u1 of 1905 ;ros a bitter disapp:>intment to the Bolsheviks.

The

dissatisfaction and unrest necessary for a revolution were present but the
proletariat as well as the peasantry "Yms still more of a mob rather than an

organized revolutionary army and the Social ..Democratic Party ws now'h.ere near
being 1..."1 the positio..'"l of leadership as "vanguard of the proletariat."

The

party itself was split into two camps resulting in the disorganization of
party effort and the confusion of the masses it preached to.

Furthermore,

tactical questions had to be cleared up before any more progress towrd revol-

ution could be made.

Wh.o were the allies of the Social-Democrats and the

proletariat in the cooing struggle?

What 'rould. be the nature of a future

Provisional governmer.t end l1hat part were the Social-Democrats to play in it?
How were the Social-Democrats to organize the masses and :L1crease their revolutionary ardor and political consciousness.

Finally, there ~"fls also the

Deed for the technical preparation of the armed uprising.

t.Tithout a solu:t1.on

\o these problems there could be no democratic revolution, muc:1 less a social-

tat one •

-44-

The first proble!!!. ws the disunity of the Social-Democratic Party it-

self.

Since the Second Party Co:r.1.gress in 1903 the !-i!nsheviks obtained control

of' the Centra 1 Comittee.

Durin.g the same period Georgii

Plek.~anov 1

the

fol.Itliier of the Social-Democratic Party 1 tended to side "t-rith Julius Martov, the
Menshevik spokes:nan on the editorial staff of Iskra, thus undermining Lenin's

position in the party organ.

~lith

the Central COOlmittee and the party news-

paper under Menshevik control, the Social-Democratic Party did not. live u;p
to Lenin's expectations of what the "vanguard of tbe Proletariat" shou.ld be.
He feared the

!~nsheviks'

willingness to cooperate l-Tith the Liberals t-Tould

turn the party from a revolutionar;y proletarian organization into a tradeunionist and reformist socialist party of the western European type.

To carry

on a theoretical dispute in the party paper would not furnish the proletariat
with the leadership it needed but would only confuse and demoralize the masses
who

did not understand the f:lYJe points of the disputes within the party.

Rather, it \rould be better to break with the Mensheviks and the Central Committee altogether.

A completely separate party organization and newspaper

would enable Lenin end his followers to carry out their revolutionary program

without t·Senshevik interference and would enable them to clearly present the
Bolshevik message without having to confuse their readers with the opposite
message on the same page.

Lenin, therefore, was determined to make a clean

break with his I!lOst intransigent opponents even if they composed the majority

ot the partyo

By manipulating local committee elections he cou.ld arrange s

third Party congress dominated by the Bolsheviks.

Those wo supported the

decisions of his congress he would accept as party members while those who
'bo7eotted the congress or refused to sul:rnit to its rulings would be clearly
•PBrated from his organization.

Lenin did not mind being in the minority if

the follmrers he did have: "trere devoted to his ow.a plan of revolutionary action
It was extremely important to act quicldy i."l order to grab control of
the Social-Democratic organizations which
ious parts of Russia •

vlE're

then being fomed in the var-

In the urte summer of 1904 Leni."l convoked the famous

council of the "twenty two" somewhere in Switzerland.

The "twenty-two" who

are said to have attended included Lenin's wife 1 ii. KrupskB.ia 1
A.A. Bogdanov,

r,ra si.kov 1

A.v.

Lunacharskjj, lo1. Essen,

and R.s. Zemliachka.

v.v.

s.

I. Gusev 1

Vorovsldj, I-4. Liadov, P.A.

T'.uis gathering called for a new party congress

to give a Bolshevik interpretation to the decrees of the Second P a'ty Congress
As the meetings of this body continued, Lenin was granted funds for establishing a Bolshevik paper, VJ2Sred 1 as a rival to Iek:ra. The editorial board was
to include Lenin, A.V. Ll.mscharski).

v.v.

after, the Bureau of' the Committees of

I

Vorovskti, and D. Olminsk1j.

tr£~

Soon

Majority, including Gusev, Zem-

liachka, Bogdanov, Liadov 1 ant '-1.J.1. Litvinov, was set up ass Bols."l.evik substitute for the Central Committee and entrusted with the task of convoking
a third party congress.

The creation and membership of' the Bureau were

approved by the Southern Conference 1 which was supposed to represent three
of the Social-Democratic organizations in the Ukra:J.ne, the Caucasian Union,
which supposedly represented the Baku, Tifl1s 1 Batu:n, and Inmeretii•}.fingrelia
COUIIlittees, and the Northern Conference representing the st. Petersburg,
Moscov and Riga committees and other organizations in the north and industrial
center of Russia o

l

As will be seen, it is extremely doubtful whether these

~. Liadov Iz Zhi i Pa ii Nalmnunie i v Godi Pervoi Revol u:tsii.
(Vosponimannia) ( Sverdlovsk, Kommissia Universiteta I.M. Sverdlova, 192
PP.
Anna Pank:ratova, Pemta Rgsskaia Revoliu:lisiia, (Moscow,
~atelstvo Po1iticheskoi Literatury, 1951) pp. 85-90. Liadov claims that
vas present at the conference and names sane of the "twenty-two." Yet 1
!:alomon Schvmrz in his The Russian Rev.2l~Jon of 1905 1 pp. 257·260 1 doubts
t there was any such conference. The exact location and time of the

54-po.

conferences actually represented the conmittees they claimed to represent
and even more doubtful whether the mentioned committees themselves represented
the majority of the Social-Democrats in their respective areas.

The Caucasian

Union, for example 1 represented an area in which Menshevik influence was very
strong.
o~m

By fair means or foul, Lenin practically had his own party rlth its

paper and central committee in the form of the Bureau of the Committees

of t..lJ.e f.-i!!()ority by the end of

1904.

One can imagine what etf'ect the creation of the Bureau of tbe Committees

of the Majority bad on the organization and activity of the local party organizations in Russia.

The intra-party feud had been diSl;'Upting the party work

of the local committees during much of

1904.

As the split widened, the peak

of the confusion was reached during the critical period following January 9
when the Social-Democrats should have been devoting all their efforts to form
and organize a revolution.

A few examples should serve to illustrate one of

the reasons wb:'y they failed to fulfill their task at the time.
One area 1n which the intra-party feud deeply affected the local com-

mittees was the Ukraine.

In Ekaterinosl.av a Menshevik group had been carrying

on its own agitation and organization of the workers separately from the
Bolshevik-dominated local committee.

The Central Con:mittee of the party

continual:cy- urged the Bolsheviks to include the Menshevik grotq> in the local
conteeence are unknown. Furthermore, it is known that Vorovski, Lunacharski,
and Essen perhaps a few others could not have been in Switzerland at the
time. Perhaps Lenin alone wrote the "Declaration of the Twenty-Two" after
consulting Bogdanov and Ol'minski 1n order to present it as a demand of party
1101"kers 1n Russia, so that he would have a declaration formulated by a foraal conference wich would be a.pproved by committees 1n Russia. Or perhaps,
there really was a conference which was attended by only a few of the people
llentioned by Liadov. In any case, the beginning of the Bo lshevik party re•1ns shrouded i.'"l. mystery.

party organization.

Though the Bolsheviks at :t'irS't refused 1 they soon fomtd

themselves short of propaganda literature

fran the Central Committee and

-vrere forced to accept the Mensheviks as co-workers.

The

r<~enshevik

group 1

meanwhile, continued to slander the local committee 1 as 't.ras customary for

both factions 1 and eventually built up a large following among the workers 1
created or took over the great majority of the Marxist reading and discussion
circles in the city, and even managed to gain control of the local party press
thus canpletely throwing the Bolsheviks out of contact with the masses.
After Janua.ry 9 the Mensheviks became even more popular among the workers
when they proposed that a strike commission formed by the workers be headed
by an elected leadership wile the Bolsheviks had some presunably less demo-

cratic plan of o;rganization in mind.
inept to counter the popularity of the
from all support from the workers.

The Bolsheviks were too few and too
l~nsheviks

and were eventually cut off

Finding they could no longer operate under

such conditions, four of the five Bolshevik canmittee members dissolved the
camnittee and le:rt while the fifth member vas ou:t of town.

An agent of the

Central Committee soon came and. finding no cam:nittee in Ekaterinoslav, formed
a new one composed entirely of

I~nsheviks.

When the fifth Bolshevik member

returned he clamed his right to form the new committee as he was the last
member of the old one.

Instead 1 he was excluded from all cormnittee work for

being absent fran his party work and not returning within fifteen days after

be was called back to Ekaterinoslav.

Qaam1ttee but received no answer.

The

BolsheYik protested to the Central

In the meantime, he organized his ow

group of Bolsheviks and undertook a campaign against the mrw connittee.

'rhus, the workers in Ekaterinoslav were again faced ~.rith ttro bickering

.._______

·.:.

factions of the Social-Democratic Party. 2
A similar situation arose in Nikolaev, near the mouth of the Bug, when

a police raid around the middle of February, scattered the local oommittee.
A week later, an agent of the Central Committee n:rived and formed a new

connuittee composed of Mens.YJ.eviks. As in Elalterinoslav 1 a Bolshevik member
of the scattered con111ittee returned claiming his right to co-opt the new
members necessary for a new canmittee.
'tVSS

The agent fran the Central Committee

willing to arrive at some sort of canpranise

but was not willing to al

both himself and the Bolshevik to form a new committee together.

So, the

Bolshevik went on to form his ow organization and Uiltolaev 1 like Ekaterinoslav found itself nth tw feuding Social-Democratic organizations.

Here 1

again, the Menst.1viks enjoyed f'ar greater popula.rity among the workers because their orga.nization and program. seemed more democratic to the workers)
In Sarato•t 1 the M:mshevik-dominated committee sinned in a manner the

Bolsheviks considered abominable.

Tvro Mensheviks Joined a "united Camnittee"

·which was created by liberals in 19011. to carry on an anti-government propeganda campaign.

When the Bureau of the Committees of' the Majority called on

all local committees to elect delegates to the coming party congress, the
Saratov Mensheviks refused to comply.

In

!·~rch

1905 1

M. Liadov 1 who had been

sent to Saratov b7 the Bureau, held a general party meeting wbich elected a
representative to the party ccmgress.

That this irregular move ws made a-

gainst the will of the local committee is proved by the fact that even after
the lhird Congress the Menshevik committee refused to recognize the legality
2

'l'retii S'ezd RSOJ.Y:!f Apref-MaA 1292 ~a 1 Pjretokog, (Moscow, Institut
i•iarksisma•Leninisma, 1959 pp. 30-6§3, 69094.

3!21:.4..

pp.

694-697.

b

of the congress or to accept its decisions.

4

In Voronezh a group of Bolsheviks had obta i.."led the support of a member

of the Central Canmittee and declared the rival
in September of

1904.

~nsh.evik

committee dissolved

The r-tensheviks 1 however, can-ied the dispute to the

Party Council and finally' won back their status as a cormnittee 1n the spring

of 1905.

In the meantime 1 during the critical period of revolutionary un-

rest, party agitation and organization was severely disrupted.

In an area

where the Socialist Revolutionaries had a strong influence 1 the rivalry be•
tween the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks caused the Social-Democratic Party
to lose much of its respect and trust among the workers and made it unable to
take advantage of the strike movement and peasant unrest.5
Even the December strike in Baku was hampered by the dispute in the
party. As far back as the summer of

1904 sane of the Mensheviks

from the local committee and formed their

ers' Group."

broke off

own "Bal.akban and Bibi•Eibat Work•

While the strike movement ws reaching a peak in late 1904,

the quarrel between the two factions over the proper timing of the strike,
reduced its effectiveness.

The Bolsheviks' su;pport of the strike was reluc•

tent for they wanted to delay the strike till a general all..Caucasian or all•
Russian strike movement got under way.

0 nDecember 27 the Bolsheviks further

weakened the strike movement by issuing leaflets calling on the Baku workers
to return to work and save their strength for a greater struggle against

615-620.

capitalism in th.e near future.

6

The Kazan Committee composed of Bolsheviks and Mensl'"Leviks split over
the issue of' a party congress and even Lenin doubted the legality of counting
tile Kazan Bolsheviks' vote in favor of convoking a congress.7
The Riga Ccmmittee was a very small Social-Democratic organization and
had always had enough trouble coobatting Iettiah and Jewish nationalist
propaganda even without internal dissention.

T'.ae clashes between t>1orkers and

troops after January 9 brought about such a. degree of revolutionary ardor in
Riga that there might have been serious trouble in Riga had there been

sur-

ficient arms for an uprising.

hO\T•

ever,

l.1llS

The best the Social-Democrats could do,

to urge the workers to strike and organize a strike committee to

collect fands and enforce the strike.

Just at this crucial moment, an argu-

ment over the appointment of a Menshevik to the Riga Contuittee caused a split
1n the organization.

The Bolshevik-dominated camnittee dissolved the Menshe-

viks' organizations, which were carrying on agitation among the

11

intelligent-

sia," on the grounds that a separate organization for more highly educated
people was not needed.

The Mensheviks, however, continued their work, and,

:In the meantime, contacted the Central Canmittee.

As the strike movement

reached its pealt. between January 20 and 30, the local Bolshevik comrlittee
worked along with the Mensheviks rather than disrupt the entire movement.

But feuding seemed unavoidable. The strike caumittee became divided and
workers were puzzled and scandalized by the frequent arguments bet-ween the
6

pP.

Ibid. pp. Gl0-614. Solomon Schwarz, 'l'h.e Russian Revolution of 1905,
301-311.
1
Khammatov, Kezansmia Organizatsiia Bolsh.evikov, pp. 40-42.

Social-Democrats.

The Mensheviks captured the support of most of the workers

in the city, though, arter much exertion, the Bolsheviks managed to keep the

loyalty of the railroad vcm.kers. After e little while 1 the Mensheviks com•
pletel;y disassociated themselves from the Bolsheviks.

The letter remained

faced with the task of creating new organizations among factory workers,
renewing previous connections among the workers, organizing new discussions

end reading circles and creatin8 sub-committees to train new psrty workers
in the various districts of the city.

In other words 1 the Mensheviks had

completely wrecked the Bolshevik organization in Riga.

Not receiving party

literature from the Central Committee and being unable to communicate with
most of the proletariat in the city because of the lack of leaflets written
in Lettish, the Riga COI!Illittee remained a shadow organization supported by

some of the railroad workers and a few soldiers belonging to the local Russian
8

garrison.

Even the st. Petersburg Caamittee was not spared the strife between the
two factions.
Majority the

After the formation of the Bureau of the Committees of the
Mensheviki~

1n the capital struck back by campaigning among the

workers against the Bolsheviks. Apparently, the Mensheviks succeeded in
making their rivalr: very u.npopular.

Bolshevik prestige fell to such an extent

that workers frequently beat Bolshevik agitators and destroyed their leaflets.
TI1e Bolsheviks' prestige rose after January 9 because their views con-

cerning the march had been vindicated. For a few days even the Mensheviks
cooperated with them in a United Committee which carried on agitation and
issued leaflets jointly si(pled by Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.

8

Tret!i S"ezd, pp. 58l-6oo.

The friendship

did not last long, however.

Although Bolsheviks and Mensheviks occa$ionally

Inet and discussed party work, their loyalties remained with their own organizations.

Workers often demanded that both factions unite and stop their

arguing but it ws no use.

Even the Social-Democratic student Organization,

which h.ad been organized yea.rs before to recruit party members from among the
students, obtain funds for the party, and support the revolutionary movement
among students of' all parties, was also split b:y the party squabble.

When

the Bolsheviks supporting party centralism demanded that the student Organizetion, which included many non-party members, be headed by a member of the
Bolshevik-dominated committee, those sympathizing with the Mensheviks quit
and formed another organization.

Despite the efforts of conciliators to

unite the two factions in a "Executive Committee," the Menshevik-orientated
students declared that two thirds of' the original organization had quit and
demanded the treasury 1 press 1 and large library of' Marxist
given to the new Menshevik student orga.nization.

literature be

Thus, even in the imperial

capital the feud between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks weakened and disorganized
9
the party' s vork.
So, it is easy to see hov the deplorable condition of the Social-Democratic Party rendered it too weak to carry on its task of' organizing the
proletariat into a revolutionary army.

The Bolshevik Bureau's campaign to

obtain the necessary approvals of local committees for a third party congress
only worsened the situation by resulting in the formation of many pseudo-

CCIIIIIlittees and shadow organizations.

Yet Lenin thought it well "t-TOrth the

'temporary confusion to obtain freedom of action for himself and his followers.

!bat he was determined to be completely disassociated f'rom his opponents is

9

Ibid.

pp. 537-546.

s11ovn in a letter Lenin wrote to Gusev late in January of 1905 urging, "For
God • s sake ••• put through an unconditional split, a split 1 a split!"

10

Nor

did Leni:l let the possibility thnt he v."'u.ld end up L'"l c mL."1.ority deter hi:n

from creating his ow party.

In February he wrote to Gusev and Bogdanov,

But now 1 after the Bureau, after V:e,t!red 1 the split is a fact t

And when the split had become a fact that materially we were very much

-r;-reaker ••• The Mensheviks have more money, more literature, more
transportation facilities, more agents, more 11names 1 " and a. larger
staff of contributors ••• only after e long 'battle, and only vith
the aid of an excellent organization, can we tut"J:l o\n" moral strength
in.to materia 1 strength •••
11
As the year 1905 cO!Ilmenced 1

~nin

was already

dee~

in his canrpeign to

obtain enough support to make his congress at least seemingly legitimate.
The

~.tensheviks'

domination of the Party Council and the Central Committee

was the main obstacle to his :plans.

Lenin's article 1 "Time to End It 1 "

which a-ppeared in V!!!!red 1n early January, is a good summary of his position
regarding the upper circles of the pa.rty.
Central Committee

~re

Since the Party Council and the

obstructing the convocation of a congress against the

will of the majority of the committees, the Bureau of the Committees of the

Majority would take upon itself' the duty of' organizing the congress Which
would be held with or without the approvsl of the Centra 1 Committee.

Lenin

went on to declare that Iskra had lost the confidence of the party because

ot the lies it printed, and therefore 1 V;e.t!red w s now the major party organ. 12
'l'hroughou:t the first third of 1905 Lenin continued his abusive campaign
8 sa1nst

the Mensheviks, blaming them for the split in the part;r and condemning

10
Lenin, Polnoe Sobrannie Sochinenuii, XI, p. ll.
11
Lenin, Collected Works, VIII, p. 145.
12
Lenin, Collected Wox:ks 1 VIIIa pp. 35•39·

>

the Central CO!t'Jmittee and Party Council for their opposition to a party
congress.

In February of

sniled upon Iellin.

1905, Fortune, in the form of the Russian police,

Nine of the eleven members of the Central Com.'nittee were

arrested in Russia, while the remaining two, L.B. Y..rassin und A.L. Liubimov,

,;ere "conciliators" an...v.ious to repair the split 1...11 the party even if it meant
s'3tisfying Lenin's O.entands. 13

re::noved 1 it became a

lllUCh

\iiith the opposition of the Centra 1 Committee

simpler matter for the Burel<u to obtain

tm~

majority of votes by local committees calling for a party congress.

r...ecessar
By April

4, Lenin could triumphantly announce that with the consent of the Central
committee the support of tventy-four local camnittees, he had more than the
necessary majority of committee votes to convoke a congress.

14

To dispel any

doubts concerning the legality of the congress, the Mandate Cet.mnission which
had the duty of checking the delegates' credentials at the congress, obtained

a three-fourths majority of the votes by accepting the affirmative votes of

a few committees which were so recently formed that their full privileges
had not yet been confirmed.

l)

It must be remembered, however 1 that many of

these organizations were mere splinter committees. For example, the Kazan
end Nikolaev Committees were obviousl-Y not regularly formed committees, while

the real approval of the Sarstov Committee had never really been obtained.
At the same t:l!ne, some of the legitimate committees tr:.lch as those of

st.

13

Lec·lwrd Schapiro, The Cammtu1ist Party of the Soviet Uni.on.
1960.) p. 59.

(llev York, Random House,

JA.

The J.ocal committees which gave their approval were the st. Petersburg
Moscow, Northern, IHzhni NovgoroclJ" T\."er; Tula 1 Rtga, the Siberian league,
Voronezh, Saratov, Orel-Briensk 1 Kursk, Polesie, Snolensk, Northwestern,
~1k:oleev, the Ural League, Xhark.ov, SAmare, sru'I the four Couccs:tan Cocrnlttees.
le.Ollected Works, VIII. PP• 336•337 •
l 5Tretii S"ezd, p.

497.

Petersburg, Riga 1 Kharkov and some of the Caucasian committees did not enjoy

16

the support of the majority of the Social·Democrats in their respective areas.

The congress opened 1n London on April 12 (April 25 in Icndon) with

Lenin presiding.

The Central Committee and Party Council were represented

along with twnty of the local canmittees 1 all of 'Which had full deciding
votes.

A few committees commissioned men already in exile to represent them

in order to save the expense and risk of' traveling from Russia to .England and

so it turned ou:t that Lenin represented the Odessa Committee while Vorovskii
1
represented the Nikolaev Committee • 7
The first question to be considered was the declaration of the party's
attitude tow.rd an armed uprising.

Lenin submitted a resolution declaring

the proletariat to be the leading revolutionary force 1n the democratic revolution in Russia and that it could play its role in the revolution only if
tmited under the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party.

Therefore, it

was the task of the Social-Democratic Party to set up an apparatus 1n order
to provide the masses with information and leadership for a direct struggle
with the autocracy by means of' mass political strikes and general armed up•
risings. All party organizations, therefore, had the duty not only to pro•
vide the proletariat with class consciousness and a political ideology but
also to organize special groups to provide and distribute arms, devise a
detailed plan for the struggle against the autocracy, and to actually lead
the armed uprising.

18
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See Above 1 pp. 49-55.

17For a full list of' the delegates
aee Tret11 s"ezd, pp. 469-470.

and the organizations they represen-

l8
Lenin, Collected Works, VIII. P• 368.

After so.-·ne discussion on the exact timing of the uprising and the readiness
of the proletariat to rise, Lenin asserted that the events of the past fevr

months had

shom1

the proletariat to

t.~.S.ve a

sufficient degree of class and

political consciousness to be a revolutionarJ force though he admitted that
more ini'ormation from local party workers was needed on

proletariat.

the readiness of the

There bei.."'lg no serious objections, Lenin's resolution ws adop-

ted unanimously.

19

Regarding participation 1n government elections to such bodies as the

Shidlovskii Co::mnission or to the council Which w s to advise the Tsar in
matters of legislation, Lenin argued that there was no need to be so rigid in
political tactics.

By participating in such election campaigns, the Bolshe-

viks could take advantage of the freedom of expression offered by the govern•
ment on such occasions to consolidate the peoples' gains of new liberties
end expose the government's effort to disunite 1 deceive 1 and draw the workers

away fror.t their true interests.

Lenin emphasised that the party must act in

the open as \Jell as in the lm.dergrotmd, and therefore, should use every legal
means to develop class cansc iousne ss among the masses.

Should the field of

legal political action be left to the liberals, the bourgeois class would
strengthen its econanic and political dominetion over the masses and make the
working class an appendage of bourgeois democracy.

However 1 some Bolsheviks

found it hard to adjust to &$epping into open politics.

19

I<rasin, the repre-

Tretii S"ezd 1 P• 450-1J.51. N.V. Romanov, the delegate of the Northern
CCIIIIaittee 1 vanted an additional resolution on the timing of the uprising
Iince he considered the ~revolutionary enthusiasm in Russia at that time to
have fallen considerably since January and feared a premature uprising.
pP. 154-157. z,iost of the delegates supported L enin in his belief that the
Pl"'letariat <ms ready for an uprising at the time and Romenov' s resolution
•a ignored. Did anyone remember Romanov's warning in December?

::>en.tative of' the Central CoiTmlittee, proposed c: clause i'orbidding the party
to participate in government cor:nnissions and in actual elections, thus allowing Bolshevik :partici:fXltion only in the campeigns preceding the elections.

PL'I'ltllly,

H

20

resolution embodying Lenin's position, calling on the Scx:ial-

Democrats to

ta.~

tion., was passed.

advantage of every legal means of carrying on their agita21

One of the most noteworthy contributions of the Third Congress to the

Bolshevik tactical plan of revolution was the nev agrarian program.

program was not entirely new.

This

T'.o.e Bolsheviks had already realized for a long

time that in Russia, where the great majority of the population consisted of'
peasants, the relatively srtl8ll urban proletariat could hardly hope to overthrow the autocracy without help from the countryside.

Bolshevik leaflets had

long been declaring that the Social-Democratic party supported the peasa.nts
in their efforts to a .olish all feudal dues and rents, all existing taxes

and payments to the government ns compensation to the landlords for the loss

of their serfs, along W'ith the transfer of all Church, State 1 and "out off"
lands to the peasants.

isfactory.

This policy, as far as it went, was found to be unsat-

L"'l the first place 1 the acquisition of' merely the "cut off'tt lands

did not attract most peasants.

They wanted to sieze all the nobles' estates

ae well as the state, church and non.astery lands.

22

Another problem lied in

the Social-Dem.ocrata analysis of the social structure of rural Russia.

To the

Social-Democrats the peasantry did not represent a single class, but an exten20

Ibid. p. 174.
21
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Sbmygin, Bolshevikst§kie O£gan1zatsi1 Sreclpti Povolzhe, pp.

126-127.

sion of urban class differentiation into the rural areas.
<'l

Just as there was

proletariat opposed to a bourgeoisie vhich owed the means of production

in the cities, there

l-786

a rural proletariat composed of agricultural day

laborers who owned no land opposed to a rural bourgeoisie which owned the
means of' production 1n the rural areas••laJW and livestock.

Ccnsequently,

there was a fear among most Social-Democrats thnt by su;pporting the entire
revolutionary peasantry the;y would be surrendering the rural proletariat
tmder the tutelage of the peasant bourgeoisie. Finall;y1 a concrete tactical
directive uas needed to enable the peasants to overthrow the autocrac;r and
landed nobility.
During March and April of 1905 1 Lenin gave much thought to devising a
clear resolu:tion which would provide the congress vith a solution to these
problems. 23 Regarding the siezure of estates, Lenin quickly realized that the
old Social-Democrat:i.': slogans calling for the seizure of the "cut ott" lands
had failed to give the peaaantry a common atm to unity it as a revolutionary

force.

Overhearing a conversation of Father Gapon, who had arrived in Switzer

land soon atter "Bloody Stmday1 " with another emigre and became convinced
that the peasants wanted something f'ar more than the seizure of the state 1
church, and "cut off" lands. They wanted all the land, includ.ing the nobles'
24
estates.
He realized that only by supporting the most radical peasant
demands could the proletar:tat hope to obtain the su;pport of the peasantry in
a struggle for a democratic republic.

The peasantey might be backward and

politically tmeonscious, but if their main interest--the seizure of all the

2
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land--were at stake, they would be the most determined opponents of the
autocracy and feudal order..

Th.e:refore, Lenin ss·u· no objection in supporting

the peasant revolution in its most extreme form.

In April he wrote in Vpered,

We are in full sympathy with the peasant movement. We would
consider !t n trenen.dous gi'in both for t!w genercl socirll developuent
of Russia and for the Russian proletariat if the peasantry, with our
help 1 succeeded in. 'rreuti.'c.B fror;: the lnndlords

ill tbeir

lBnd.c by

revolutionary means. 25
Though the seizure of all the nobles' estates would mean the destruction
of the old feudal order and the advance of political democracy, the increase
of economic freedom would only enlarge the problem of capitalist oppression.
Though it was the duty of the Social-Democratic Party to support all revolutionary actions of the peasantry, lenin added that the rural proletariat must
be organized by the party in order to make it conscious of itself as a class

with interests antagonistic to those of the peasant bourgeoisie.

Once demo•

cracy had been wan, the urban and rural proletariat were to unite in a canmon
struggle against bourgeois societ;r.

Although for the time being the rural

proletariat was to participate in the democratic revolution in the cotmtry•
side, it was also to prepare itself to act together with the urban proletariat
1n the great social struggle in the near future.

26

Finally, as a tactical directive for a successful agrarian revolution
against the state and the nobility, Lenin insisted that the peasants create

tbeir own village committees which were to democratize rural society by
Hizing and distributing the land, grain, and livestock, and setting up

l"nolutionary self-administration.

In his draft of' the resolution to the

!hird Congress, I.en5.:n further recommended that the peasantry disrupt the

-
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autocratic government refusing to recognize its aathority, non-performance of
military service, and reilu.sal to pay all taxes.

27

Lenin's reoolution at the congress on the Social-Democratic attitude
to-ward the peasant revolutionary movement expressed these ideas on Social-

Democratic support of the peasant seizure of all state, church, and nobles'
estates, the organization of the rural proletariat 1 and the formation of
revolutionaey peasant camnittees.

28

Krasin did not like the idea of actually supporting the peasant bour•
geoisie and submitted a resolution stating that the party would not oppose
the peasant movement which went so far as to seize all the nobles' lands,

29

but Lenin's resolution was adopted without alteration.

Another tactical question facing the congress concerned the relation of
the Social-Democrats to other parties participating in the revolution.

Tl1.e

Mensheviks were the first group to be dealt with as Lenin already considered

them outside the party for all practical purposes.

In a short resolution of

one paragraph Ienin condemned the Mensheviks for putting mass spontaneity
above consciousness of the proletarian struggle a.nd thus relinquishing the
role of the Social-Democrats as the vanguard of the proletariat, disrupting

party discipline and organization, endangering the independence of the party
b7 close coopera.tion vith the liberal bourgeoisie 1 and den.yin.g the possibility
and desirability of the party playing the organizing role in an armed uprising
8!ld participating in a

future democratic provisional government. The resolu•

tton further called on all party me!!lbers to combat and expose the fa.lsity of
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:,1en&:1ev:tk doctrines and decreed that only those 1-rho subu.itted to party discipli.."le and recognized all the party congresses were party members.

determined l4ens.heviks would never

~recognize

Since

the legality of the Third Cvne;ress

this would a·tttomatically exclude them and their organizations from Lenin's
party. 30
liot all Bolshevilts vere prepared to write off the Mensheviks so quickly.

M.G. Tslt.b..akaia 1 o:J.e of th.e representatives of the Caucasian Union, denied

that the Mensheviks had become a separate party and declared that they were
still the Bolsheviks' comrades and that the party split could still be healed.
He further declared the Bolsheviks to be partially responsible for tl'l..e split
and condemned the formation of

6

personal cult around Lenin.

The Boisheviks

-were devoted to a revolutionary method and ideology and not to "Leninism."
Len:L'l might be one of the party's most able
infallible and would make mistakes.

31

~heoreticians

but he '-ISs not

Krasin, who was devoted to restoring

tmity 1n the Social-Democratic party, objected that the present period of
revolution was not a time to further divide the party but to Wlite it.
ever the Me::J.sheviks' energies were needed, it was nmr.

If

Besides, there were

so many different shades of belief among the Mensheviks themselves that it
was hard enough to define the group much less condemn it.

32 Romanov reminded

the delegates that Menshevik cooperation was necessary at the local level
and proposed a resolution condemning individuals rather than entire organizations vth.ose cooperation was needed.

31
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33 B.V. Avilov denied that the party split

,.,as very "tr.tde and pointed out that L'l his mr..t to\1'.!1; Kharkov, 1:!: the !Jkraine,
both factions distributed Islcr""a B:>.d Vpered and recognized the Central Cozar1it-

tee.

Therefm.~ 1

other co1:mittee s ohould be 'tvilling to nerge 'ltr.f.t::1 the H""nshe-

vilcs and guarantee them freedom of expression.

34

This idea 1 !J.cnrever 1 vre s too

much for even the "conciliators" and provoked an outburst of laughter.

But

though there '~s much opposition to Lenin's proposal to make a complete break
with tlte Iilensheviks, his opponents could not agree on a plan that would remedy
the

r.~nsheviks'

disruption of Bolshevik propaganda and organization.

quently 1 L:!nin's resolution vms finally :passed

't~ithout

Conse-

a dissenting vote. 35

The Bolsheviits' attitude toward other Social-Democratic :partias i.."l the
Russian

~pire

-was far more friendly.

Parties such as the U!ttish Social•

Democratic Labor Party, the Social-Democratic Illbor Party of Poland and
Lithusnia 1 the Armenian Social-Democratic labor Organization, end the General
Jewish Workers' Union were Marxist ]?Elrties which differed from the Russian
Social-Democratic U!lbor Party mainly in that they carried on. their propaganda
1n the la!lot"""!.Wge of the minorities among 'Which they worked and in that they

usually de:nanded autono."!lY within the Russian Empire for these national r1inorities. For instance 1 the Lettish Social-Democrats resembled the Bolsheviks
1n belief and action even more than the

Henshevil~s

temporarily fusing with the Bolsheviks in 1906.

did and proved this by

Believing that the interests

of the common struggle of a 11 the proletariat against the autocracy demanded

the eventusl unification of all :proletarian parties, the Bolsheviks looked
forward to t!J.ei:r a'bGOr:ption of the other parties.

Many, ~mrever 1 still

Z'emembered their disagreements with the Jewish \-lorkers' Union over autonomy

-
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i'or national groups within the Ru ssian Social-Democratic Party.

G.L.

S.hklovskii 1 representing the Minsk Group, warned that it would be wise to
readmit the Jewish Workers• Union into the party, not as an organizativn, but
as individual members.

As a further precaution to keep the principles of the

Bolsheviks free from the influence of possible erroneous beliefs of other
Social-Democratic Parties, all agreed that the Central Committee should cerefu.lly' oversee all forms of cooperation between such parties on 'bhe local level

Therefore, a resolution introduced by Vorovskii 1 proclaiming the necessity of
the eventual w.ity of' all proletarian parties, reaffirming the principle of
eentralian against federalism within the party as established by the Second

Party Congress, and instructing the Central Committee to supervise all forms
of cooperation between Social-Democratic parties on the local level was
quickly adopted. 36
The Socialist Revolutionary Party received special consideration be·

cause the Bolsheviks considered it not a socialist party but a radical liber•
al one.

Its program promising the distribution of all land in Russia so that

each family would have as much land as it could work without the use of hired
labor was condemned by the Bolsheviks as bourgeois vhile its non-Marxist hope
that democracy would immediately replace capitalism with socialie was derided by the Bolsheviks as utopian. At the congress, many delegates saw
great difficulty in vork.ing out a plan of cooperation with the Socialist
Revolutionaries. V.M. Obukhov, representing the Saratov COOJitittee, and
P.A. Dzha.paridze, a representatift of' the Caucasian Union, both came f'rom

regions where there was ample opportunity to observe the activities of' the
Socialist•Revol.ul#ionaries and cautioned the other delegates at the congress

-

36 Ibid. pp. 368-371.

that the Socialist-Revol\Itionary Party was overrated and far less active
than w s commonly thought.

Therefore 1 cooperation with it might actually

hinder the Social-Democrats' revolutionary effort rather than help it.
G.I. K:ramolnikov of the Saratov Committee added that there was such diveriity
of belief and tactics a.mong the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves that
they did not really constitute a party. Further complaints were raised that
since there 'Wfls no real Socialist-Revolutionary program or pat:ty discipline,
many of the Socialist-Revolutionaries were monarchists and reformists rather
than revolutionaries, thus making it impossible for the Social-Democrats to
cooperate with them. 37 Finally, the congress accepted a resol\Ition introduced by Lunacharskii and supported by Lenin.

Militant agreements betveen

Socialist Revolutionary and Social-Democratic organizations for the purpose
of combatting the autocracy were approved of provided that they did not
restrict the independence of the Social-Democratic Party or affect the purity
of its proletarian principles.

As in relations with all other parties, the

Central Committee was to supervise all forms of cooperation between the local Social-Democrat and Socialist-Revolutionary organizations.38
It was also considered necessary to peas a resolution on revol\Itionary
cooperation with the liberals.
however, was well-know.

Lenin's mistrust and hatred of the liberals,

Since the class interests of the bourgeoi£

demo-

crats were essentially anti-proletarian, Lenin believed they would eventually
turn against the proletariat as 'b.h.ey bad in other countries.

In the meantime

they were willing to ally themselves with the Social-Democrats 1n order to

-

~~-~--------------~

obtain the support of the

~rorking

autocracy--to use the wrlmrs to

class in. a com:.non struggle against the

'tt!n

freedom for themselves.

Lenin did not

object to strildng against the t::utocracy <trl.th any group that opposed it 1 but
he did object to entering into a formal agreement with any party.

T"ne Social•

Democratic Party could hope to attain victory only if it preoerved its bdependence and purity of ideology.

A formal alliance 'lrlth even radical bour-

geois democrats such as the Socialist Revolutionaries vould lead to a fusion
of trends and ideas which would result 1n chaos in the Social-Democratic
revolutiona,ry program and the confusion of the proletariat.

I!mr much more

then w s an alliance with the liberals to be feared. 39 One had only to look
at the Menshevik wing of the party to behold the inconsistency and waveri..11g
which resulted from dealing with the liberals.

Accusi.."!.g the l.fensheviks of'

clouding the class consciousness of the proletariat by cooperating with the
liberals 1 he wrote,
••• Considering themselves to be Social-Democrats and the true spokemaen
of the working class aspiration, these gentlemen do not understand, or
do not want to understand, that the \TOrk~-class movement will achieve
substantial results only if it is led by a vorking-class party, if the
proletariat is conscious of its class distinctions and realizes that
its true emancipation lies in its own hands and not in the hands of
the bourgeois democrats who are discrediting the actions of the worlt~~rs'
party. These 'strictly speaking' Scx:ial-Democrats, alleged r-mrxists,
ought to realize the demoralization they are bringing amo~ the working•
class masses by seeking to prove that certain 'democrats' (but not
Social-Democrats) 1 consisting exclusively of bourgeois intellectuals,
are called upon to show the workers the way to freedom and socialism. 40

le.in was determined that the Bolsheviks would not follow the Menshevik course

ot cooperation with the liberals.

-

Most of the other delegates felt that a resolution on the question of
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cooperation 'tdth the liberals ,;ras necessary.

A resolution submitted by

Voroovskii declared that the Social-Democrats

sr.~.ould

support the bourgeoisie

::L."l its opposition to the autocracy but also warned that tr.t.e Social-Democrats
must also show the workers the limited quality of the bourgeois movement and

the anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian character of all liberals, espec•

ially those of t..lte Union of Liberation, and must struggle to prevent the
bourgeois democrats from taking the leadership of the workers • moV\'!Illent or
any parrt of it i..TLto their hands.

V.I. Fridolin 1 a representative of the

Ural Union, supported the resolution by claiming there were various shades
of liberalisn besides the most radical, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and

that these lass radical liberals could joi.11 the struggle against the au:tocrecy.

41

Lenin had his doubts,

To 'Wldertake the question of cooperation with the liberals is
Our cause in. Russia has cane to a.n uprising, and under these
conditions such agreements are tmreliable. Even i f some groups of the
"Liberation" or liberal leaning students, which do not refuse to step
forward vihh weapons in their hands can be folmd, that does not conclude an agreement with Struve -~
u:u~.doo.

2

However, since the resolution contained the warning that the Social-Democrats
were obliged to expose the anti-proletarian nature of the liberal movement 1
Lenin disco11tinued h:ts opposition to it and it was passed u.naniraously.

T"ne reletion of the Social-Democrats to other parties in the revolution

wes an important tactical question, but it was necessary to look further ehea •
What would be the role of the Social-Democratic Party once the autocracy had
been overthrmm and the revolution accomplished?

Could the Social-Democratic

Party take part in a revolutionary provisional government l.-ri.th non-proleta.ria

~~etii
~2

s"eza,

Ibid. :p.

376.

375-377.

elements?

rJ!ost 31enslleviks

lfOu..lil

say not.

Tl1ough they 'l:rere villin.g enough to

enter into agreements ldth the bourgeoisie in order to strike together against

the autocracy, they were war.y of entering into a bourgeois government and
thus ceasing to be a revolutionary oppositional party, lapsing instead into
"reformismtl and "opportunisn" as head many socialist parties in western
Europe.

In a pamphlet entitled Two Dictatorships, A.s. I'-1artynov "rarned that

the Social-Democrats' participation in a democratic government and their consequent effort to establish oocialisra. would frighten all the anti-proletarian

elements into restoring the monarchy and expelling tr...e Social..Democrats from

:povrer.

On

the other hand, if the Social-Democrats participated in the

gove:rn.!llent 'trl.thout attempting to establish socialism, they would be guilty of'

"Jau:..--e sisn" i.e. "reformism."

Therefore, Martyn.ov advocated the boycott

and opposition to a :future provisional government.
Lenil1.

68'\r

the problem in another light.

lie retaliated by issuing a

pamphlet entitled §.oc,1,!31-Democracy a.nd the Revolutio.nary Provisional Govern~·

43

and an article, "the Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the

Proletariat and the Peasantry,"

44

desirability of seizing power.

in which he set forth his vie'tvS on the

In the first pl.ece, under Russian conditions,

there could be no truly democratic go,rernment with universal suffrage 1 the
arming of' the people 1 separation of church and state, economic reforms, civil

rights, and so on, without the participation of' the proleta.rist 1 the peasan-

tey, and the petty bourgeoisie in the provisional government. According to

Lenin, Martynov v78s confusing the democratic revolution with the socialist
~'eVolution.

43

44
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Tb.e present revolution was a democratic one and Social-Democrati

Lenin, Collected Works, VIII, pp. 277-292.
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participation in the destruction of' the last remnants of the auto.-:::racjl' and
feudnlim, the defence of the republic against

!~onarchist

reaction, the dis-

tribution of the land among the peasants, and the implenentation of such
economic reforms as the eatebl.ish!:1ent of the eight-hour day rlid not constitute
a soc:teliot revolution.

Lenin '-r.ls vague on

~-Then

and hmr socialism uould be

i.•!rglemented in Russia and expressed the hope thnt the irestern European proletariat would rise and come to the aid of the Social-Democrats.
it

v-C~s

Until t'.1en

best for the Social-Democrats t? concern themselves <t.rith the establish-

r.tent and

preserro.tior.~.

of a democratic republic.

In the Russian situation,

Socbl-Der.locratic participation in a. democratic government did not constitute
"Juaresiw." or a betrayal of the proletariat but the defence and consolidation
of political liberty which was the first step toward socialism.

The proletar-

ian party trould not sanction the abuses of power by the bourgeoisie but use
its ovn1 political power to eli.mi..'l'}.8te the bourgeoisie.

As for the possible

reaction C[1linst the proletarian party and democracy in general, it was probable that there

~rould

risks and struggles.

be

one, but then e revolution cannot be

The possibility

won without

of' a reaction made it all tr..e more nee-

essary for the proletariat to unite vith the :peasantry and petty bourgeoisie

to

defend the political liberty they had gained.

The main thing to rementber

vas that if the proletariat ws participating in a revolution, and even leading it, it must hope and expect to vin power or there l.<ras not much purpose in

the struggle.
In his speeches at the congress lenin restated his views on the participation of the Social-Democrats in a. pr0Visional goV"ernment.

He especially

ftreased the neeci of seizing power to combat reaction; "Even if' ~re did seize
St. Petersbtl:'g r.nd go..dllotine racholas, we would still have several Vendees to

......

deal with. "~5 Hov were the people to force the bourgeoisie to

cons~te the

revolution or rise against it if they renot.m.ced the state treasury and government power?

The Social-De!:tocrats would alwys keep the interests of tr..e pro ..

letariat 1n mind and remain a party of opposition to the bourgeoisie elements
in the government 1 but to Lenin the Iskra principle of "only from be lov and

never from above" ws an anarchist principle. 46

In the midst of revolution,

the proletariat could not afford to fear or shun victory and the power it
would bring.

The Martynovist fear of seizing power only sapped proletarian

energy:
At such a time Martynovism is not mere folly but a downright crime 1
tor it saps the revolutionary enerQ ot the proJArtariat and clips
the vings of revolutionaey enthusiaan.

47

Most of the delegates agreed with Lenin.

Krasin, however, warned that

though participation in a revolutionary provisional government was as a general principle desirable, the question of whether or not the Social ..Democrats
should participate 1n a revolutionary provisional government vould have to be
decided on the basis of such concrete conditions as the relative strength of
the bourgeoisie and proletariat in the government for certainl.3' the Social•
Democrats could not participate in a predominantly anti-proletarian govern•
ment. Furthermore 1 the party would have to exercise close supervision over
its representatives in the government to enSUl"e that they did not betray the
interests of' the proletariat or compromise the party' a independence.

Lenin

agreed with Kras:ln on these points and his resolution with Krasin.'s additions

~5l!?J4. vm,.
~6

P• 393.

Ibid. VIII. P• 393.

47 Ibtd. VIII. P• 395.

vas adopted as a statement of the party's objectives in the democratic revolu
42.
t 1on.
The resolution declared that the interests of the proletariat 1 namely
the final implementation of socialism, required the greatest possible amount
of political freedom which could be achieved only by tr.te replacement of the

autocracy by a democratic republic.
ll'8S

The creation of a democratic republic

possible only as a result of a victorious popular uprising, whose instru-

nent, the provisional revolutionary government could establish full liberty
of pre-election agitation and convoke the constituent assembly on the basis
of general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.

However, the resolution also

wrned t..lJ.at the democratic revolution would not weal".en but rather strengthen
the hegemony of the bourgeoisie which 1 at a favorable moment 1 would attempt
to seize most of the gains of the revolution from the proletariat.

Therefore

the Third Congress provided a blueprint for Social-Democratic participation
in a revolutionary government:

a) It is necessary to spread among the working class a concrete
representation of the most probable progress of the revolution and the
necessity of the appearance 1 at the right moment 1 of the provisional
revolutionary government of which the proletariat demands the realization of all the illlnediate political and economic demands of our program
(Minimum program);
b) Depending on the relation between forces and other factors
which cannot be determined ahead of time 1 participation in the provisional revolutionary party by plenipotentiaries of our party is permitted with the aim of ruthlessly struggling against all cotm.terrevolutionary attempts and all attempts to set aside the independent interests of the working class;
c) 'l'he strict control of the party over its plenipotentiaries
and unceasing protection of the independence of social-democracy
striving for the full socialist revolution and an irreconcileable emnit
to all bourgeois parties stand as the necessary conditions for such
participation;
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d) Regardless of whether t2le participation of the socialdemocracy will be possible or not 1 it is necessary to propagate among
the lvidest strata of the proletariat, the idea of the necessity of
constant pressure on the provisional government by the armed prole·
tariat, led by the Social-Democrats, with the intention of protecting,
strengthening, and videning the gains of the revolution.

49

'E1is, then, was the goal of the Bolsheviks in 1905--the establishment of a
democratic republic as a first swp toward socialisn.
Besides outlining the tactics to be used in the coming upheaval, the
Bolsheviks also organized themselves as a party though they still kept the
name oi' Social-Democrats to make the r.fens."levU:s appear as the secessionists.
Canmittees not recognizing the Third Congress were declared dissolved and a
new Bolshevik Central Committee was elected.

50

The organization of the party

contained elements of centralism as well as of local autonomy.

The defi.r."li·

tion of party membership which Lenin had failed to attin at the Second
was adopted.

Congre~

A party member was defined as one who allhered to the party

program, contributed to the party's support 1 and what

't.m s

very important to

the Bolsheviks, worked in one of the party's organizations.

The Central

Committee ws made the su:prer.te organ of authority having control of the party
paper so that the Pa.rty Council, Which used to be composed of members of the
Central Ccxm:1ittee and the party organ, was now needless.

The Central Com-

mittee also had the power of organizing new committees and co-opting members
for theo with the consent of the majority of the remaining members of the
committee. A two thirds vote in the Central Conmtittee could a lao dissolve a

49
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The new Central COIIIllittee included Lenin and Krasin who vrere left
~ from the :previous Central Committee as well as the new members, A.A.
~uanov,

D. s. Poatolovskii 1 and A. I. Rykov.

s

IJ

local committee i f two thirds of the lccal party ::nembers consented.

~"'i..?W.lly,

to end the wrangling which had plagued the previous central COTif!littee, the
unanimous vote of the remaining committee members was required to co-opt e
new member into the Centre 1 Camnittee.
Yet there were also signs of decentralizatio...'1.

Local committees were

granted considerable freedom i>'l printing their own literature as long as they
did not take it upon themsel-res to decide general party questions in their
publications. All organizations were guaranteed the inviolability of the
autonomy that was giwn to them when they were organized.

Subordinate organ-

izations were giwn the right to influence the local committees and receive
information regarding party business from them.

51 It was hoped by the Bol-

seevil'>:s that such decentralization would increase local initiative and that
some freedon within the party would appeal to the masses as had the Mensheviks seemingly more democratic organization.

Lenin wanted to go even f't.tl:"ther

and admit enough workers to ensble thea to outnmber the party intellectt¥lls

four to one.

He urged the creation of more party organizations and less

stringency in admitting workers. Finally, he ewn suggested the admission of
workers from the lower party circles into the local camnittees as a means of
political education.

Lenin saw the recent disorders in Russia as having

ahaken the foundations of the autocracy and believed that an exclusively
aecret and conspiratorial organization was no longer necessary, though he

bJ no means discarded the undergromd aspect of the party. In such a revoluttanary situation, l1.e considered it necessary to increase the memberahip of

the Pfirty both to give it more of the bulk it needed to carry out its task of

51
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organizing the proletariat to lead the revolution and to increaoo the revolutionary mood among '\vorkers by r.1akil1.g their membership in. · :w pvrty e means
of political education.

the

~fensllevik

Though in this case Lenin may have been approachL"'lg

position on mass participation in the party, !1e "tms not adopt-

ing their tendency to,rord party spontaneity for he probably still counted on

t:-,.e structure of tb.e party to keep the worlters tmder the tutelage of the
professional revolutionaries.

However, many agreed -o;rl.th

rr.v.

ROl.'llanov and

V.A. Desnitsldi when they warned that the autocracy ws still standing and

tr..at s:L'l'lCe the situation had not really changed, the party had better remain
pril'"aarily an underground organization for tb.e tiD::: being.

After considerable

debate, the project was shelved and the question of tlw number of \-lorkers and
the conditions under 't¥hich they could be admitted was left open.
On. April

52

Z7 (May 10 in London) the Third Party Congress closed.

o:f' the delegetes departed for Russia

~rhile

Lenin, Vorovskii, and a

f~v

Most

others

returned to Stvitzerl.and wi1.ere L nin continued to edit Vnsred, the na."":le of whic ll
was changed to Prolejta£Y in May.

Uith the conclusion of the Third Party Con-

gress, tlle ::-:>olsheviks vrere left organiZed as a separate party end in possess ..
ion of a clear plan. of action. for the caning revolution.

5''
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~III

BOLSHEVIK EFFmTS TO mGANlZE THE MASSES

During the spring and Sl.lrltiler of 1905, most of the Bolsheviks' efforts
-were directed toward inciting a gensral strike throughout the 12np1re. Though
by April revolutionary ardor and unrest had sanewhat decreased, no one had
forgotten January 9 and the situation vas far from peaceful. To revive the
revolutionAry spirit, all revolutionary parties, including the Bolsheviks,
took advantage of every occasion to incite political demonstrations and
strikes, hoping that these might grow into an all-Russian general strike.
The best occasions for creating tmrest were May Day, which in some Russian
cities was celebrated on April 18 to coincide with the first of May in western
Europe, July 91 which commemorated the passing of six months since "Bloody
Sunday," and any day on which news of defeat from the Far East or clashes
between workers and troops in other cities served to stir u;p the people.
Whether the agitation by revolutionary parties resulted in mere political
meetings or 1n actual violence depended on local conditions such as the amount
of tmrest among the workers and the measures taken by the police.
In st. Petersburg the situation was relativecy quiet.

The May Day

celebrations consisted of political meetings with revolutionary speeches but
not violence.

This does not mean, however 1 that the local Bolsheviks were

idle. A police raid on one of the party presses tm.covered a small store of

.......

rifles, revolvers, and daggers as well as a pamphlet, "on the Eve of the
struggle" calling on all vorkcrs to sieze such strategic points as administrative buildings, especial:cy the Ministry of Interior, police stations, and
banks as well as surrounding buildings by a surprise attack and urging them
to prepare themselves for the upris:f.rl..g by gathering bombs, dynamite, and
flammable materials.

Along with this store of equip:1ent which was apparently

Lntended for use on May Day about a hundred members--most:cy 1miversity students--of' the "Armed Uprising" group were arrested, thus disrupting acy plans
the Bolsheviks might have had for creating a major disturbance on May Day.

1

For the next t-wo months Bolshevik activity in St. Petersburg consisted
mainly in gathering crowds '\dth red flags around railroad stations and threa-

tening officers embarking recruits to Manchuria.

IBte in Jime, the Putilov

workers ceased work and were followed by the wag:on-'W'Orks and port workers.
However, the strike failed to achieve anything because workers in many plants,
especially those in the Sestroretskii armaments factory refused to join the
strike.

'.ro the Bolsheviks this provided another example of

Why political

freedom was necessary to improve the workers• economic condition.

A leaflet

issued by the lieva District Bolsheviks told the workers,
••• our enemies 1mderstood very well that as lang as the autocracy
exists '\<Te cannot organize ourselves into such a powrful and mighty
trade unions as our comrades abroad, and as long as we are not organized
we cannot successful:cy struggle against capitalisn for the betterment
of our economic condition and even if we do strike w will be unsuccessful. So that w can successful:cy struggle against capitalism we need
wide political liberty, i.e. the freedom to strike, associate, gather,
freedom of' speech and press, so that we may freely gather, discuss and
print our demands. But all these liberties, as it is well known, can
be guaranteed to us only by popular representatives chosen from all
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-uclasses of the people by general, equal, direct, and secret voting,
and passL.""Lg laws protecting t:1.e interests of the people as vrell as
seeing to it that they are protected. 2
Follovring this arguoent up in otber leaflets, the Bolsheviks, as well
as the Socialist Revolutiozwri.es and Gaponists, called on all workers to join
in a general strike on Ju.l.y 9 to commemorate the ISSsing of half a year since

"Bloody Sunday." Much of the Bolshevik agitation was aimed at the Putilov
workers, both because the motor works were such a large and important part of
the economy of the city and the nation and because they had already had experience in organizing themselves tmder Father Gapon.

The !<lsnsr.t.eviks expected

tlle Tsar to grant a constitutio.tl and vronted to ,.;sit till July 16 but they
finally gave in to the perstW sion of the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries and 'With their support about 6o 1 000 wrkers struck on July 9.

The

strike, of course, was nmfuere near being a general one, but as the stElmer
progressed the workers began to show their political a'\-rereness by increasingly
including demands for a constituent assembly, a peoples militia, labor reformsl
and free education for all among their economic demands. 3
In Russia • s other great industrial center. MoscovT, the Bolsheviks had

great difficulty 1n implanting a proletarian self-consciousness among the

workers who maintained their patriarchal relations and whose primary allegi&nee

was still to their clans.

Bolsh.evilt leaflets and orators constantly re-

lltnded the YOrkers trJBt 'trl.thout a general strike and a final uprisine against

'tbe autocracy, the socialist goal, the ownership of all factories and rail•
I'Oade by all the people could never be reached.

Only a frection of the workers

ltruck at any one time and these quickly returned to vrorlt when granted higher

......

2

lbi£.

3

I. pp. 287-288.

JP1d. I. pp. 253·309 •

wages.

In July the Moscow Cor.rnittee despaired of ac:i1ieving a general strike

in the near future and saw no point in one at the present time anyvay.

In a

letter to Lenin a member of the Committee pointed out that a general strike
by itself would not overthrow the autocracy but only partially paralyze it.
Only an armed u,prising could destroy the autocracy end due to the lack of
arms and the disorganization of the proleta,..iat, it would be unsuccessful at
present.

Therefore, the ~foscow Committee held that it ws better to save th4

workers' strength for the time when all Russia would rise against the Tsar
than to prematurely and uselessly waste the strength of the working class in

the central city of the Empire.

4

In most other industrial centers the Bolsheviks similarly failed to

organize a general strike but the increase in gatherings and.,demonstrations
did serve to make the workers more concerned with political affairs.

The

firing of the troops on a May Dey demonstration in Warsaw stimulated sympathy
strikes as far fiWSY as Baku.

In June, violence broke out in Revel, in Estonia

and Odessabut nothing substantial was achieved.

There vas heavy fighting a

Lodz and Warsaw, reaching the stage of pitched oattles among barricades but

the Bolsheviks pla;yed a very snall part in these uprisings which were mainly

the wo:t:k of the Polish Socialist parties.
Though there was no general all-Russian strike in the summer of 1905 1
the Bolshevik strongholds of the north-central industrial regions and the

Urals produced something much more significant--the seeds of revolutionary
•lf sovermnent.

-

Up until May, revolutionary agitation urging the workers to

Ol'PJ1ize and the workers' own tendency to organize during the strikes in early

4

Ibid. I, pp. 351·352.

190) had resulted, at best, in the creation of strike cozamittees which kept
a strike ftmd, formulated demands, and exerted pressure on the workero to ad•

here to the strike.

'r'ne f01'11lation of' a workers' council or sO"riet 1 however,

marked a departure from the regular strike committee in that a soviet signi•
fied the seizure of certain govel"'ll1lental po-wers by the 'trorkers.
Tbe newly-instituted soviets

arose

~m

previously existing strike com-

mittees and developed greduelly so that it is hard to determine just 'tidlEm a
striJ:..e committee actually became a soviet.

In the second l"J.Slf of May, the

wrkers in Nadezhdino, a small town on the western side of the Urals, went on
strike and elected a cotmcil of ten deputies to formulate their demands.

Once

bhe co'Wl.cil or soviet was formed 1 the workers and the deputies expelled the

politce from the plant where the workers held their I!leetings.

Admittedly,

this w-as a modest beginning, but the exclusion of the police from tr.e plant

did mean taking a part of the area out of' the jurisdiction of the local town
authority.

5

~"le

news of the soviet quickly spread to some of th.e nearby mines

and railroad stations and the institution was copied in these isolated places

on a small scale.

At about the same ttme 1

~rorkers

in Nizlmi Tagil 1 in the

Ural range seized control of the local theater, end elected deputies to a

aoviet, or as some celled it, a "comrades' court."

The soviet's regulations

8DD.Ounced 1

-

The Comradely Court, or Soviet, consists of workers' deP'..rties
and has the atm of protecting the legal and material interests of
the comrades, by maintaining a mo!"H influence and tmdertaking
6
to raise the class consciousness and initiative of fellow comrades.
J

5

Bystrif'~h,

6Ibid

-

Bolshevistkie 0 rmn1zetsi1 Ural.a 1 pp. 119-120.

- · p. 121.

In Ivanovo-Voznesensk, a textile factory center in the north-centra.l

industrial region, the Bolsheviks spent most of the spring urging the workers

oo

go on a general political strike.

Several economic strikes occurred in the

first half of May and the Bolsheviks continued to urge togetherness, class
solidarity, and organization among the vorkers.

By the middle of May over

50,000 textile, river-port, shoe-factory, and railroad workers had struck.
At a meeting held in the town square on May 14 about one hundred and fitty
deputies were elected to carry on negotiations with the government and to conduct the strike. This "Assembly of Deputies" maintained unity and discipline
among the vorkers by forbidding individuals to return to work and by asslJlling
the authority to bargain for all the workers coll.eetively.

To give the new

"Assembly of deputies" more proteetion and authority the organiZation of a
workers militia was begun. Due to the l.Bck of ams, this militia could not
even protect workers' meetings from Cossack attacks, much less undertake an
armed uprising, but it did give the wrkers a sense of unity and. power.
As the summer progressed, the institution of soviets or "assemblies"
spread to a few other towns.
1n Kostroma.

I'

In J~, an "Assembly of Deputies" was fotmded

It organized a workers' militia of 110 men 'Which occssional:cy

clashed lrith the police 1 organized a financial commission, and in general

\laS

recognized by the workers as an autonomous democratic authority.7 T'nere ws
l.lao a s1milar organization in Odessa at about the same time but for the most

»art,

the soviets remained isolated phenomena in the Ural and notth Russian

1Ddustr1a 1 centers for the remainder of the S\Jlmler of 1905 • IIowever 1 these
urq soviets did provide precedents for the larger soviets in the autumn and
A'-..

1

A.V • Piaskovskii, Rsvoliutsiia 19Q5-1901

-.v.811lia Uauk., SSSR.

1966) p. 91.

gg,

'

v Rossii 1 (Moscow,

II

winter months of 1905.

5

Besides directly appealing for an armed uprising, the BolshevU:s also
sought to unite all classes against the government in common opposition to
the wr being fought in Manchuria against Japan.

Leaflets and orators of all

socialist parties told the workers that the war was being fought by the lower
classes in the interests of the greedy Tsar, nobles, bureaucrats, and capital""

8Since the soviet or "Assemb:cy- of Deputies" was such a new institution
many Bolsheviks failed to see its significance or usefulness as an organ of
revolutionary government, thus leaving the initiative of creating the soviets
in late 1905 to the Mensheviks. For example 1 the tbscow Bolsheviks urged the
workers to elect deputies in August of 1905 to combine the demands of the
working class and for 1111tt181 support but as the workers in Ivanevo•Voznesensk,
but it seems they did not look upon the Ivanovo-Voznesensk organization as
the beginning of a revolutionary govemment. s. Schwartz, 'I'he Russian Revolution of l9Q5, p. 351. And little wonder! Sane of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk
Bolsheviks themselves did not think of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk "Assembly of
deputies" as much more than an oversized strike committee. Some of the local
party workers did express pride in what their agitation accomplished. An
unnamed correspondent wrote to lenin that the "Assembly of Deputies" enjoyed
immense authority among the workers as a provisional government and proudly
cla:L"lled that every detail of the recent events was due to the role of the
local Bolshevik organization. Revplipts1c?n,n.oe Dvizhennie v Rossii I, p. 468.
Miha 11 V. Frunze, a member of the Northem Cam:;tittee and later leader of the
red forces against Kolchak's forces in Siberia in 1919, took great pride in
the part the Bolsheviks had played in Ivanovo-Voznesensk in those days.
While it is true that Bolshevik party workers guided the election of deputies
and :printed leaflets for the "Assembly of Deputies," some Bolsheviks -were
remarkably indifferent to the "Assembly." Some Bolsheviks themselves became
deputies only because to refuse vroulii injure the reputation of the party and
because as deputies they could broaden their contacts and influence among the
workers. Hikhail Frunze himself expressed concerned that those Bolsheviks who
were elected deputies might not be able to fulfill their duties to the party.
~t the same time no Bolshevik was ever a chairman or a secretary of the
lasembly," this role being left to non-party individuals. Schwrz, ~
Bys1an Revolution of 1905, p. 136. Many of the workers do not seem to have
considered the "Assembly of Deputies" as much more tl'lt:ln a strike committee.
Ia letters concerning the Assembly, printed in Krasni Arkhiv 1935, #4, p.l)l-137.
~not indicate that the correspondents thought of the "Assembly" as a rev0
~ry gmrer:nment. Finally, when the strike was broken l.Bte in June 1
the lssembly of Deputies" dissolved and was not revived late in 1905 when
IOviets vere becoming widespread throughout Russia. Apparently both the
11Qrkers and the Bolshniks considered the need for the "Assembly of Deputies"
::.~nded with the strilte. The case of Ivanovo-Voznesensk indicates that
8 of wrkers' assemblies being organs of revolutioru:lry government had
._
,._·-J DlOdest beginnings.

I'
i .

I

ists.

Peasants were urged to evade militar.f service by refusing to report

to mobilization centers, vrorlrers in the munition plants and railroads were
urged to go on strike 1 end soldiers were urged to tur-.a. their weapons against
their worst enemy the Tsar.

Like the other socialists, the Bolsheviks wel-

cOOled the defeats at Port Arthur 1 l-fukden 1 and Tsusl1.ima because they

ser~.ried

to

show bhe corruption and inefficiency of the Tsarist bureaucracy and disgust
the people 'ldth the entire governnent. After th.e fall of Port Arthur, in the
last days of 1904 1 Lenin rejoiced in Vpered 1

T".ae war is not ended yet by f'ar 1 but every step towrds its continuation,
increases immeasurably the unrest and discontent of the Russian people,
brings nearer the hour of the new great 'mr 1 ·the var of the people
against the autocracy 1 the 't-tar of' the proletariat for liberty •0
·'

Ai'ter the destruction of the Russian fleet in the Straits of Tsushima, in llay
of' 1905 1 Lenin expected that all classes would be up in arms against the gov-

ernment.

He wrote in Vpered 1

E•rerythi.ng is up in arms against the government: the 't.ro1mded. nat ::tonal
pride of the great and petty bourgeoisie 1 the outraged pride of the
army, the bitter feeling over the loss of hundreds of thousands of
lbres in a senseless r:tilitary venture: the resentment against the
embezzlement of hundreds of' millions from the public funds, the fears
of financial collapse and a protracted economic crisis as o result of
the usr 1 the d,read of' a formidable people • s rising, whicr~ (in the opiniOl
of the bourgeoisie) the Tsar S:1ould have avoided by means of ti.JJ.tely
and "reason.able" concessions •••Now the autocracy is facing the end it
deserves. The war h.e.s laid bare all its sores, revealed its rotteness
to the core, its complete alienation from the people, and destr,oyed its
sole pillars of cesae:rian rule. The people have already passed sentence
on this government of brigands. The revolution vill execute the sentence.10

!bel'efore, it is easy to see <til:J.Y the Bolsheviks did not desire peace at any
Price as many socialists were demanding.

-

The longer the 'tmr continued, the

9
Lenin, Collected Works, VIII, p. 53.
10
Ibid. VIII. pp .. 483 1 485.

closer the revolution came. They encouraged desertion and rebellion 1n the

army to bring on more defeats and increase the disgust of the people with

the government. However, the last thing the Bolsheviks wanted was a peace
concluded by the '.rear which would leave the a.utocracy in power and release

the troops in the Far East for the suppression of domestic uprisings.

It

was essential that the people first overtbrov the Tsar and then conclude
peace through a constituent assembly. A leaflet of the Moscow Camttittee reminded readers of the ma.ny war deaths and the increase in the national debt
and taxes and eVtm. accused the government of prepartng another war in India

against Ch-eat Britain, Japan's ally.

~by

overthrowing the Tsarist gov-

ernment could the people avoid further bloodshed.

Onl.7 the Canstt.tuent Assembly will end the war and conclude peace with
Japan. On.l.y it will save us from excessive toil, only it: will declare
a democratic republic and give us liberty and rights, necessary to us
so that we can struggle against capitalian for our happiness 1 for
SOCia Usn •
12
In this "-~Y' the Bolsheviks held peace out as a bait for revolution.
In attempting to unite all the people, and especiall7 the prolstariat 1

against the autocracy, the Bolsheviks also sought to obtain the

s~rt

of

all the nationalities which had so long been oppressed by the tsarist policy
of Russif'ication.

On the local level ths Bolsheviks frequently cooperated

with proletarian national parties such as the Lettish Social-Democrats or
the Social-Democrats of Lithuania and Poland. The Baku. strike in December of

1904 -was marked

by cooperation between the Bolshevik Baku Camn1ttee, and the

Armenian Droslwk and Hnchak grou.pa participating in a tmited camn1ttee which

12asvoliuts1o:r:moe Dv1zhenn1e I, p. 311.

1
was to organize and sustain the strike • 3 When the Armenian-Tartar canf'Uct
broke out in the same town in early 1905, the Bolsheviks frantically strove
to prevent the tw sect ions of the proletariat from wiping each ather out.
However, violence spread throughout the Transcaueasian region and involved
not only Armenians and Tartars but also Georgians and Russians.

The Titlis

Conmittee accused the police of inciting these riots 1n order to maintain
its authority by the tactic of "divide and

rule."

One of the Committee's

pamphlets, ln"itten by Stalin, called on all nationalities to unite aga1nst
the Tsar.

These miserable slaft a of the miserable Tsar are trying to
foment a f'ratricidal war among us here 1n TUlia! They are demanding
your blood, they want to divide and rula over you! But be vtgilant
you Armenians, Tartars, Georgians, and Russians! Stretch out your
hands to one another 1 unite more closely 1 and to attempts by the
govermnent to divide 3f'OU 1 answer u.nan1mousl.y: Long live the fraternity of the peoplesl 14
I!owever, nationalistic riots spread not onl.7 to Tiflis end Erivan but even
to Kazan, were bed feeling arose between Russian and Tartar wrkers. A
leaflet of the Bolshevik Kazan Camnittee, written in the Tartar l.an.gt.tage 1
pleaded with the workers.

Victory vill only' be obtained by the workers when the workers of all
nationalities--Tartars, Russians, Jevs, Armenians, and others-stretch the 1r hands out to one another, as brothers, all fusing
into one close family •• .Always remember comrades Tartars your enen:cy'
is not the Russien people but the autocratic government •
15
Throughout 1905, the Bolsheviks strove to influence the non-Russian
masses.

stalin wrote leaflets for the TUlia Committee in Georgian.

~ti .s"ezd,

1

other

p. 612.

14
J.V. Stalin, Wgrks 1 (Foreign Isnguages Publlshing House, Moscow, 1954)

I, P• 83.
15

KhatmlL&tov~zgskai,!

Orp.ap.izatsU.a Bols¥vikov 1 p. 39.

3olsllevik Cau.easian committees 1rrote party literatl.l.1"e in Tartar and Armenian

as well as Russian.

In Kazan, :.Iussein Iamash.ev "harangued Tartar workers and

organized 1ilrxist discussion circles in the Tartar language.

16

Attempts were

E'ven made to spread revolutionary propaganda among the Mongolian Buriats in

oouth-central Siberia.

Leaflets were also written in Yiddish and Lettish,

though for the most part, Bolshevik influence in Poland and the Baltic area
"tas overshadcnred by the national Social-Democratic parties such as the General
Jewish Workers' Union, the Lettish Social-Democratic Party, the Social-Demo-

cratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, and the Polis.."l Socialist Party.

In

the Ukraine 1 the Bolsheviks neglected to produce party literature in the
Ukrainian language 1 leaving the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union, which was

an autonomous organization of Ukrainian Leninists, without canpetition in
this field while the Bolsheviks themselves concentrated on the urban prole-

tariat 1n the Ukraine which was mostly Russian.

There we s not, however 1 any agreement between th.e Bolsheviks and other
revolutionary parties on a national scale. The only attempt to reach some
sort of tactical agreement between most of the revolutionary organizations in
the &lpire turned out to be a failure.

After "Bloody Sunday" Father Gapon

fled from Russia to Switzerland where the emigre revolutionaries hailed him
as a hero.

Lenin himself' tried to convert the priest to Marxian and encou.rage

him to read the works of Plekhanov.

Soon, however, Lenin observed that thougL

Father Gepon 'tres indeed a revolutionary, he still lacked the materialistic
Tievpoint necessary to be a Marxist.

arrange

a.

16

Nevertheless, Father Ge:pan proceeded to

conference of revolutionary parties which -was to include the

!bid
· p.

47.

Socialist Revolutionaries, both factions of the Russian Social-Democratic
Party 1 and fifteen national sod.al-democretic and socialist revolutionary

organizations.

The conference was doomed even before it began.

The

:Marxist

socialists objected to the seating of the Fin.."1.is.l). Activists while no real
attempt had been made to even invite the Workers' Party of Finland.

The

Lettish Social-Democratic Party strongly objected to the participation of
the Lettish Social-Democratic League which it considered

organization.

to be a ficticious

The Mensheviks declined the invitation outright.

When it

became obvious that the Marxist parties would be outnunbered by the Socialist
Revolutionary groups, the Bolsheviks, Lettish Social-Democrats, the Jewish
~1orkers'

Union, and Armenian Social-Democratic labor Organization withdrew

from the conference. With the Marxist parties absent 1 the conference adopted
the Socialist Revolutionary program, including the seizure of land wose cul·
tiwtion ws based on the use of hired labor, independence for Poland and
Finland, Autonomy for the Caucasus, and a federalist government for the rest
of the 12llpire.

With the announcement of the conference's decisions, the

Bolsheviks and other Marxist organiza.tions disassociated themselves from the
conference and its program.

17 Hereafter the Bolsheviks vorlmd with other
1

parties onl\v in local situations, usually in organizing strikes and combat

detachments.
The Bolsheviks' relations with the l.te!lsheviks and liberals were even

less cordial.

Soon after the Bolsheviks' Third Party Congress, the !>Jenshevikf

closed a conference of their own at Geneva and, except for a resolution de ...
claring they would boycott a provisional government which contained bourgeois
l7Len1n 1 Collected Works, VIII, PP• 416-420.

e lenents m'ld a more democrdtic party organization, they largely agreed with
tl;.e llolshevik revolutionary program.

18

1'he Menshevik conference goaded Ieni.."'l. into writing

a11

entire pamphlet 1

:l:'m' Tactics of the Social-pemocracy in the Democratic Revolutioll,
entirely to the condemnation of the Mensheviks.

devoted

Le:n:tn•s main objection to

the Mens.l-teviks' Revolutionary program was their refusal to participate in a
revolutionary provisional government with the bourgeoisie.

In the psmphl.et

Lenin restated the decision of the Third Party Congress which affirmed

tl.~e

necessity of proletarian participation in the future provisional government

19

as wll as the arguments he himself presented to the congress on that point.

Lenin cl.a'bned that the establishment of a democratic government was not 1n

itself socialism but a first step toward socialim.

The full consur.nnntion. of

the democratic revolution, that is, the redistribution of land to the peasants
the establishment of a :fully democratic republic, a.nd the spark.ing of a revolution throughout the rest of Europe 1 could not be achieved by boycotting the

provisional government and thus

renoun,~ing

governmental po;<Ter 1 but only througl

the armed dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

20

Toward the end of the pamphlet Lenin re-emphasized that the :first step
toward soc:t.altam could not be taken without th.e armed dictatorship of the
proletariat and the peasantry.
T'.he actualiza.tion of the demands of the contemporary peasantry, the
complete defeat of the reaction, and the winning of the democratic
republic will be the full end of the revolutionary leanings of the

1.8Schapiro, Communist Party of the

§ov~t yP.ion 1 pp. 62-63.
T!J.e Rgasian R~rvylution of 1905 1 pp. 11-14, 22:229.

l9See above, pp. 68•70.
20
Lenin, Pol.noe Sobrannie Sochirunmt, XI, pp.

44-45.

s.

Schwarz,

bourgeoisie 1 even the l'Jetty 'bourgeoisie. It 'tfill be the begL11...'11ng
of the present struggle of the l):roletariat for socialism. The oore
complete the democratic upl:..eOV'al 1 the soone:r, wider, !:lore clearly,
and more decisively 'Will this new struggle develop. The slogan,
"democratic dictatorship" designates ti.1e historically li.VJ:ited c::wracter of the present revolution and the necessity of a ne11 struggle 1
on the basis of a new order 1 for the ftull liberation of the working
class fran all oppression and all exploitation.
21
Bath the pa.'n.:phlet and lenin's speeches at tll.e Third Party Congress re-

gar:'.! in.g t:1e provisional revolation.aey govenr'll<!llt

s...~ov

that he w s not dabbling

in. the "si:nultanious re"rolution" of the democratic and social kinds but held

tl:u! full consummation of the democratic revolution to be necessar.f before the

socialist re""rolution could be begun.

To Lenin the establishment of a , fully

denocratic republic did not constitute socialism, which is the ar.flwrsh1p of
all the means of' production--factories, ccmmunications, and land--by all the

people.

The former had to come before the latter, perhaps "rith the aid of a

revolutionary western European proletariat.

Therefore, the claims by sor1e

historia!ls vThich hold that at this time Leni..."1 formulated tr.Le tactics of si.11ul·

Besides condemning the t%:!nshevilta for their refusal to rmrticipate i..'1

a democratic provisional government, Leni..Yl. denounced them for emphaoizing the
possibility of revolutionary cooperation with the liberals rather ·than empha-

sizing the necessity of exposing the liberals' anti-revolutionary c].,gss inter-

eats to the proletariat. Lenin feared that Menshevik cooperation

~rith

the

Uberals would only lead them astray from the path of revolution, cause them

to dampen the revolutionary ardor of the people 1 and lead the !-fensheviks
tbeiaselves i..11to betraying the L11terests of the proletariat through the loss

21

-

Ibid. XI, pp. J20•l21.

'i:

of their independence of action

~1.d

Fi..Yl.ally ~ Ienin condem."'l.cd the

tl1ei.r absor:;.rtion in liberal :parlczncntor-

1~nshevil:

revolutionary p:t•ogra::-:1 as vague 1

o;;spccinlly bccauoo it diu :u<Yt exglicitl,y call i'or the cstablish'lent, of a re-

public and adnitted the possibility of participati.ng in an assembly \rlthin
a monarchist governr:Ient as a party of extreme opposition.

!Ie ridiculed this

vagueness i."l the f,ienshevil~ progra;n calline it "te.ctics as process" and accusi110 the Mensheviks of conf'using the wrkers by not givL."'lg them a clear goal

of a democratic republic.

As for participation in a tSZ:lrist re:presentative

as::a.nbly 1 lenin pointed out that an.,y promises the UenshevH:s could extroct
from tlle autocracy by parliamentary opposition

't-TOuld

be only lies since the

autocracy 'trould never consent to enlli..11g its mm existence.
only 'W8.Y :L"l 'tlhich truly representative government could be

Therc;for€, the
oc~lieved

only by

means of an amed uprising and the Mensheviks ·were only hindering the rev·.Jlutionar'iJ r:J.oVErt.'lent by not maldng this clear.

22

Lenin's condemnation of' the Liberals '\'SS even stronger.
Stl!mler 1

Trrrou.z;:1out the

his articles in Vp!!red and P:roletw attac!red the Libcraln as hypo-

crite s uho were willing to use the people to gain liberty for the:naelves but
not to establish a truly popular govern.nent.

The liberals were 'rilling enough

to end the outocra.cy but their class interests did not permit t"::em to destroy
the monarchy and

~"l.e

bureaucracy for fear that a people' a government would

deprive the bour~oisie of' its property.

To back this a:rgunent, Lenin

811alyzed the constitutional projects proposed by the Union of Liberation group

ot Uberals a.'Yld compared them vrith the goals of the Social-De1:1ocrats.

-

-

22

!Pi£.. xr, PP• 121-125.

The

liberals vislwd to retain the Tsar as a constitutional monarch vh.ile ·the Social-Democrats stood for a democratic republic.

The

liberals proposed a bi-

cameral legislature of which one house would be elected by indirect and w.equa
suffrage 'While the Social-Democrats demanded a unicameral legislature elected
on the basis of general, equal, direct, and. secret suffrage.

The liberal plan

provided :f'or a division and separation of powers which, by leaving only one
bouse to popular control, would leave only' one third of the power of the gov-

el"'!.lll1ent to the masses, 'While the Social-Democrats demanded that aU power pass

into the hands of the people with no checks, divisions

tor capitalists

and landowners.

of power, or privileges

'!'he liberals feared Jacob in centre.llan as a

threat to their property and desired not a populer revolution. but one of the

1848 variety. All the liberals wanted was to balance the monarchy vith the
power of the people.

They did not wish to destroy the monarchy but to use it

as a brake on the popular will by retaining the pollee and army for the pro-

tection of the bourgeoisie. 'l'b.ey tailed to giw the power of the state 1
undivided, into the hands of the people for they dared nat; give the prole-

tariat the freedom to struggle for socialian and thus abolish all class privil
23
eges and put all the means of production in the hands of the people.
This
argunent was put in outline form and widely' circulated as a leaflet entitled

Tbt'!!

£CJl.!Jiit~J.pp.s,

gr

±ht'!9

!'!l§t&s of

qove;ngez,

comparing the monarchist,
24
liberal and Social-Democratic plans for a future constitution for Russia.
Of' all he said about the bourgeoisie, Lenin most wanted the people to

remember was that :

23
Len1n 1 Collected Worl"..s, VIII, PP• 425-432 1 486-494 •

......

-

c:<+Ibid. VIII. PP• 557•559.

••• The bourgeoisie does not 1 and because of its class position cannot
want, revolution. It merely wants to strike a bargain vith the monarchy- agai:ast the revolutionary- people: It merely- wants to steal the
pm10r behind the people's back.

25

While lenin and ot..'her emic;:res conti:u.ued their polemics in Sw-itzerland,
the Bolsheviks in Russia had their r. 'UJ.ds
.
full combatting the political back;.r.:.rdness of the people a.'l'l.d the i.."lfluence of other parties. Due to its con-

spiratorial nature, it is impossible to accurately state th.e size of the Bol·
sllevik organization in Russia and very difficult to determi:o.e the strength of
tile Bolsheviks' influence relative to other parties.

In mid 1905 the member•

ship of all Social-Democrats nl%!lbered in the thousands but it is very doubtful
,,•hether it reached the ten thousands.

26

In gene1-al, it can be said. tn.at the

Bolsheviks' main strength lied in tlle central and northern industrial region.,
25

~. rx:,

pp .. 244-245 ..

2&.u. M:artov, P. Maslov, and A. Potresov, ( eds. ) Obshchestve;moe
Dvizheff:i& v Rossii v !iachale XX-go Veka, (Petersburg 1909) Vol. III, pp.
572·57 • J:.fartov gives figures Bh~vine the size of many Social-Democratic
organizations but these mt~st be understood as only approximate. For one thing
the conspiratorial natu:re of the party did not allow the kee:ping of an accurate roll. Furthermore 1 in those days there was no formal admission of an individual into the party. An individual who regularly S1l'J?ported and wrlted
fol' the party was considered a member. Consequently, Martov•s desi(;lation of
"organized workers" might vary from place to place depending on how a local
co."llllittee defined an "organizec workar s." IIowever 1 aartov' s report is accurat
in U.~signating the areas in which either the Bolal-J.eviks or the Ii:?nshevi?..s pre ...
dominated. According to ~rtov, some of the largest BolshevU:: organizations
~rere in r<bscow and St. Petersburg with several hundred organized workers each.
The Ivanovo-Voznesenak Committee '\-tas Gtt.PPOsed to have about 6oo 1 Uizhni Novgorod about 400, and Iaroslavl and Kbstroma 1 ea.ch with about 200 workers and
students. The largest Bolshevik cormnittee in the south seems to llave betm the
Odessa Committee with about 300 organized workers but 1n this region the Bolsheviks \-~ere in canpetition with such Mana'levik organizations as the Odessa
Group of about 700 wor1mrs 1 the Kiev 8anmittee with 500, the Poltava Conmit
with 400 1 the Kremenchug and Kharkov COlllllittees with 300 workers each, the
Elmterinoslav Con:rnittee 'tTith perhaps 1000 worlrers 1 and the Crimean Union which
in addition to worlmrs coun::ted several hund.red sailors in. its membership. At
the same time 1 the membership of the Mensheviks in the Caucasus numbered in
tlle several thousands. It appears, therefore, that the Bolsheviks• :name is in
itself' misleading and that they were actually the party minority in the Socia}

stretching fron the area surrounding Moscovr to tl't...e tfuite Sea in the north, and
t~1e

Ural region.

In Sl;. Petersburg, the Mensheviks' organization of t"ttelve m·,

thirteen htmdred irorkers and several htmdred students heavily outnumbered the
Bolshevik organization.

The same was true in most of industrial centers of

the Ukraine, southern Russia, and the Caucasus which were centers of
power.

r~1enshevik

In the Baltic area the Mensheviks were more powerful than the Bolshe-

viks but both organizations were much smaller than those of the Lettish Social
Democrats, the Jewish Workers' Union, and the Social-Democrats of Poland and
Lithuania •

In the Volga region the Bolsheviks might have been r:1ore powrful

than the Mensheviks but both groups were insignificant compared to the Socialist Revolutionaries' organizations in nlDbers i f not in organization.

In

Siberia the division between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks ws not yet clear.
The local cozmnittee vas the unit of organization arotmd which all the
party's activities in a given area were centered. Most of the local

committee~

consisted of five men, approved by the Central COlll'llittee. Usually a cha:irman
was elected from among the five and vas given the power of acting for the

entire committee i f for sane reason it was impossible for the committee to
meet as a vhole.

Each committee bad the responsibility of carrying on propa-

ganda and agitation among the masses by means of speeches at gatherings and
Democratic Party i f one considers the nl.lllber of members. Even Bolshevik
IOUrees corraberate Martov. The Protocols of the Third Party Congress reveal
the weakness of the Bolshevik organization in St. Petersburg. In the begin•
Bing of 1905, the St. Petersburg District which contained some 10 ,ooo workers
bad only 128 workers belonging to Bolshevik organizations. The Vyborg Dis ..
trict with 20,000 workers had onl:;y 129 in Bolshevik organizations. The City
district had only 325 workers organized in various Bolshevik propaganda circles. The Neva District Bolsheviks were even worse off with 150 or~ized
rkers and outnumbered by the Mensheviks by about three to one. ~
tzd, pp. 538-556. The Bolsheviks were somewhat stronger in l-k>scow where
; ; of their districts had as many as 300 organized workers. Kliueva 1
Go kovlk!e Bolshevik! vo Glave Vooruzhenom Vosstaniia v 1905 &rode 1 (Moscow 1
- audarstvennoe Izdate:rstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1955) p. 20.

demonstrations, the distribution of party literature, and the organization of
reading and discussion circles.

Also, it was considered no less important :for

each committee to print its ow literature, maintain contact with the Central
Co:nmittee 1 and prepare for an armed insurrection against the government by
organizing and arming canbat tmits.

To carry out these tasks, each committee

had special departments a :tached to it. Almost every committee had an attachec
technical department which handled the printing storing, and distribution of
local party literature. Almost invariably propaganda and agitation department s were also attached to the committee.

It was the business of the props-

gandists to hold lectures and preside over discussion circles while agitators
had the duty of serving as orators at msss meetings and demonstrations, explaining the party program to the crowds, exorting them to take some revolutionary action, and condemning rival parties.

Ccmmittee members themselves

took on the duties of organizers. This involved the organization of' new cir·
cles and the recruiting of new party members.

Often a financial department

vas also attached Wlder the authority of the eOIIll!littee to collect contribu-

tions and distribute the money for such party needs as printing, equipnent,
paper, the renting of apartments for printing and storing literature, and the
acquisition of weapons.

Special attention was given to spreading propaganda

among the youth because the young were potentially the most revolutionary
•ction of the population and could therefore be the soln"Ce of devoted and
a.rgetic party recruits.

The St. Petersburg Bolsheviks had a student society

M4e up mostly of students fran the university 1 while the Kazan and Saratov

lolab.eviks organized youth departments to spread Lenin's writings among the

JOung, especially the middle school students.

In regions 't-rhere the committee

•• too .... u to have a special student organization, individual porty members

~

~

•rould frequently hold discussions and spread literature among the youth on a
r:1ore L"1.forma l basis. Ia•M•

Sverdlov 1 one of the Bolshevik organizers who

operated in !Costroma 1 Iaroslavl, and Perm spent much of his time with students,
discussing l'·tlrxism and especially those vrorks of Lenin

27

to read.

~vhich

he gave them

Such informal gatherings often grew into large stu:lents organize ..

tiono.
In addition to the student organizations, the "periphery" consisted of

district committees and factory committees vhich were subordL"1.ated to the local committee.

The organization of the "periphery" depended on the size and

social structure of the industrial population in the surrounding area.

The

st. Petersburg Bolsheviks organized six district committees, each of which was
pased on e geographical section of the city and headed by a MllbEr ./1 the St.

Petersburg Committee.

The main City District ws even

subdistricts, each with its own committee.

subdivided into four

Finally each district committee

administered and supervised numerous plant and factory committees made up of
the employees 1n these enterprises, various reading and discussion circles,
and apartments full of leaflets, pamphlets, and books, which served as illegal

11brarie s of Marxist literature.

28

The r4::>scow Bolsheviks had a similar organ-

1zation of ten districts and a large suburban organization which eventually
bad to be converted into a committee in its ow. right.

other

Bolshevil~

organ-

izations were subidivded on an occupational rather than a geographical basis.
betimes a mixture of both types was used.

Sevastopol had a :Bolshevik city

collective and a port collective.

-

Gatherings and demonstrations vere an important part of the Party's

27

K.T. Sverdlova, Vospom1Daai1! I.M. Sverdlova. (Sverdlovsk, 1960), 86-~ •
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538-556.
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activity.

Bolshevik agents would often appear at factory workers• meetings to

persuade them to adopt political demands as well as econanic demands in their
ultimatums to the management. At various times 1 when the revolutionary

feel~

among the masses provided an opportl.mity, Bolshevik agitators gathered crowds
arol.md themselves and ba.rangued them on the necessity of political freedom,

a constituent assembly, ·.-he creation of workers' organizations, the need of a
general strike and amed uprising against the autocracy, and so on.

Besides

treating with these general topics. Bolshevik agitators were careful to deal
'With more immediate and local issues such as "Bloody Sundayfl and the Shidlovskii Camnission 1n st. Petersburg, the necessity of a railroad strike in Siber·
ia to end the war against Japan, the necessity of supporting the general strilo:!
in Ivanovo•Voznesensk 1 protests against police brutality, and so on.

Atter

the Third Congress, much time was spent by the agitators explaining the resolutions of the Congress to the masses and condemning the Mensheviks.

Invariabl.J

the meetings included the handing or sca.ttering of leaflets among the crowds.
For special occasions such as the first of May or July 9, large demonstrations
were planned ahead of time and special literature was prepared. All the

social~

ist parties would organize processions and meetings at which orators i'rom other
parties would appear to counteract each other's influence, otten resorting to
heckling and other forms of abuse.

Then the demonstrations would end with the

distribution of leaflets and the adoption of resolutions promising to work for
the overthrow of the autocaracy l.mder the leadership of the Social-Democratic
Party. All this would be done amid red barmers and the singing of revolution•

ary songs--or violence if the police and Cossacks attacked the meeting. Due
to police surveilence, meetings in many centers had to be held outside of town.
The Riga and Odessa Bolsheviks often held meetings 1n the nearby forests.

r4.F. Fru:nze, the future marshal of the Red Arm.y, held mass meetings ill thE

29
wods outside of Ivanovo-Voznesensk so that the first large soviet carried

on

of itc activities in a forest.

muc~.,_

I.M. Sverdlov v.a.o usually operated in

the upper and middle volga region, often held mass meetings in the fields near
the river and had boats and barges ready to support the agitators and the

crow to the opposite barJt of the Volga in case the police or the C..:>ssacks
showed up.

Not all agitators were as fortunate as Sveltdlov, however.

In

Jcme the C:6ssack.s made a severe attack on a forest meeting outside IvanovoVoznesensk.

Gatherings in other towns liks Kazan were frequently threatened

by the police or by the "Black Hundreds" which were bands of super-patriots
who organized relig!lous and patriotic manifestat1ons honoring the Tsar which

freqtf4ntly resulted 1n the beating and even murder of Jews, Armenians, revolutionaries and even stude:lts. Few local committees had the money to procure
arms to protect themselves.

Some 1 like the Kazan Committee 1 built u;p a snall

reserve of rifles and har&emade ba:nbs which served as a deterrent against 1ndiscrim1nate attac:.ts but did not make the Bolshevik organizations revolution•
ary threats.

30

By the end of

the 01.lmller of 1905 only the st. Petersburg and

Moscow Committees had made any progress toward organizing strong combat organ-

izations.

'J!be

st. Petersburg COOIIlittee's Technical Groups, headed

by S.I.

Gusev, had been organizing workers' combat detacl:mtents 1 distributing ams to
31
them, and manufacturing bombs since ear~ spring.
The Moscow Bolsheviks
did not begin organizing a revolutionaey combat organization until the SlmiDler,
but

soon, with the cooperation of other revolutionary parties, about forty
29

Revoli:u)s~

Dx&;benp.te, II. p. 435-443.
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·--; .. ~~..... Akilun and A. Makhovskii 1 Voennaif. 1 Boevata
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combat detachments vrere organized 1 of which half were composed of Bolsheviks.
At the head o:f this force ws a loosely organized coalition council composed
of Bolsheviks, Menshevilt.s, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and of organizations

of students, printers, and non-party revolutionaries. 32 H""rever 1 the Central
Camnittee soon realized that such isolated instances of success would not
provide sufficient force for an all-Russian revolution. Representatives of
the Central COOJmittee were sent to contact local organizations to aid them
in organizing the workers into eanbat detachments and in building laboratories

for the manufacture of explosives.

In the meantime, the Central Committee

soug..'lt to obtain arms from abroad. Firearms and ammunition were smuggled
into Russia from Austria but one of the main sources of arms was the ship,
John Grafton which smuggled arms into Russia fran Sweden.

IIowever 1 it w s

soon sent to the bottan of the Baltic Sea by the Russian rw.vy an£1 despite
the ef'eorts of Bolshevik "fishing" operations, to salva.ge some of the "tleapons,
most of a large cargo was

lost.

33

Despite feverish efforts and great risks

the Technical Department of the Central Camnittee could only fail in its

f

efforts to sufficiently arm the Bolshevik combat organizations all over the
lbpire and by the end of summer 1 few centers be sides st. Petersburg and

Moscow--perhaps Lugansk in the Don Basin and Sukhtrn in l-lestern Georgia-bad respectably' large and -well armed canbat organizations.

Finally, at the bottom of the party organiza.tion wre the equivalents
ot today's cells in the Comnnm.ist Party, the factory and plant committees and

'the propaganda reading and discussion circles.

-

The plant and factory co-mit-
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Kliueva, f,1oskovskie !?lsheviki pp. 20-21.
33
I
Akb.un, Voennaia 1 Boevaia Deiatelnost, pp. 23-24.
The Life and Death of Lenin, {New fork, Simon & Schuster, 1964) P• 86.

tees operated among the workers of a given nanui'acturi.ne enterprise at tlwir
place of employment and spread Social-Democratic slogans and programs by distributing literature, conversing, and encoura.ging or organizing gatherings
to discuss the workers• grievances or to strike.

Usually, the committee :wem•

bers would hold a speech before his fellmr vrorkers showing tllenl. tf!..e necessity
of obtaining political freedom to better their economic conditions.

Often a

ready printed resolution signifyi.ng the agreement of all to fight for a constitOCl'l.t

assem.b~

tmder the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party would

be passed arotm.d among the workers to be approved and adopted by them by ac-

cl.amation.

Though the resolutions meant little since many of the workers did

not ful.ly understand them, this method did serve to

make

workers more consciou:

of the main points of the Social-Democratic program and of their

OWll

political

interests.
T:.'1e small circles run by the party were a more intensive form of propa•
ganda and agitation.

T'.aey were classified as instruments of propaganda be-

cause they were designed to impart a Marxist outlook on life to its members
and to recrllit them either as full party members or cooperative sympathizers
•-what 'rould be known today as fellow-travelers.

The questions of the i.llllled-

tate situation and necessary courses of action 1n local affairs were, of

v.:."~

course 1 not 'Wholly left to agitation such as factory meetings and mass demo:n-

atrations.

!.?cal and immediate themes were discussed in the circles along

Y1th the main tenets of Marxism and Social-Democracy but the main function of

the circles vms to give the members a deeper tmderstanding of the Social».ocratic movement and obtain their support in one form or another.

Usl.lally

tbe Circles met in apartments rented by the party for that purpose but in
--.. 'Which were small en.ougl1 to be under strong police surveilance, circles

,

11

secretly i'Utletion.ea in tl1e nearby· forests.
depended on police efficiency.

The size of the circles also

The safe number of members in a circle viEls

six to t-welve people 1:.'1 most places.

There 1rere exceptions, hmrever.

Some

:[)ropagandists in St. Petersburg cra::nmed u;p to thirty..five people into an

apartment.

Often the same landloro vrould rent otlwr apartment a to circles of

other parties thus making the builc1i.ng a prime target for a police raid..
Often these apartments served not only as meeting p1aces for circles but as

libraries c:i.rculati.."''lg r,farxist and Social-Democratic literature.
Each circle ws run by a propagandist appointed by t 11C local party committee and sometimes another propagandist 1rould also be assigned to deliver a
lecture concerning a. subject in -vrhicl1 he vms consi{1ered an expert.

gram of th.e circle varied

~rith

The pro-

the education of the propagandist and the r.;en-

eral i.l"1tell:tgence of the members.

In some circles composed of semi-peasant

wrkers in the surrounding areas of a city, the propagandist -vroald merely

read a copy of V:pered or one of U!nL"l.' s earlier parnphleto aloud to the oth.er
members and comment on it or discuss the local situation vrith tb.em.

ITJ. other

circles the members meeely discussed the r.tlrxist literature they had read at

home and how this material applied to their own situation.

In L'Jrger urban

areas sucl1 as St. Petersbure, circles for the "i.."ltelligentsia" featu."':"e(1 a
aeries of lectures, each given by a specialist i..."l. that field 1 explaining the
history a."ld progt"8r.'l of the Social-Democratic Party, the i..."'levitability of
80Ciali~ ti:u-oue:1 the operation of i'mllutable social and econ011ic la,ro, and

the necessity of a proletarian party to liberate the -.;vorki.'lg class..

Some of

these circles practically served as courses 1n schools of l·ilrxism.

One circle

ln st. Petersburg presented a series of nine lectures.

The first consisted

ot a l-ilrxist interpretation of -world history, tracL"lg the war between the

exploiter and the exploited through the stages of ancient slavery, medieval
feudalism, and. modern c:apitalisn and explaining the inevitability of

socialism~

The second lecture was an analysis of the French Revolution and other western

European revolutions in the nineteenth cent'U17'.

1'h.e third lecture recounted

various worldn.g class movements in the West and :ln Russia. other lectures
dealt vith the basic principles of Marxism; Marx's surplus theoey and his
political economy; historical materislism; the Ertu:rt Program; the CCD!lunist
!oltlnU'esto. Finally, the progrem was concluded by' two lectures on the errors
of the nineteenth-century populist and anarchist revolutionaries and a
of the program and constitution of the Social-Democratic: Party,

s~~

ot those who

completed this course, any that wished could :progress to a higher circles

dealt with socio-econanic

ana~s

of the situation in Bussie, the revolution•

ary movement 1n Russia, revolutionary tactics, and the tactical errors of Men·

shevian.

34

Another circle, established toward the end of the year 1n the

same city, had a similar program with the addition of a lecture on the class
nature and anti-revolutionary leanings of the bourgeoisie.

35 A circle des"~" r1

especially for uni-versity students included a lecture on the role of the
"intelligentsia" in the revolutionary movement and its natural opposition to
the autocracy. 36 Circles in other towns adapted their lectures to fit local
conditions. A series of lectures in Perm, in the Urals, resembled the basic
courses given in St. Petersburg but also added lectures on the uselessness of

34Shaurov, 1:222 IR!•

PP• 9•13.
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Moscow, Akademia Nault, sam, 1955 Part I, pp.
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individual terrorism. as practiced by the Socialist-Revolutiona ... ies, the
mo~

hypocrisy of the liberals, the necesstty of supporting the peasant

and the methods by which a general strike could be begu:o. and turned into._
armed uprising.

37 To assure that Social-Democratic propaga::lda also reacbe4

the Tartars, some circles, such as these rtm by the teacher Gafur

Kula~

8

were conducted in the Tartar language. 3

One might ask just how effective or convincing these discussion aDd
lectu.-e circles lmre, or what actually led a person to become a Bolshevik.
The biographies of party leaders such as Lenin or Stalin are well known, but

the motivation of a party worker lo-wer down the party seale may also prove
to be of interest.

V. Shaurov's aceotmt of 'Why he Joined the party provides

us with an enlightening example. llo single event or piece of literature con·
verted him to Bolshevism.

It was a gradual process.

While he was a student

at the pol:ytec:P.nical institute of the University of st. Petersburg, his stud•
ies in the natural sciences, philosophy, history, and economy conv1..'1Ced him
that materialisn provided him with the only true view of the universe.
him Marxiem was the logical consequence of his materialism.

To

When he joined

a readi..""lg circles established by the Bolsheviks, h;Ss reading of Harx and

other materialists such as Herzen, Cherniashevs!r.ii and Pisarev along wtth
Social-Democratic literature confirmed him in his convictions and roused a
desire in him to take nn active pa.rt in the revoltttionory r:10vement.
he become a Bolshevik'?

He

Wli.y did

preferred the Bolsheviks' efficient and centralized

organization and their revolutionaey program. Above ell, he admired the
37n;ystrikh: Bolshevistskie Orgsnizatsii Urela, p. 111.

38 r~~mmatov,

I~zanskie

Organizatsia Bolshevikov, p. 62.

Bolsheviks' detemination to achieve victory. 39
The

Bolshevil{s concentrated their main efforts in the urban areas but

the cotmtryside was not ignored.

If the Bolsheviks expected to lead a succe se -

f'ul revolt agai."'lst the government, they could not afford to disregard the

rapidly intensifying movement 'Which might involve the bulk of the population
In the early part of 1905, the bulk of the peasant

of the Russt"'n Empire.

population, vith some notable exceptions 1n Georgia, south-central Russia,
and the Volga region, waited quietly for some cataclysnic event.

Rumors that

the Tsar had granted the land to the peasants or that he had quit abounded.
With the approach of smuner, however., the :peasants took more positive action.
The number of strikes among agricultural day-laborers increased.

In Poland,

White Russia, and the Kuban region, most of the peasantry ceased to pay rents,
taxes or fees for pasturing animals or cutting wood on the nobles' land.

In

the Volga region there was a nmber of cases of looting of large landowners'
I:n Georgia, peasants and amy deserters intensified

barns and even murder.
their guerrilla war.

I:n the Baltic area 1 peasants organized their own com-

mittees and militia tmits and a serious threat to the government's authority
would have developed had not the Baltic peasants ~en as ord.erl.y and self•

restrained as they -were.

The Bolsheviks sou..3h,t to organize such

revolutiona~

peasant com."llittees and militia organizations throughout Russia 1 to incite
.trikes among the agricultural proletariat 1 and to persuade the peasants to
boycott all GOvernment authority, especially by ceasing to pay taxes and W'ith•
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Shaurov, 12,02 god. pp. 12-14. Other interesting accounts of why a

=~aon would become a Bolshevik are conttined in Vladimir s. Woytinsky 1
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l'lolding
t::.~.e

r~cruits

fro:a the army.

It was not all tlwt easy, ho't.rev-er. First,

political co:nsciousnass of the peasantry r..ad to be raised L"l o::r·de:r to

give the violence of' the peasant movement direction tmra:rd a definite goal .. -

t::le overthrow of the autocracy.

Bola..nevik Committees iL Tve:r Poltava, Cherni-

gov, Ekaterinoslav, and Saratov, among others, sent some of their most trustworthy party n1embe:rs into the surrounding countryside to organize gatherings,
propose Social-Democratic resolutions to the peasantry, and distribute leaflets

The Ssratov Bolsheviks concentrated much of their :pDOpaganda on the village
teachers and the peasant youth.

Teachers converted to Bolshevism could be

even more useful than regular party agitators.
tened to attentively by the villagers.

They were :respected and lis-

Often the teachers

~rould

hold gatherines

in the village and speak against the Tsar and the landlords, re::ninding the

peasants of their poverty and impressing them with the need of a constituent
assembly.

Reading circles

~re

also established by the teachers 1."1 sane vtl-

lages and the literature circulated among the peasants -vrllo could read included

Marx's Communist Manifesto and The Class Struggles in France, 1848-18,20,
Ingels' The Peasant l-Iar in Germanx, and some of Lenin's earlier pa:nplllets such

as The Development of Capitalism in Russia and To, the Village Poor.

l~o

Itm-rever,

the Bolshevi:-;: effort to obtain the organized support of the pea sentry must, on

the whole, be considered a failure.

connections -vrith the

•• their own feult.

bJ

co~.mtryside

Compared

Due to their sma 11 mrnbers 1 Bolshevik

remai."'l.ed few and weak.

~Tit!1

Partly, however, it

the attention ;;;iven. to the

the Bolsheviks, the peasantry was ignored and neglected.

urbar~

workers

For example, of

170 leaflets iss:ted by the samara C~ittee in 1905, only ten -vrere addressed

-
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Shmygin, Ilol,.n'.:1evistkie Org?nizatsii Srednoi Povolzhe 1 pp. 80-83.
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directly and exclusively to the peasants despite the fact tlwt 1anw.ra lies in
the middle of one of Russias most important agricultural regions.
between revolutionary parties did not help the sitt.Wtion.
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Polemics

stalin's tour of

Georgian villages in the stllli!ler of 1?05 to combat the influence oi' his popular

Menshevik ri·.ml 1 Ra:mishvili 1 probably only conf'u.sed the peasantry.

Verbal

attacks on the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the agricultural areas vhere they
predominated did not serve to raise Bolshevik prestige.

At any rate, the pea-

sants :..till 1rere attached to the Tsar and hoped he would better their condition.

As evidence of the failure of the Bolsheviks' rural c8D'lpaign against

the Tsar 1 the peasants outside Hose ow occasionally sent petitions to the Tsar
asking him to grant a constituent assembly 1 local self gowl"Dlllent, equa 11ty

before the

la1-1 1

and the transfer of the land to those who tilled it.

42

IJ."he

peasants around i'ver asked approximately the sa• concessions and added the
very unrevolutianary petition for the alleviation of taxes.

4-:>
J

Even where the

peasants did organize in peasant unions as the Bolsheviks had urged, these
were most often dorainated by the Socialist Revolutionaries 'tinile the Bolsheviks

were left ltithout much of a following in the cotm.tryside.
It the Bolsheviks could not afford to lose the support of' the peasantry1

they could afford to lose the support of the army even less.

As it turned out 1

the entire course of the revolution depended on the atti'b.ude of the military
forces tmrerd the government and the revolutto:naries.

course, were not ignorant of this.

The Social-Democratic Party had been print•
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The Bolsheviks, of
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ing leaflets calling on the troops to turn agail'lst the Tsar since 1901.

In

the first few years of the twentieth century, Social-Democratic agitation in

the army consisted of handing out or throwing leaflets into barrack windows
or at soldiers at railroad stations.

With the caning of the Russo-Japanese

war, the Bolsheviks, like all other revolutionaries, intensified their work
among the troops.

Leaflets were issued by the Central Committee urging the

soldiers to go to prison or even be shot rather than face the horrors of the
war--the end would be the same anyhow.

44

Other leaflets reminded the soldiers

that the revolutionaries -were struggling against the autocracy 'Which was oppressing the workers, peasants, and soldiers alike.
were also adopted.

New methods of agitation

Bolsheviks organized anti-war demonstrations around mobil-

tzation centers where the conscripts were being gathered. Campaigns

~rere

launched in which parents of soldiers were urged to write to their sons imploring them not to shoot at revolting peasants and workers.

~anwhile 1

all along

the Trans-Siberian Railroad, workers attempted to fraternize 't>rith the soldiers
and even invited them to attend their gatherings.

However, the Bolsheviks

quickly realized that no revolutionary movement in conjunction lri.th the army
could be made without direct contact between the party and the military forces.

17 the end of 1904, Social-Democratic cells of both factions of the party began
to appear :ln the army and the navy. These 'tfere organized either by Social~rats who had been conscripted into the am;y or by soldiers themselves who
bad come in contact with party workers at street gatherings or casual eon.versa-

45
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llbol

Up through the summer of 1905 these organizations

44.
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t~re scattered and

lt~· Poleshchuk, "Revoliutsionnoe Dvizhennie v Armii v Sibirii"
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varied in their composition and complexity.
JGionary organizations 'Within the

ar.t~.ed

Some of the :nest complex revolu-

forces in

t~1e

3altic area.

In .,iihe

Higa garrison the .Bolshe-tiks and the Lettish Social-Democrats succeeded in

creating many cells among the soldiers and ooilors with a hiera:rc21y of coordinating cOllllllittees at the battalion and regimental levels.

In 19J5 1 the total

membership of this organization 'lll8Y have nurabered as high as doo men.

Similar

though analler organizations were built up at Ust DYinsk 1 on tae

bunlt

of tll.e Dvina, and Libau.

46

othel~

At the same time, a large ' 1So:Wiers 1 Union" was

organized among the garrison troops in Tit lis Georgia.
T"n.e work of the cells conoisted mainly in secretly holding conversations

on current events among the soldiers and distTibuting literatm-e supplied by

the nearby Bolshevik. Ccmmittee among them.

In some cases the cell members

would even dare to organize gatherings and hold revolutionary speeches within

the barracks.

The work of the cells, however, was neithel'" safe nor easy.

Officers restricted furloughs to prevent revolutionary
IIDOng

atu:re.

conta~ts,

planted agents

the troops, and frequently searched the barracks fOJ.• revolutionBry literArrests of cell members were frequent, as for instance, the entire

Bolshevik organization in the Twenty-First East Siberian Battalion, stationed

1n Moscow, was arrested.

47

Bolshevik and numerous other revolutionary organizations succeeded in
IPI'eading dissatisfaction and rebellion.

Disobedience of orders was frequent,

tiptcially in cases where the army was used to restore order in the tows and
ftllages.

In Lublin, Poland, for instance, a Paiish Social-Democrat organiza-
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~m..

tion headed by F .E. DzershL"lskii, the future head of the red secret :police,
succeeded in dissuad:L"'lg the garrison from marching agai..'tst tlle neighboring
peasantry to restore order.

However, real revolutionary actions i'iere

tmtil the last quarter of the year.

II:Dre

The only serious rising that m.trlmer

occurred in the Black Sea port of Sevastopol.

.Here some of the sailors organ-

ized the Social-Democratic Sevastopol rraval Central, which maintained contact

with the Sevastopol Social-Democrats and aimed at a genere.l rising in the fleet
and the town.

Frequent meetings

"t.~re

held aboard the naval vessels and on.

sJ:>..ore and dissatisfaction spread among the crews.

The Socialist-Revolutionariee

also opn-ated within the fleet and soon most of tba crews either belonged to
revolutionary organizations, or 1 more often, were merely disgu.sted with the
conditions of naval life.

The Bolsheviks themselves were planning to leed

tl

revolt sometime in the fall when more of the crews would be sonscientious revolutionaries and there -would be

!40X"e

chance of an aU-Russian uprising.

They

bad an es-pecially large organization on the Ekaterina II and expected to lead
the Blacl" Sea F1eet in spreading the revolution all along the coast.

However,

the spontaneous unrest among the mass of the crew took the control of e'rents
out of th.e hands of the Bolsheviks as was to happen so often in ·the coming

months.

In June of' 1905 1 a runor that the fleet ws to sa 11 to the ll'ar East

alal"'lled the crevs and increased the tension.

!Ievs of the 1\ussisn defeat in the

!aushi.loo Straits and a vorker's uprising in Odessa made the sailors even more

restless.

On June

14, tbe crew of the battleship, Kniaz ?otemkin Tavricheskii,

found their meat to be rotten.

When the officers attempted to

Refusing to eat it they started an uproar.
shoot at some of the mutineers, two Bolshevik

-bers or the crelr 1 G. Valm.lenchult and P. Mat iua'ltenko, started a scuffle which
laded ~N"ith the death of Vakulenchu..lt and three officers.

The c1-ew then raised

•J.OO•

the red flag and sigoalled the rest of the fleet to join them.

The crevs on

the other battleships vere not prepared to go that far, however, and the
Potgkin sailed out of Sevastopol and toward Odessa, where the uprising organized by the Social-Democrats had been going on for several days.

By the time

the Potemkin arrived in Odessa, most of the Bolshevik inslll'gents had been
arrested and for sane reason the MensheViks failed to contact tlle mutineers.
The battleship shelled the city for awhile, hit nothing 1n part1eular 1 and
after Vakulench.uk was bUl'ied aehore, it sailed off to Rumania where it was
interned and given back to Russia without the crev.
The PQ:!(emkin mutiny could have been a far more serious affair had it

not been so ill-prepared.

However 1 there was little contact between the

crews of the other ships.

The revolutionary organizations within the fleet

ltere as yet too small and most of the crews, though disgusted with the
conditions 1n the navy, were not prepared to take the final step toward

hers...~
mut~

Finally, little can.tact was made with the Soeial•Demoerats 1n Sevastopol and
Odessa and therefore, the sailors could not Join with the workers to make up
the revolutionary army the BolsheViks dreamt of.

In short, the rising vas

premature and spontaneous being mostly out of the control of the Social-Democrats and did not at all turn out as the Bolsheviks had wanted.

The mutiny

itself received world-wide publicity and serious doubt was cast on the reliability of the military forces.

However, it was only a foreshadowing of things

}£

to come later 1n the year.

In spite of their risks and efforts to organize the workers, soldiers,

and peasants into a revolutionary force under their leadership, the Bolsheviks
48
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i'a iled.

By the later summer of 1905, it was obvious that the Bolsheviks'

schievet:~ents

in the countryside and in the armed forces were still negligible.

Ttleir success among the "trorkers also seems to have been unimpressive.

of' both factions of the Soc:ial·Democratic Party, the

:~nshevik,

Speak

Evegenii

iviaevskii, admitted,

The organizational ties of the Social·Democratic Party "t-rith the
masses were always very weak. The number of organized '"'orkers in
relation to all the masses was insignificant. However, the ideolodial
influence of the party wqr-; great.
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How great the Social-Democratic influence on the workers really "t-ros, was yet
to be seen.

1l

CliA~

TIIE OCTOBER

As the
sides.

Stt:~mer

WU~IFEST

IV

A!ID THE RISE OF THE SOVIETS

of 1905 wore on, pressure on the Tsar increased from all

1'he Union of

Unions~

made up of organizations of the liberal profes-

sions and vhite-coll.ar workers, had been carrying on liberal agitation since
l·~y.

In. July, radicals representing various local peasant unions founded tb.e

All--Russian Peasants• Union and

~ediately

began agitating for 1.a.n.d reform.

Seeking to decrease the disorder in the Empire by satisfying at least some of
the revolutio11ary elements, the Tsar announced on August 6 that he was granti."l€
to the people an elected state counceil vhich ws to advise him 1n matters of
Legislation.

The limitations of the state count 11 or D'l.lna wre imnediately

realized by all the oppositional parties.
not a legislative body.

The Duma was only an advisory and

It vas not to be elected by universal suffrage since

most of the non-Russian areas were excluded and e property requu·ement limited

the classes which could vote.

levels of electors.

The suffrage was also indirect, having several

Workers in general were excluded from the voting and all

1lho sat 1.11 the Duma had to be able to spea.k Russian.

The Tsar• s move did serve to divide the revolutionary forces.

The liber·

ala 1n the zemstvo congresses vere 'trllling to accept the Dtl'lla 1 hoping to eventlaUy turn it into a re~.l legislative body.
10ted to boycott the Duma.

.....

The Union of Unions; however,

Most socialists were also rllling to boycott the

Duma. A congress representing th.e Russ1an, Lettish, and Polish Social-Democrat ,
the Jewish Workers' Union, and the Uk:rainian Revolutionary Party voted for the

boycott of the D'l.llla.

~

of the leading t>ienshev1ks 1 Julius

I~ov,

put forth

a plan to use the Duma elections to form a provisional revolutionary governm.ent.

He proposed that all Social-Democrats, though not participet!Dg in the

elections themselves, set u;p agitation conmittees which would e:xpose the short
comings of the Duna to aU voters and urge them to elect the most democratic
and radical candidates.

These c.!3cted candidates could then gather in sane

city in Russia and proclaim themselves a constituent assembly thus :tllega.lly
usurping the powers of the Tsar and providing the foundations for sel:f'-govern-

ment.

Lenin rejected this idea as naive.

Since the workers were excluded

from the election, ewn the most d.emocr&tic assembly of de1egates would repre-

sent the interests of the bourgeoisie and a victorious revolution in such a
case would

~

yield the leadership of the revolution and possession of the

governmental power to the liberals at the expense of the Social-Democrats.
Even more important 1 the autocracy would never allaw the existence of a pro-

visional revoluticmary government.

One could not ba-ve a provisional governmen:

followed by a revolution but the provisional govermaent itsel:f' could only be
the result of an armed uprising.

1

Lenin saw the Duma as a grant of limited

freedom or as a step toward constitutionalism 1 but as an attempt of the Tsar
to divide the forces of the revolution and quash the revolutionary movement.
As for the liberals who aupported the Duma 1 L enin claimed that this only
proved their counterrevolutionary nature and that their participation in the
Duma was nothing but an agreement between the constitutional monarchists and

\enm, Coll!aP. Works,

n,

pp. 224-226.

the conservative liberals to divide the power of' the government among thems(U.ves and rule in harmony over the proletariat.

It vas therefore the duty

of the Social-Democrats to carry on a campaign condemning the Dl.lll8 for its
shortcomings and the liberals who participated in it and urge the necessit;r
of an armed uprising amons the masses.
The

2

Bolsheviks diligently agitated against the Duma through leaflets,

gatherings and even breaking into liberals meetings.

One leaflet of the

Central Camnittee listed the l:b:nitations of the suffrage and of the powers
of the D\1118 and called u;pon all to fight for liberty--to the end.3 1'he Moe•
cow .A:rea Committee called on the pea.sants to adopt a resoluticm. reading,
We nov realize that if we wnt to better our lot 1 and obtain
a better life, it is nece&O<.<r)" for us to carry on a struggle so that
the business of' the government be run not by the Tsar and his officials,
but our representatives, with full deciding votes, without any Tsar or
officials, vith the full power of passing laws 1n our interests. We
knov also that the R.S.D.L.P. struggles for the tull liberation of the
people from the yoke of the autocrac7 and the rich. We unite with it
end announce: l) We v:tU not elect 8J110D8 to the Tsarist Duma; 2) We
vill obtain with weapons 1n our hands our popular dl.llfl•-e democratic
republic given to us b7 a constituent assembly on the basis of general,
equal, direct, and secret suttrege.
4
Throughout 1905, the Bolsheviks had been urging and hoping for the general strike that they hoped would turn into the final armed uprising. And
then••un.expectedly••it happened.

On September 20 1 a strike broke out spon-

taneously among the Moscov printers and apread to the bakers, restaurant em•
plo,ees, and workers 1n the turnitu:re factories and tobacco shops. As the
strike spread through lvbscow 1 the mood of the workers became more violent.
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On SeptembEr 25, the printers broke into severa 1 g-..m.sl1ops to obtain ...rea pons
and clasl1ed vrith the police and even raised oor:ricades.

fight i.11g tt-re lve 110rkers were dead and thirty trounded.

unrest in the city increased.

After

t~.ro

days of

Nevertheless 1 the

Towrd the end of September, the wrkers of

several occupations, and espec ·ally those of the printing and furniture indus
tries 1 forrned their awn individUDl soviets.

As yet these vrere not organs of

revolutionary government but mere strike committees embrscing only their own
occupations.

In early Octobel" 1 :Jeveral strike committees of tlle printers,

mechanics, and railrood 1 furniture, and tobacco industry employees formed e
joint strike committee which 11as joined by liberal professors, students,
lavyers, doctors, and even bank employees and government bureaucrats.
few days later, the strike

moverrL~:.u.t

ber 7 1 the Kazan, Iaroslavl 1
from I.Toscow struck.

spreed tc the railroad wrkers.

~ak, and

A
On Octo-

Brest bltanches of tl1e aystem rediating

The other branches soon ,1oined t:b..e movement and the Grea

October Strike spread to every industrial center in the E:npire.

The strike

not only imrolved 700 1 000 railroad workers and more than 300 1 000 workers of
other industries, but also countless professors, lawyers, doctors, office-

workers, pharmacists, and small shop owners.

Admitted.ly only about one third

of Russin's industrial work force went on strike but this third included the
operators of such public utilities as post and telegraph, electricity, gas,

steam, and <."8ter plants, streetcars and cabs, ond, of course railroad worlters

Many of the workers .entered the strike demanding civil rights and a real
constitutional assembly but a greet number also struck to satisfy economic

clemands or because they were coerced by other lrorkers.

5
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Surprisingly, neither the Bolsheviks nor the !·ienshevili:s L'lcited the
In fact they 1-1ere unprepared for it.

strilte.

T!:J.e strike itself ws a s:pon-

taneous IOOvet'lent among the industrial proletariat ,,.hieh 1.ms by this time more
politically conscious, more dissatisfied with the autocracy and management,
t1:nd better organized in variou:..: trade unions such as the All-Russian Railway

Union, the All-Russian Post and Telegraph Union, and the liberal Union of
Unions.

The Menshevilts were somewhat more instrumental in inciting, spread

and organizing the movement
unawares.

Oh<.;t.

it -was started but even they were caught

It is true that the printers who set off the strike were strongly

influencea by the Mensheviks, that the Moscow-Brest Railroad 'tTo:r·1;:ers wh.o were

instrumental in spreading the strike among the rest of the railroad wrkers
-.;rere under the domination of the l'4ensheviks, and that once the strike was

started, Mensheviks played a great part in helJ?ing the v-rorkers formulate
their demands and elect their deputies to the various soviets which sprang up

during the strike.

Jiavrever 1 it must be noted that the Mensheviks vrere not at

all pleased by being faced with a general strike at the time since the wor1.er
were still too :poorly emed and disorga.."lized to turn the stril"..e into a succes
f'!..ll uprising.

The strike had already become general before they ewn dared

call for it but seeing that it was the irrepressible wish of so many of the
worl..ers in Moscmv 1 the :Mensheviks could only follow along and help the worker

organize.

6

The Moscow

Bols:.~- viks

were even less prepared or enthusiastic about the

general strike than the Mensheviks.

Like the Hensheviks 1 they sa.w the workers

were not yet sufficiently organized or armed f'or an uprising and a pl'Blllature

559.
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attel!lpt wuld certainly end L"l disaster. Furt'hermore, the Bolsheviks feared
that the idea of a genera.l strike might eclipse the goal of an armed uprising.
E-ven after the strike movement had spread to the railroad workers on October

'T, the l..foscow Committee decided against appealing for a generi.l strike by a
~vote

of seven to two.

Only after so man.v of the Y4oscmr worl"'..ers joined tbe

strike that the Bols.hevif'...s feared they would be cut off from the masses did

tr...e Bolsheviks call for a general stn-ik.e on October 10.
remained aloof fran the task

c-f'

In the meantime, they

")rganizing the workers and left the organiza-

tion of elections of 'tvorkers' deputies to the soviets and the agitation for
the creation of an all-city soviet of workers' deputies to the Mens.."leviks.

When in early October, several strike committees of the printers, mechanics,
and furniture, rs il:t"'8d, and tobc.lcco -vrorloers formed a joint strike committee
;;thich was joined by libera 1 professors, studen··· s,

lev~rs,

doctors, engir..eers 1

bureaucrats, and even judges, the Bolsheviks eagerly Joined the Mensheviks in
E·ttempting to build a s::pcr.l·ute stri1re organiza.tion made up exclusively of
proleta.rian industrial vorkers and to break up J.!oscow Strike Comnittee vThich
contained bourgeois liberals.

7

Violence between wrkers and police broke out in Kb.arlmv a."td Odessa
but events took a really revolutionary +:urn 'When the strike mov'-ment reached

st. Petersburg.
stril~.in

Moscow.

The Mensheviks urged all wor~rs to support the general

Th.ey emphasised the need of a massive workers' organiza-

tion against the auto-M--acy.

Even if this organization ws a non-party worker

congress, it might still be converted into a form of revolutionary selfgovernment which could lead the masses against the autocracy.

7
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Large meetings

lTere held "'n the rmreets and

L~

the halls of the st .. Petersburg University

calling on the worlters to join the general strilce which would eventually
turn into an armed

~rising.

By October 12, every industrial enterprise in

the city was affected by the strilte and even the govermnent offices closed ..
On October 13, representa-&ives of several stril"..e ccmmittees and strilting

worlters of various enterprises met at the technological institute of st.
Petersburg University under the presidency of

G.s. Krustalev-Nosar'

claimed themselves the Soviet of Workers' deputies.

The

and pro-

Soviet vas supposed

to be a non-party organization uniting the broad masses of the workers in

their struggle against the autocracy.

However, its organization had been

initiated by the l>S!nsheviks and it remained under tlteir domination
its short existence.

throughr.iU';~

Though the Soviet was presided over by a non-party

lawyer, Krustalev-Nosar' 1 and dominated by Leon Trotskii, not strictly a 1\fun-

shevik but a "conciliator," the great majority of the deputies were Mensheviks
or under rianshevik influence.
1n the Soviet.

workers.

The

Bolsheviks, however, were not unrepresented

Their agitators had sane influence on the st. Petersburg

A few of the elected deputies were Bolsheviks and t-wo of them,

B.l~.

Krumiants-Radin and D. Sverchkov, were members of the Soviet's executive
committee.
Though the Bolsheviks had alw;ys looked upon a general strike as the
first step toward an armed uprising, the st. Petersburg Bolsheviks certainly
Ud not a.pprove of' either the Great October strike or the creation of' a Menshe
nk-dominated Soviet.

'bJ

Like the l4oscow Bolsheviks, they saw that the stJrike

itself would not bring an end to the a.utocracy but would only sap the

ltl'ellgth the 'nn•:ters needed in the final armed revolt. At the present time,

\here ws no possibility of converting the strike into a victorious uprising

f'ircn:rms a.n1 the great majority o!' the workers lwd
:for weapons.

on~,.

lmives and crowbars

BolS:1.evilt agitatJ..,_;n hod pr<Xlu.cecl its effect..

ers vras 'tvilling to take

~

ams again.st the auti1orities.

A nu:aber of worlc-

Hmrevcr 1 the Bolslle-

viks' technical tmprepared.ness for the armed co:nflict no'ir :put them in an embarassing position.
of

revol~,rers

When the Bolsheviks distributed a pitifully small store

among the workers they 'Here bitterly disapptlinted and asked the

:Bolsheviks why they had been calling for an armed ltPrising the past several

months 'While they had only thirty :Brownings with which to arm the

vrorl~rs.

lUth so little hope of a successful armed u;prisi:ng, it is easy to see ,.my- the
Bolsheviks did not issue a definite call to the workers to join the general
strike until October 13 'When it was already well tmder wy. At the same tL-ne 1

the Bols..'heviks hesitated to SUJ?port the St. Petersburg Soviet.
ted a multi-party political organization as a rival.

They distrus-

Seeing the Soviet mainly

as a lerge strike committee, they- did not think of it as an organ of revolu-

tionary leadership. Therefore 1 to counterract the Mensheviks' :i.nf'luence on
the workers and to use it as a means presenting their own revolutionary program before the vorkers.

8

Under Menshevik leadership the Soviet t'll'l"n.ed out to be more than the
large strike committee the Bolsheviks accuc-ed it of being.

As soon as it

canvened, it called on the workers to arm theraselves and to form combat

detachments.

:rn

defiance of the censors..'1·lip laws it printed it~ mm bulletin

aJ1d exercised i"ts ow.n. censorship on conservative publications by ordering the

Pl"inters to continue their strike even when other printers returned to "trork.

-

......

nicipal authorities, the control of the actool distribution of su,pplies to
the lTOrkers, the discont tnuan.c ' of a 11 supplies to tl1e police, a ad the expul-

don of all troops from t:.w city.
basis of representation.

In the oonntime, the Soviet L11.creased its

Its first meeting was attended by less than forty

delegates, each theoretically representing five hundred m:>l..kers, but eventually, the nmnber of delegates passed five hundred. 9
~lith

most of the Empire paralyzed by the general strike and a workers•

revolutionary government developing in the capital, th.e Tsar "reo faced with
the choice of granting real constitutional government or establishing a military dictatorship over his realm.

Was he willingly to lL'llit his ow auto-

cratic pover or risk a gigantic revolution which might deprive him of hts
throne?
Amid the conflicting advice offered him by the members of his court 1

Nicholss II vacillated between martial law or a constitutional government.
Count S.I. Witte, who now enjoyed great prestige because he had managed to
keep the Russian losses at a minimum in the treaty of Portsmouth which ended.
the Russo-Japanese War, advised a liberal course.

Grand Duke UU::olai Nikolae

vich advised putting the Empire under martial JJ.n.r but refused to take the
dietatorial poirers himself. Fine.lly, the Tsar decided with vlitte.

17,

On Octobe

he issued the famous manifest ending the centuries-old autocrs.cy in Russia.

'lhe October r·Janifest 1 drafted by rlitte 1 granted full civil liberties to all,
that is, freedom of opinion, speech press, and association.

The state Duma

9
.
I
1'rotskii 1 !2Q.2_ 1 (Moscow, Gosizdateistvo, 1922) pp. 190-208. E. Maev1905 god. Och.e[ki Revoliutsionorp Dvizhenia. (st. Petersburg-!-1oscow 1

::t·

bolevsl>.aia Kamnissiie 1 1917) p.

69.

1ras to be elected by all classes and nationalitiea previousJ...y excluded
the classes remained unequally represe11ted.
:r..m-~ever,

thou.g.~

'fhe most important provision,

established that no law could be promulg-ated without the consent of

the Dma and that the Tsar's officials were accountable to the Dur.ta.

Though

the suffrage was 't.reighted to favor the privileged and wealthier classes and
the executive pmrer remained wholly in the hands of the Tsar, at last the
Tsar's povrer had been limited.

The autocracy vre s at an end!

The Manifest met with various reactions.

The conservatives were dis-

The Constitutional-Democrats, a moderate liberal party formed early

mayed.

that autWllll, were dissatisfied with the r.tanifest but \dlling to enter the

:tTJ. order to pressure the Tsar into granting a truly constitutional gover11

Duma

ment. Among the Social-Democrats the Manifest senred to open another tactical
debate between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.
probably best expressed by A.L. Helph.and, (Pa.rvus).

The Menshevik Position

'l.TaS

The Duma ws a wonderful

opportunity to agitate and organize the masses without oppost.tion from the

gover.n;"lent.

The Social-Democrats might just as well tal"..e advantage of the

opporttt'lity offered by the Duma to prepare the masses for a revolution by
freely expressing the Social-Democratic program and lim.iting the power of the
Tsar by

such means as refusing to provide the money and the armies he needed

to stay in power.

The Duna was a political fact and a Social-Democratic boy-

cott would not destroy it bu.t only leave the Social-Democratic Party and reduce the power and will of the Duns to oppose the Tsar.

He lphand agreed with

the Bolsheviks that the liberals were essentially enemies of the proletariat 1

but

why could not the Social-Democrats support the:n in the Duma against the

!aar?

Why not use the energies of one's enemies to combat hi a other enemies?

It vas stranc.~ that Lenin should tal~ such an obstinate stand on participating

in the Dura and cooperating 'trith the liberals.
~1uestions

Ire was tu.."lling these tactical

i..."'l.to moral isSt.Jes though there is no :political morality--only class
IIelphand denied tha:; by entering the Duma the Social-Democrats

no:rality.

";TOuld be la.psing into reformsi:'!l or r'"'nouncing revolution; rat'l:.ter 1 they would

merely be using another weapon for revolution.

11ave to be

~rrilling

The Social-Democrats "t-Tould

to use every 'l:reapon in the ;tong process tovrerd revolution

a.nd not rely exclusively on an armed uprising. 10
The Bolsheviks, meanwhile, maintained the same position tm.mrd the Octo•

ber

~1anifest

as toward the August Manifest.

Lenin condemned the October Mani•

fest as an agreement between the Tsar and nobles wh.o needed bourgeois support
and the bourgeoisie who did not want a complete revolution but only to seize

the govermnent machinery.

To Lenin, the armed uprising was the only way
11
toward the complete liberation of the toiling masses.
Vorovskii joined

Lenin in condemning the Mensheviks for not urging the boycott of the Duma and

not concentrating their energies toward preparing an armed uprising.
nounced the Duma as a trick by the Tsar and

He de•

tl~

liberals to split the forces
l2
of the revolution and condermed the Mensheviks for falling for it.
Along

with Lenin's and Vorovskii • s articles :t.n Proletm=:ri 1 the Bolsheviks issued
leaflets throughout the Empire, denounci.."lg the October 1\{anifest as a lie.

A

leaflet of the Central COll.lllittee cautioned the people not to be deceived by
the Manifest and urged them to obtain real rather than paper rights by force

of ams,
10.Psrvus Rossiia 1 Remliutsiia, (st. Petersburg,

~. 144-176, 1Ba~l90.
1

(u.

~nin 1

l2v. V.
...

,..

s.

Glagol.ev 1 1907)

Collected Wgrks, IX, pp. 396-404.

Vorovsldi 1 Izabrannie Proizvedenia o Pervoi RusskQ.i ReYO_liutaii.
~

~~-l'l

Only by force of arms, only by a popular armed uprising will 'li.'e
sweep the enemy from the fece of the earth and win liberty for
ourselves •• .Forward into battle! ••• To arms comrades! Dow. vith
the false constitution! Long live the popular armed upris1ngt

13

Obviously, the October Manifest had not deterred the Bolsheviks from their
revolutionary purpose.
The Bolsheviks and many Mensheviks found it their task to convince the

people that the Manifest had gained them nothing and that the real revolution
was still to come.

In the first few days after the issuing of the Manifest,

the streets of st. Petersburg were filled with rejoicing crowds celebrating the
victory of the revolution.
had changed nothing.

Trotskii reminded the crowds that the Manifest

The Tsar still actually held autocratic power.

troops and his police were still present.

Even the promised release of poli-

tical prisoners had not yet been carried out.
ing throughout

His

The Bolsheviks echoed his warn-

st. Petersburg urging all, even the students to continue the
14

general strike and prepare for an armed uprising.

Along with the Manifest, the Bolsheviks denotmced the Duma as a shan
parliament controlled by bourgeois liberals.

In Ekaterinburg in the Urals,

I.t4. Sverdlov held several speeches at workers' meetings repeating Lenin's
position that the liberals had betrayed the revolution and concluded a deal

'

with the Tsar to maintain their hegemony over the working class.

15

In Moscow

a leaflet printed by the Federated Cotmcil of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks ex-

pressed the typical Bolshevik attitude toward the Duma.

Arter condemning the

1~

.)Piaskovskii, RevoliHjtsiia ,l2?5-l2g:I v Rossii, p. 139.

14
1

'

Shaurov, 1905 sod, p. 49.

5I.M. Sverdlov, Iza}lrannie P.roizvedenaia, (Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe
Izdateistvo Pol1ticheskoi L1teratur1, 1957) I. pp. 15-27.

liberals as traitors because of their support of the DU!lla it closed l.rith,
Dow with the exploiters! Down with peaceful friends! Dotm. with
the liberels! Down ~ritl~ t:1c Tsarb:t goverm. rent and its collaborators!
Long live the armed uprisi:1g! Long live the popular constituent assembly
Long live the democratic republic--pir sole dependable -vray to sociali~.r.~i

6

Obviously, the October .Manifest had not deterred the Bolsheviks from their
revolutionary purpose.
The Bolsh.eviks were justified :L."l. fearing that the October I·'&snifest would
split the forces of' a popular

~v~lution.

Disorder increased throughout the

1!1np1re after October 17 but not all of it was directed against the gove:rrar:1ent.
After the announcement of the October Manifest 1 a wave of violence, motivated
by a mixture of patriotism, reaction, and racial hatred, swept Russia, swept
the Empire and especially its non-Russian regions.

st. Petersburg.

Demonstrators clashed in

In Moscow, r-r .E. Baum.."ln, one of the lead 1ng Bolshevik agitators

vas released fran prison by virtue of the Tsar's amnesty and killed wh.en the
triumphant crowd surrounding him was fired on by counter-revolutionary demonstretors.

Even worse crimes were committed by such Black Hundred organizations
1.

as the Union of the Russian People, the Society of Russian Patriots, and the

',1![

'·1'1:

!I

uatian i··fonarchist Party, sometimes with the local authorities' passive appro1 and even assistance and sometimes in defiance

0~

all authority.

t-rurderous

grans were carried out against the Jews in Odessa, Kiev, Gomel, I..odz, and
I.'l'l Saratov police, troops, and volunteers carried out a general

om against local revolutionaries who had freed a large group of arrested
In Cheliabinek ninety members of t'he local Bolshevik combat
surrotmded in a build:L."lg

:S1td

severely beaten by the police and

,,

'.'lr.,

the Black Htmdreds.

In Ufa there was an armed conflict between the Bolsheviks

and the Black Hundreds fran wi:.ich Sverdlov barely escaped.

The worst disaster

occurred in the Siberian town of Tomsk when a la.rge crowd of the Black IIundrede
surrounded a building where a workers' meeting was being held and set it on fir
burning about 4oo people to death despite the resistance offered by- a smell
group of' Bolsheviks.

Even in Moscow the students were surrounded in the
1

university by a menacing crowd until they were saved by the police • 7
Even 1f the mass of the population did not engage in such counterrevolu-

tionary activities, most of the people had lost interest in the revolutionary
1novement.

In

gan to wane.

st. Petersburg and Moscow the defiant spirit of' the workers be•
Realizing this, the St. Petersburg Soviet called otf the general

strike on October 19 while the Moscow Strike Committee, which represented the
greater part of the city's labor force 1 and the All-Russian Railroad Union had
recommended the cessation of the general strike even earlier.

Seeing that

the strike would only fade away rather than turn into an armed uprising, the
Bolshevik Moscow Caamittee urged the workers in the Moscow area to return to
work temporarily and prepare and organize themselves for the next general strikl
which was to turn into the final decisive struggle of the proletariat for the
fulf'illment of its political and economic demands.
The Great October strike was over.

18

It had been something the Bolsheviks

hsd desired and agitated for but certainly tr..ey were neither its sole nor main
instigators.

other parties had been agitating for a general strike also, bu:t

more inlportant factors were the general condition of the working class, the
1

7Pankratove, Perva1! RW!sk@ie RevoliutsU.a, p. 134.

l8

ro~d.

p. 135.

widespread unrest of 1905, the disgraceful behavior of the
''Bloody Sunday, 11 and defeat in the Fer East.

gove~~nent

on

As far as revolutionaries of' a 11

parties were concerned, the Great October Strike had been a partial success.
It resulted in the limitation of the autocracy.
more politically minded.

It had made the proletariat

It had established a revolutionary pmrer in the

1

capi'"'~"-

t8l--the Soviet--and many lesser revolutionary bodies, such as the !-1oscow
Strike Committee, which were to provide bases for the construction of future
soviets.

Finally, it in itself was a revolutionary weapon r..rhich other European

socialist parties later used either actually or as a threat.

However, as far

as the Bolsheviks were concerned, the strike vas also largely e failure.
tsarist government was still standing.

The

At least the Bolsheviks could take a

little comfort in that their tactical principle had been proven correct: the
goverament could not be overthrown by a general strike alone; the government
could only be destroyed by means of a general armed uprising.
'l"ne failure to convert the general strike into s revolution proved that
the Bolsheviks were not anywhere near being prepared to lead an armed uprising
The

stril~

was over and a great opportunity had passed by but perhaps there

wes still time to achieve something.
had now been reached.

Lenin believed that the point of balance

Many of the military units were considered unreliable.

The autocracy had betrayed its lack of confidence in its own pm1er by retreatirl~

before the anger of the people and granting a constitution.
had been won but it was only the first step.

A great victory

Russia did not yet 'have a demo-

crat:t.c republic or even a responsible ministry.

The PDOletariat had to press

further, to organize a workers' militia, to gain the support of the soldiers,
to overthrow the autocracy and thus spark a general European socialist revolution Which ,,ould establish socialism throughout all Europe, L'"lcluding

......

Russia.
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Throughout 1905 Lenin had spent much of his spare ti.'!le i...'l'l the Gene-

va library studying the works of C1useret, the leader of the French "Cornnnm-

ards" in 1871 1 on street fighting.

tfuile net.rs of disorders and uprisings in

Russia reached Switzerland, Lenin longed to be at the scene of events.

If he

could not be present, he would at least send advice to :his embattled comrades.
Apparently he became well-versed in revolutionary tactics.
to t!1e Bolsheviks in Russia was sound.

The advice he sent

He urged them to arm themselves with

anything they could get hold of including rope, Keroseve, and even nails to sl
dovm the charging cavalry.

Leaders were to be elected and the necessary pre-

parations for an effective struggle made: the organization of headquarters,
the prearrangement of secret signals for communication, the reco:n.naisance of
primary targets such as banks and police stations as well as secret escape
routeso

He urged each Bolshevik committee to organize small canbat detachments

of three, five 1 or even thirty men each.

It was not necessary that these men

should be social-Democrats as long as they were sincere revolutionaries.

Of

course, these untts could not be successful without the preparation of' the men
themselves for their tasks.

Training was to be carried out on the theoretical

level by reading historical literature on revolts in other European cities as
well as by lectures presented by ex-soldiers.

!·1ore important, the men were to

obtain practical e:x:perience by attacking individual policement, raiding banks
and police stations, and clashing with the Black Hundreds.

20

No definite

deadline was set for the armed uprising, but Lenin did warn against a pre-

uture revolt and expressed his opinion that it would be best to de lay the
19

LenL~, Collec~ed

20

~. n,

Works, IX, pp. 427-434.

PP· 244-246, 420-424.

uprisi:ng until the coming spring when the most dissatisfied segment of the
army would return from Manchuria.

21

Though there was no date set for the armed uprising, the Bolsheviks intensif'ied their preparations for it lest the masses rise in a spontaneous and
uncoordinated effort before the Bolsheviks were ready.

In st. Petersburg the

Central Committee and the st. Petersburg Committee worked together.

More

party members and sympathizers were organized into combat units in every district.

Each unit had about ten men end was headed by a "desiatnik" who was

under the command of' one of' the party's district organizers.

It is impossible

to tell how many Bolsheviks 'tvere organized in such detachments but there were
enough to provide a deterrent against attack on the workers • meetings by the
Black :Iundreds. Rifles and revolvers were distributed among the men and they
practiced using them by hunting outside of town or firing a few quick shots in
the parks at night.

There was always a shortage of firearms, however, end

many '"orkers resorted to improvising daggers, pikes, and other homemade weapons
within the plants themselves.

The technical department of the Central

Committe~

meanwhile, managed the aspects of an uprising which could not be hand led on the
district level.

i..f. Litvinov was in charge of smuggling weapons from Germany

and Austria into Russia.

Ammunition was often obtained from the revolutionary

cells within the army in exchange for party literature.

A member of the Cen-

tral Committee, Leonid Krasin, took on the task of manufacturing, testing and
ltortng bombs.

The university students in St. Petersburg also built up a com-

bat force composed of all classes of revolutionaries.

The Bolsheviks among

them saw no point in not participating in this organization with the Mensheviks

-

-
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and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

They all agreed on the necessity of an armed

uprising and a revolutioury provisional government.

I~ot

only was the student

organization an ally of the Bolsnevik fighting units, but it also gave them
access to the university's laboratories to make bombs.
T:.t1e money for this general arming came from various sources.

Bolshevik

orators collected contributions from the workers at factory and street gatherPolitical clubs which were looser forms of' workers' discussion circles

ings.

yielded additional funds.

Maxim Gorkii used his popularity and influence amone

the rich to obtain contributions.

Apparently he was very successful for even

wealthy industrialists such as the two Moscow factory owners. Schmidt and Moro
zov, contributed large sums of money to the Bolsheviks.
were always short of ftmds.
only expense.

22

Yet, the Bolsheviks

Weapons were costly but they were not the party's

The party presses needed printing equipment, paper, and. ink.

Apartments had to be rented to hold meetings and store arms and literature.
Furthermore, few of the Bolsheviks could support themselves by even part-time
It is difficult for fugitives and revolutionaries to find work in s

work.

police state.
Tr.e
rising.

~k>scow

Bolsheviks worked even harder to prepare for the armed up-

Around the time of the October !43nifest, the Bolshevik canbat organ1-

zation numbered only 250 men, armed for the most part, by bad revolvers and
low quality bombs.

After Bauman's murder on October 18, the :,foscow Bolsheviks

realized the v..-eakness of their combat organization and accelerated their effor1 s
to build e real revolutionary army.

The organization of the con1bat force was

22
Akhun, Boevaia i Voennaia Deiate~os~, pp. 25-35. if.!I. Iakovlev,
J-~he~11e Vosstania Delrebria 1905 13• (Moscow 11 Gosudarstven."'loe Isdatelstvo
~:iticheskoi Li'eeratury, 1957) pp. 57-70. Liadov, Iz Zhizni Parti~, pp. 79-

cir!lilar to t::1at of the St. Petersburg organization witil its ''desiatniki" and

district organ1.zers.

It seems that volunteers ·i.rere screened more strictly,

:10':rever, for it \t."8S required that every member be vrell knowu &nd :reco:rrnnended
by a party organization as a determined revolutionary.

'l'hese most disciplined

and adept at handline weapons were ad.'llitted into the active
the rest were members of the reserve.

companies while

Strict discipli.'1.e was mainMined in the

obedience of orders, disposal of arms, and expenditure of ar:1munition.

The

members uere constantly impressed with the f'act that it was their im:nediate
duty to protect the party from attacks by the police and Black :iundreds and

that their ultimate duty was to lead the proletariat in its final struggle
a ga i.TJ.st the autocracy.
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Much ti111c was devoted to the training of the men for their duties.

Ex-

soldiers organized nightly target practice in basements and schools wr;ere the
sound of the shots could be muffled.

Instructors held lectures on street-

fighting tactics used by ·~restern European -workers in the revolutions of 1848
and the defence of Paris in 1871.

stations and escape routes for revolutionary

staffs and snipers were picked out end plans for lines of barricades were
draw up.

Bomb laboratories 'Here set up.

Political meetings 'Were held more

frequently to obtain more contributions from the workers.

A gift of' 20,000

rubles by Scl1."llidt, the great furniture manufacturer, toward the end of 1905
vas also very welcome •
In cddition to all this training and preparation, tb.e Bolsheviks gained

first hand experience in small, isolated exploits against the Dlack Htmdreds.

Baaetimes t!:ley broke up meetings of the Black Hundreds by shouts end gunfire,
1-

L
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Vvsshii Pod 11 em Revoliutsii, It pp. 600-601.

but tl1ere were no serious clashes.

Hore serious were the attacks on individua

policement to rob them of their gwts and passport books and attacks and burglnrier;: of small gunshops to obtnil1 firearms.

21~>

Similar organizations were also built up in the suburbs of Z.fosc;ow) and
-vlith the development of Socialist-Revolutionary)

Menshevil~)

and anarchist,

and non-party combat organizations, the rJfoscov area rivalled st. Petersburg
as the revolutionary center of the Empire.

Yet mistakes in the training and

organization of these 'lmits left serious waknesses in the structure and efficiency of these cOJ.abat groups which would only become apparent in the heat of

battle.

v.

Kostitsyn, one of the Mosco"VT Committee's organizers, compl21ned

that while combat un.:i.ts were organized on the basis of the area in which they
operated) they also accepted volunteers from other sections of the city.

When

the shootinG started, these men would be more anxious to defend their own
neighborhoods th.an the ones they were assigned ·t;o.
was that the leaders themselves were ineJq>erienced.

Even more serious a defect
The party's organizers

were essentially political agitators vrho had themselves never had any experience in actually leading an armed uprising.

The instructors, 'vho vere usually

ex-soldiers, had been trained for fighting in the countryside, in the field
or on rugged terrain, but not for street fighting i.."l. a large urban area.

\ihen

the actual clash came, these shortcomings vould cost the Bolsb.eviks dearly. 25
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v. Nevskii 1 (ed.) Dekebr' 12,05 na K.rasnoi Presno, (Mosccnr 1 Agitprop·
Oi.:.del 1 Krasno--Preaenskogo Baikoma 1 RKPB 1 1926} v. Kostitsyn, "Deknbrslmc
Vosstanie 1905 goda" pp. 21-30. M. Sidorov "vosponimania Druzhinika F--ki
Schmidta," 117-121. u. Korolev (Batyshchev) "Ila B:restskoi Zheleznoi Doroge
v 1905 godu)" pp. 150·157. Iakovlev, Vooruzhenie Vosstania, 110-113.
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5v. Kostitsyin, ''Dek8barskoe Vossta11ie 1905 gods" Ne"7sldi, Dekabr' 1925
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Similar eanbat organizations were being built up in most af the industrial centers of the Empire by all revolutionary parties including the Bolsheviks.

The

strength of the Bolshevik organizations varied with the size of the

local population and the influence the Bolsheviks exerted on it.

Nizhni Ifov-

gorod wi.th its 300 armed Bolsheviks had an even larger organization than e-ven
the Moscow Committee.

In a town like Voronezh where taey had less influence 1

the Bolsheviks could only arm seventy or eighty men.

Even more important

than numbers, the fighting efficiency of the various centers varied with the
initiative of the local Bolshevik leadership and the Yvail.ability of money and
arms.

These differences, however, would only becane really apparent once the

fighting had started.
Despite the:tr extensive preparations for the final armed uprising, the
Bolsheviks managed to arm and organize a very small portion of the urbtlll working class.

What the Bolsheviks always aimed for, however, vas a mass rising

led by themselves--not a coup executed by a conspiratorial minority.
oould the support of the masses be obtained1

Row

The obvious answer would seem

to have been the soviets which could be the basis of a workers' revolutionary
organization.

Yet 1 many Bolsheviks mistrusted the soviet as an organ of rev-

olutionary government.

Though. soviets had their uses on such occasions as

political st:rikes, the Bolsheviks did not think them capable of assuming
political leaders..l).ip because they were non-party institutions which would not
necessarily adhere to the Social-Democratic program.
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Therefore 1 the Bol-

shevik attitude toward the Soviets in general vas not only one of mistrust,
but dovmrigh.t hostility.
~

B.M. Knuniants-Radin 1 one of' the two Bolsheviks 1n

Bystrikh, Bolghevi§tki! Ormmizatsii Urela, p. 176.

the st. Petersburg executive committee, feared that if the Soviet

\ISS

not used

to propagate the party's ideas, the Soviet might turn out to be the germ of
an "independent labor party'' as opposed to socialism.

Many of the Bolsheviks

in St. Petersburg looked upon the Soviet as little more than a Gtrike commit-

tee which, once the general strike was over, had outlived its purpose and become more of a nuisance than an asset.

They were ma 1nly concerned with the

question of whether they shoulil boycott the Soviet or join it ad "explode" it
from Vithin.

Whatever the tactics to be used, most Bolsheviks agreed that the

St. Petersburg Soviet had become "u.n.necessaryn and th<; it should leave the
political leadership of the proletariat to the Social-Democratic Party and
accept its lead and party program or dissolve. Z7
The attitude of the Central Committee toward the Soviet is probably best
expressed in the Central Committees "Letter to all Party Organizations" of
October 27.

The Central Committee instrt..tcted Social-Democratic participants

in all soviets or similar organizations to invite the soviets to adopt the

program of the Social-Democratic Party and accept its leadership 1 and ultimately to dissolve into it.

If' the soviet refused to accept the Pz-ogram of

the party, the Bolsheviks were to leave and expose the antiproletaria.n nature
of such an organization.

If the soviet refused to accept the entire party pro

gram but reserved its right to decide on even individual political issue as
it came up 1 the .Bolshevik deputies could stay in the soviet but had to expose
the "absurdity" or such political leadership.
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27sci1wrz, The Russian Revolution of 19QS. pp. 179-185. Schvarz•s
chapter "The Soviets of Workers• Deputies" pp. 167-;93, is a detailed survey
of the Bolshevilt and rilenshevik attitudes toward the soviets.
goclu.''

2P, .. r. Vasil 'ev-Iuzhin 1 "I>'Ioskovskii Sovet Rabochikh Deputatov v 1905
Proletarskaia Revol1,'W;siia 1 April, 1925 1 p. 90.

Following these instructions, the Bolsheviks in the st. Petersburg
Soviet proposed that the Soviet accept the Social-Democratic program or disband, arguing that such a vague, political amalgam as the Soviet could not be
the political leader of the vorking class.

The Socialist Revolutionaries in

the Soviet illlllediately objected that the Soviet

was

supposed to represent

the entire proletariat and could not be attached to any one party since the
Social-Democratic party was not the sole representative of all vorking people.
Had

this proposal by the Bolshevik minority been put to a vote, it might have

destroyed the Soviet, but fortunately for that organization, the question
shelved.

was

29

Lenin himself had a somewhat different attitude toward the soviets.
Previously, he had always feared that such non-party organizations as trade
unions might lead the proletariat astray from its revolutionary path and believed that the party must either infiltrate and control such organizat tons
or destroy them.

However, he saw the soviets in a different light.

To carry

out a successful revolution both the party and the soviets were necessary.
The soviet could serve as the instrument of the proletariat and all people

opposed to the autocracy.

It should proclaim itself and take over the duties

of e revolutionary government and serve as the central organization of the
revolutionary soldiers and sailors, the peasant committees, the armed proletariat, the revolutionary democrats, and intelligentsia.

As long as the

party maintained its independence of action, there was no reason wlzy the non-

IOC1alist revolutionaries should be alianated.

the soviet be a weak coalition.

Nor would the leadership of

The soviets hsd functioned well so tar,

29G. Khrustalev-Ifosar• "Istoriia Soveta Rabochikh Deputatov (do 26
1

f~~bria 1905 gada) Istoriia Soveta Rabochikh DeEutatov g. S-PeterburS@,
ersburg, 1906) pp. 156-!51.

despite their multi-party cherecter.

Besides, all revolutionary

~laments

would be united in the struggle for full civil liberty, the eizht-hou:r day,
and the transference of all the land to the peasants, without much disag:reement.

30
Most Bolsheviks, however, vrere not ss liberal in their views of the

soviets as Lenin and believed the sole justification of their existence was
that they could be used as instruments of the party.

Lenin's letter expres-

sing his views on the soviets, which was addressed to the editorial board
of the new Bolshevik newspaper in Russia,
two decades later.

I~ovaia

Zhizn, was not printed until

In towns like Kolanna and Kostroma, in the north-central

industrial region, and Motovilik..1J. and Ufa 1 in the Urals, where Bolshevik
influence \ms so predominant that they could easily control the soviet workers
to accept the leadership of the party, the Bolsheviks readily agitated and
helped the workers to organize soviets.
In Moscow, where other parties also had a sizable influence, the overbearing attitude of the Bolsheviks toward the soviets became more apparent.
Since the Moscow Bolsheviks and I.fensheviks shared the same views regarding
the armed uprising against the Tsar and the falsity of the Duma 1 the Belshevik Moscow Committee and the Menshevik Moscow Group united in a Federative
Soviet which was actually a local party council and not to be confused with a
workers' soviet.

This Federative Soviet issued joint leaflets and organized

gatherings at which Bolshevik and Menshevik orators condemned the October
Manifest, condemned the liberals for betraying the revolution, and called on
the workers to organize end arm themselves for the coming uprising.

30 Lenin, Collected Wo;r.:ks, X, pp. 19-29.

Both

factions in the Federative Soviet condemned the Moscow strike Committee because it included professionals, store keepers, and even government employees
along with the factory workers.

In place of the strike Committee, the Federa-

tive Soviet urged the workers to form a soviet composed exclusively of the
proletarian workers of the Moscow area.
soviets 1-fere organized in Moscow.

During November, several district

The strike Committee was eventually dis-

solved by the combined efforts of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and on November 22, the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies, modelled on the st. Petersburg Soviet and having one delegate for every 400 workers represented was
organized, was founded.

The Moscow Soviet began its activity by declaring

its support of all the present strikes in the city with funds and a sympathy
boycott of all enterprises involved 1n the strikes.

Eventually, however, the

Moscow Soviet called on all workers to refrain from initiating scattered and
31
isolated strikes and to prepare for e new general strike.
It seems, however, that the Bolsheviks were not very enthusiastic about
the organization of the district or city soviets and tried to make them mere
party tools wherever possible.

M.I. Vasil'ev-Iuzhhin, one of the Bolshevik

representatives 1n the executive canm.ittee of the Moscow Soviet, vas not very
interested in the Soviet because he thought the political leadership of the
proletariat belonged to the Social-Democratic party rather than non-partisan
organizations.
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The Bolshevik aversion to independent action by the soviets

became even more apparent in their behavior toward the district soviets.
31yysshii Pod"em Russkoi Revoliutsii, I, pp. 365-390.
Vooruzhenie Vosstania, pp. 110-114.

Iekovlev,

3~4.I. Vosil'ev Iuzhin, "Moskovskii Sovet Rabochikh Deputatov v 1905

godu."

Proletariska ia Revoliutsiia, April, 1925, P. 89.

In

the Presnia District Soviet, for instance, the Bolsheviks argued that the
proletariat was a single class which should have a sil'lgle party in its struggle against Tssrism.

Unless the soviets did not openly recognize and accept

the program and leadership of the Social-Democratic Party, they would become
a "non-party party" and therefore a dangerous rival to the Social-Democratic

Party.

33 The Mensheviks protested that the Social-Democratic propaganda but

that such a blunt demand of the formsl recognition of Social-Democrst:tc leadership would only alienate a sizable portion of the workers, especially those
under the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
were unmoved by such arguments.

The Bolsheviks, however

The Conference of most of the Bolshevtk

northern committees, held on November 21-23, adopted the following resolution
regarding the soviets.
Soviets of workers' deputies need only be created where the
organization cannot direct the proletariat's mass action 1n any other
way or where it is necessary bo detach masses that have fallen under
the influence of bourgeois parties. The Soviet of \iorkrrs' deputies
must be the party's technicel apparatus for carrying the RSDRP's political leadership to the masses. Therefore, it is necessary to seize
control of it end to persuade it to recognize the program and the
political leadership of the RSDRP •
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In Nizlmi Novgorod (today Gorkii) the
the rudiments of a

popul~Jr

Bols~1eviks

managed to organize

revolutionary government which would always be

under their control, and therefore, succeeded in bypassing the organization
of a soviet.

In keeping with lenin's exortations to make the Social-Democra-

tic Party a rnass organization by allowing more worlters into the party, the
local Bolsheviks held mass meetings in which workers '\-tere encouraged to dis-

33Garvi, Vos;eonimaniie Sotsial-Demokrata, p. 603.
34vyssh1i Pod"em Revoliutsii, I, p. 23.

cuss and vote on party affairs.

At many of tnese meetings a "Peoples' Court"

tros held to settle <lifference s among the citizens by a vote rather than by

resorting to the regular courts of the government.

A popular militia, made

up of all classes, was also organized to protect the city against pogroms.
Though this was not a strictly proletarian fighting organization, it was a
force which included the proletariat and had severs 1 Bolshevik organizers
within its command.

35

provisional government.

In Kazan, tlle Bolsheviks participated in a rudimentary
On October 20, a large crovd of citizens of all

classes and parties marched on the town duma disarming police111en along the
way.

Once there, they organized a peoples' militia and town camnune 1n which

all revolutionary parties participated.

There was much rivalry between

Damperov 1 the Bolshevik leader of the militia 1 and the libert:lls for the control of

t~1e

combat detachments.

The armed workers 1 meanwhile aggravated the

situation by seizing the town's printshops and publishing workers' papers.
It would have been interesting to see the outcome of ti:1e Bolsl:1evik-liberal
rivalry in t:lis rudi..'llentary provisional government, but it was very shortOn October 26 1 a force including Cossacks, police 1 and Black Hundreds

lived.

surrounded the duma hall where the commune was meeting, arrested the leading
revolutionaries, including most of the Bolsheviks, and subjected the town to
36
a three -day orgs of looting and killing.
In both Nizhni Novgorod and Kazan
would have preferred to have had the ovle leadership revolutionsry movement,
but they realized how pitifully small their forces were and that they could
have no hope of overthrowing the government without the alliance with non35

~.

II, pp. 90-114, Iak?v1ev, Vooruzhenie Vosstaniia, pp. 220-235.

36Klwmmatov, KB zanskB ia Organizats:U.a Bolshevikov, pp. 68-8o.

proletarian elements.

Therefore, they entered soviets and multi-party

provisional govern.l!lents to direct the energy of' all the people f.lgainst the
government.
xio\>• much state authority a soviet could usurp depended on the daring

of the revolutionary leaders and the unrest of the local population as ;.rell

e s on the strength of the local authorities.

The

Bolshevik-dor:~L.'"l.ated

2-:ioto-

vilikh Soviet in the Urals expelled the police from its place of meeting,
carried on collective bargaining for all the workers in the town, took over
the administration of the local hospital, and collected money for weapons. 37
However, the largest and most powerful soviets sprang up 1n the U'Kraine aml
the Ceuca sus where the Mensheviks predominated.
the Bolsheviks' mistrust of the soviets and

The

W~tre

the workers in building up such organizations.

~nsheviks

did not share

therefore more ready to aid
Nor was the Menshevik leader-

ship in the soviets squeamish about seizing local government or leading an
armed uprising as Bolshevik historians have claimed.

The Odessa

~·1ensheviks

had already been engaged in several battles against troops and police even
before the October Manifest was issued.

In Kharkov, a genera 1 strike was

enforced by a workers' militia which forcibly closed shops.

Peoples' Courts

were founded and a soviet of doctors and hospital employees took over the
administration of the local :'1ospita1. 38

In the Caucasus, meanwllile, the

Mensheviks unhesitatingly resorted to violence to seize goverrunental powers.
In western Georgia, the peasant guerillas, known as the Red Hundreds were

very much tmddr the influence of the !>iensheviks.
37

Bystrik.~,

They attacked the police

Bolshevistkie Organizat sii Ura la, pp.
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and even Cossacks.

Government officials and prominent citizens were assassin-

ated in a wave of terror much more systematic than the isolated assassinations
perpetrated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Where the Red llundres were vic-

torious, they seized the r'.:dlroad stations, took over the town administration,
formed peoples• courts and passed sentences, and emptied the government buildings of arms and money.

Towns like Poti, when they were taken over by the

Red Hundreds or affiliated organizations, temporarily came tm.der a red dictatorship.
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T'ne Bolsheviks were certainly not the only party willing to

resort to violence to overthrow the government.
No matter how well organized the soviets

~vcre,

hope of victory without the support of the army.

there could be little

IIoping to combine the

strength of the local garrisons with those of the soviets 1 the Bolsheviks
and other revolutionary parties intensified their agitation in military units.

The Bolsheviks concentrated especially on sailors, artillery-men, sappers,

and railroad troops whose personnel was
proletariat.

large~

drawn from the industrial

In the course of 1905 1 the Bolsheviks found that political

agitation appevled only to the minority of the men in the armed forces.

To

gain the support of the mass of the Empire's military personnel, they sought
to take advantage of the soldiers• and sailors' prevailing disgust with the
harsh discipline, bad living conditions, delay in demobilization, and the
use of garrison troops to restore order.

Organizers within the military \mit s

encouraged meetings at which agitators formulated complaints to the officers,
denounced the Tsar, and called for a constituent assembly.

Most frequently

the soldiers demanded e two-;,yeor term of service, on immediate demobilization

39!2.!i• III, pp. 8o0-811.

of t:1.e reservists, batter food and clothing, better treatment by their officers, more frequent f'urlougt1s; the rigb.t to assemble and discuss their needs
within their barracks, the right to read what they wished, amnesty for all
soldiers undergoing punishment for previous disciplinary offences, and that
they no longer be used to res-tore order against their

mm people.

SO!llet:lmes,

at the instigation o"f' revolutionary agitators they would include the demand
for a constituent assemb:cy.
scious mi.."lority

wit~l

By uniting the demands of the political:cy con-

that of the merely dissatisfied minority, the Bolsheviks

i1oped to build up a massive following withi.YJ. the army.
'l'he Bolshevik activity in the Hoscow garr_Jon and its results were
fairly typic :l of Bolsl1evik efforts in other Russian garrisons.
October Manifest, revolutionary cells

After the

within the army organized an increasing

number of company and battalion meetings.

T:.'l.e main themes of the agitation

dealt ;.rl.tll the incompetence and corruption of the bureaucracy which had lost
the war, the hardships of Russian military service 1 and the injustice of
forcing soldiers to shoot at their own people to uphold the tsarist government
Outside the ba·:-racks, workers and agitators fraternized with the soldiers,
conversing with them or inviting them to workers• meetings.

'.l'O'trerd the end of

I:Tovember, some of the sappers in the I4oscow garrison decided to present their
officers

"t>rith

demands to better the condition of the rank and file.

If these

demands were not satisfied, they planned to arrest their officers, seize the
reg±nental store of arms, and the telegraph, and call the other tmits of the
garrison to join them.

On

November 26 and 27 the sappers and 300 men of the

!~esvizhski

and Perenovski regiments held armed demonstrations outside the

barracl\.s.

Had they been quickly joined by the city proletariat, there might

l1ave been an armed uprising.

However 1 before the worlters could join the

soldiers in an armed disturbance, the officers quicklJ satisfied same of the
Most ot the men were not interested in staging a revolu-

soldiers' demands.

tion and when their demands were partially satisfied, they first hesitated
and then retumed to duty.
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A similar demonstration took place in Kiev on N0 vember 17, but again,
the workers were not prepared.

A great crowd of workers did join the sappars'

demonstration in the Jewish }iarket and for awhile there was much shooting and
disorder.

The workers, however, were unarmed and loyal troops soon scattered

the demonstration by opening fire on it.

41

One of the grossest examples of lack of cooperation between the proletariat and the

a~

occurred in Voronezh on November 18.

A disciplinary

battalion rioted against their officers protesting the rotten food they were
receiving.

When the looal Bolsheviks learned of the disorder they were totally

unprepared to take any action.

Apparently they had neglected to form any eon-

neotion within the garrison and did not have the slightest inkling that trouble
was brewing.

By the time they sent a few men over to investigate and gathered

a force of armed workers, the disturbance within the barracks bad aen crushed
42
a.nd there was nothing for the workers to do but retum to town.
'J.be Bolshevik effort to win the army over to the revolutionary cause was
not a total failure, however.

Along the Trans-Siberian railroad they succeeded

1n forming large soldiers' organizations which closely cooperated with the
railroad workers.

In Krasnoiarsk, the soldiers frequently joined workers' dem-

•strations carrying weapons and red flags and shouting Social-Democratic slo-

-

ll.lls.

In Irkutsk, many of the soldiers went on strike and elected a committee

41
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partial~ c~~posed

of officers.

The 3olsheviks opposed tha inclusion of

officers in this com:r(d. ttee because they considered them to be bourgeois and
rightly feared that they would exert a moderating influence on the men.

The

Socialist-Revolutionaries and non-party soldiers, however, did not object to
the presence of officers, many of whom they still respected, and disregarded
the Bolsheviks in this matter.

In chita, the junction of the railroads lead-

ing to Vladivostok and Harbin, the Bolsheviks had their greatest success.

On

November 22, a Soviet of Soldiers and Cossacks was formed not so much through
the influence of the revolutionar.y cells within the army but of participation
in workers' meetings and the oratory of local Bolshevik agitators such as

V.V. Kurnatovskii. The Soviet readily declared its acceptance of the SocialDemocratic leadership and the solidarity of the soldiers with the proletariat.
On :!I 0 vember 26, this organization did combine wi tb the workers in the town

and for.mad the Combined Committee.

To have startad a general strike along

the railroad would have harmed the welfare
ated it from the revolution.

of

the army in Manchuria and alien-

Therefore, the soldiers and workers decided to

seize control of the railroad themselves and arrange for the speedy transportation of the Far Zastern army back to European Russia.

In the meantime, the

soldiers seized soma of the railroad cars on the sidings and distributGd 800
4J
rifles among the workers, thus leaving the regular aity government powerless.
Strangely enough, where the Bolsheviks hoped to have the most suaeess--

Within the defeated army in Manchuria--there was no rising or soldiers' soviet.

In Harbin, Flanahuria, a Menshevik Harbin Conmdttee and a Bolshevik Harbin GrofP

-

1!

4J
E. Polashahuk,

"Revoliutsionnoe Dvizhenie v Sibirskoi Armii"

Revol-

~~~!9?oe Jyizbenie v A£mii, PP• 240-JOO, Iakovlev, Vooruzhen1e Vosstaniia,

both carried out oral agitation and distributed leaflets urging the soldiers
to return home to protect their families against the Tsar and telling them it
would be necessary to seize the railroad to get out of Manchuria from
the Tsar feared to bring them baok.

wh~re

The only disturbances caused by the

soldiers were temporary strikes and enough reliable troops were left to crush
the revolationary movement in Siberia in the

n~xt

two months.
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It seems

that an army on the field is much more loyal and conservative than units on
garrison duty.
The Bolsheviks were not more successful in the navy.

At Kronstadt, the

island fortress guarding St. Petersburg, the cells among the sailors and. the
garrison's artillery-men intensified their activity after the October Manifest
and agitated for a demooratic republic.

However, the membership of the Sooial.

De.moora. tic circles remained small, totaling about ninety men and 1ts influence
was diluted. in a sea of Socialist-Revolutionary and non-party ::Jantiment.

In

spite of this, the Bolsheviks hoped that their organization would. grow and laa.c
a well-planned. revolution in connection with the St. Petersburg proletariat.
However, before the Bolshevik organization could be enlarged, outside factors
increased the ferment in Kronsta.dt.
beyond their term of duty.

Many of the sailors had been kept on d~aty

During the entire war they had been occupied with

garrison duty while news of defeats in the Far East and the mutiny in Sevastopol caused seething unrest.

On October 26, the dissatisfaction became open

when maey sailors and artillery-men held an armed demonstration through the
streets of Kronstadt demanding a constit~aent assembly, the rttduction

or

the

tel'lll of' duty for seamen from seven to four years, civil rights for all, and

the right to be educated in one's native language.
~-
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1'llh.en on the next day they

were joined by civilian workers, living in
demonstration got out of hand.

Krons~~dt,

and agitators, the

Sailors and hooligans raided several shops

o:1.nd tho public library, killing a few people in the prooess.

This was no

organized uprising but an outburst of vandalism which the small Bolshevik
organization could neither control nor make use of.
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A better organized uprising took place again in Sevastopol.
g~rrison

troops, and Savastopol workers held frequent meetings together and

separately im their own ships, barracks, and warehouses.
ized

~J

Sailors,

Soviets were organ-

many of the crews and there was muoh talk of the neoessity of the

improvement of oonditions in the navy to gain the support of the mass of
non~· ?Oli tical

members of the crews and garrisons.

Again, the Social-Democrats

last (lontrol of the situation before an organized uprising could be organised.
Lieutenant F . .,. Schmidt. com."llander of the Oohakov was hir1self a revolutionary
liberal and urged the Bolsheviks to call off the disorders in the fleet and
wait for the liberal Union of Unions to start the all-Russian revolution in
ltlhen most of the sailors' deputies refused to listen, Schmidt agreed

Mosao-vr.

to help them by staging a night raid and kidn11pping all the fleat officers.
However, he was only able to take over the Ooha.kov and three :mine layers.
Furthermore, he failed

t~

eaptura

ma~

of the officers.

The crew of the

Panteleimon (whioh wtl.s aotually the Petamkin renamed to erase its shame)
attempted to take over the ship as it had bean taken in June.

Though they

raised tho red flag, the officers and the loyal portion of the orew managed to
restore order.

Similarly, on the other ships, the orews hesitated before the

prospect of m1.1tiey" and ware still too disorganized to stage a ooup against
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thair officers.

The

S~vasbpol

garrison vlb.ioh had promised the sailors not

to fir'9 at ths fl,'i!&t if" it w.ut1..nied, finally submitted
opened fire on the

to their officers and

Ochako~T

setting it on .f'ire and ending the mutiny on Novem46
ber 17, after six days of great unrest and disorder in the port.
It seemed
tha. t the great enemy, spontaneity, stalked all .3olshevik efforts to organize
the revolution.
The 3olsh.evil-:>> 1 can1paigntto organize a.nd unite the mass of the· Russian
population, the peasantry, to the proletarian movement similarly failed.
first the outlook seemed favorable.
among the poasantr;r.

There was

plan~

of

revolutiona~y

At

feeling

lvhen the October Manif'est was issued the first react:i.on

of the peasants was, "1'lli.at? nothing about the land?"

Seeing that the October.

11an:ifest only brought on an inorease in the disorder in the countryside, the
Tsar isslled a special decree for the peasants on November

J, retduoing and

gradually abolishing all payments collected by the state to compensate the
l.ando'il!le:::-s for the loss of their serfs' lands in 1861 and establishing land
banb -vrhich provided cheap loans to peasants who wanted to acquire more land.
The Jolshevib quickly launched a campaign against this dfecree lest the peasant.;; should be partially satisfied by it and become more conciliatory- totiard
the landlords and the government.

They urged all the peasants to stop all

paylllGnts i111111edia tely instead of complying with the gradual reduction of payments since, in the past forty years, the peasants had paid more than the
L 1:is were worth.
paa.;;:;antry ·aven

The land ba.r,k was denounced as a means of mkking the rich

ri~her

while driving the poorer peasants further into debt.

Finally, the l~usants were renrlWnded that the Tsar sought only to protect the

-
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large landovmers by quieting p<iasant unrest l'd th promises while the November

3 decree did not give a bit of land to the peasants.
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The 3olsheviks had 11 ttle trouble in keeping up the rsvolutionar-.r a!'dor
of the peasantry sinoe, after all, they had plency of help from the SooialistRavolutionaries in that respect.

But trds was not enough.

revolution, organization was needed.

For a suocessful

Special groups of Bolshevik organizers

were sent out from towns to organize revolutionar,y peasant committees in the
villages.

In soma oases they succeeded.

Even a few days before the announce-

mant of the October Manifest, the peas.:1.nt::>. of tlikolaavsld in the Sara tov province organized a "Revolutionary Peasants' Committee 1 ' to replace the regular
gov3:,,nment officials with elected officials, destroy the government records,
abolihh governn1ent taxes and replace them with a. progressive income Ul.x,
organize an a:lUad

militi~.•

and confiscate all

esta:~e

requisition stores of bread fron the nearby estates
lands tdthout co:11pensation.

Soon after the proi.lam.,.

a.tion of the October 1-fu.ni.fest, the villagers of Nikolaevsld, joined by tho
villagors of

~fa.reyka,

began to carey this program out.

On October 20, an

armed band moved into town and seized all the government offices including

the post and telegraph offices and the wine shop.

After confiscating all the

money and arms they could find 1.n these offices, the villagers installed
their own
of breed.
~

committe~

48

there and began the confiscation of nearby private stores

In the nearb'; Samara province, the villagers of Staro-Buia:nsk

um went so far as to draft their own oansti tution.

w~s ~er1acAd

The regular govarnmant

by a peoples' congress and a popular]J· elected executive

board.

Under direct popular control, the executive board was responsible for the

47vysshi1 Pod'em Ravoliutsi~, I, pp. 82)-825.
48

s~·gin,

Bolshavistslde Or"'aniza.t.sii. S

•

~

P"v...1«h•

........

1nt:

1n~

protection of the village against the regular government, the collection and
dispensation of revenues, and education in the village.

The land was declared

to be at the disposal of the community and available to those who could use
it productively, though it could be taken away from them if they used it
irresponsib~.

The final settlement of the land question, however, was left

to the future constituent assembly.

Finally, peoples• courts were established

and all officials, including teachers and militia officers were electdd.
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These and other such popular governments were quickl.y destroyed when the al'llliY
returned to restore order but they did represent the Bolshevik ideal of a
revolutionary peasant committee.
Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, these instances of peasant revolutiona.ry were rare exceptions rather than the rule in the Russian countryside.
Instead of a well-organized revolution by self-governing communities, November
of 1905 saw a wave of violence sweep across most of the rural areas of Russia.
The more moderate instances of lawbreaking were the cutting of wood and grazing of animals on estate lands w1 thout the payment of a fee, the stealing of
grain and hay, the threatening of agricultural laborers who remained at work,
and the evasion of taxes.

However, most regions were beset by more violent

manifestations of peasant discontent.

Assaults at agricultural day-laborers

that remained at work, the wrecking of farm machinery, the theft of livestock,
grain, hay, and food stores, the looting of manor ho11ses, the destruction of
entire estates, the beating and expulsion of village elders and police chiefs,
the clashes with police and Cossacks, which defended the estates, and evan
aurder became widespread in the Baltic region, central Russia, the northern

-

49

"'~
Listovld. i Prokla.matsii
_ ( ""ibishev, 1959} pp. J00-)06.

Sa.marsko~:o

Komiteta R.S.D.R.P. (bll902-l9l? a.r.

Ukraine, the Volga region, the Urals, and, of course, Georgia.

Even in the

Baltic region, where numerou.s villages had established self-government peace...
fully, theee was a wave of violence 1n November.

In that one month, 2)0

estates were destrpyad. in Lithuania, 229 in Courland, and 197 in Estonia. 50
Two centers of the greatest violence were the Sara.tov province on the middle

Volga and the Chernigov province in the northern Ukraine.

In the Sara.tov

province alone, about )00 estates were levelled during November.51

Chernigov

remained quiet during Noveniber, but in December there was a rash of clashes
between peasants and Cossacks.
reached a new peak.

In wevtern Georgia, peasant guerrilla warfare

Late in October, the Rad Hundreds ambushed a Cossack

prison det1.il 1n£11ct1ng seventy oa.su..'.ties on the Cossacks.52

Bolshevik

agitators oalling for the organization of revolutionar.y peasant committees
weee lost in a sea or non-party agitators including doctors, agronomists, and
even priests, calling for attacks on the government and the landlords,but
gave no definite revolutionary directives.

Socialist-Revolutionaries set an

example of widesprN.d terrorism against government officials. but, aaoording

to tha 3olsheviks, they did not preach the actual overthrow of the tsarist
government or the establishment of a democratic republio.

Peasant unions

accepted resolutions approving the seizure of land by the peasantr,y but said
nothing definite about the overthrow or the Tsar.

Some Sooialist-Ravolution-

arias stirred up disorga.n1zed violence among the peasants by travelling around
the countryside in generals' uniforms and telling the peasants that the Tsar

-
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had giv•;)n
it

fro~tl

ther~l

the lrtnd but naeded the help of hi:. loyal su':ljects to seize

the landlords.

Such methods did stir the peasants to violence but

not to revolution against the tsarist government.

In fact, most or the

peasant violence was motivated not by a desire to overthrow the government
but by the prospect of personal gain or revenge--in short, crime.

Instances

of cooperation with the proletariat, such as the bringing of food to strikar.s
in urban

al~eas "Wal"e

rare.

Indiscrimi.nate murders weremore oor·mon, as, .for

it'lstanoe, si.""C agi t.<t tors of revolutionary parties wr.a killad by the peasants
themselves in the Saratov province during Novamber of

1905.53 Durine that

same month. VJ.adL'llir Voitinskii, a Bolshevik agitator operating in the village
of Chorino, near St. Petersburg, folln(l the peasants to be in a violent mood
but 11nwilling to reject God or the Tsar.

They were very unresponsive to his

:mc:>sage and he was only rescued by tsarist troops while the peasants wers
atte..upting to blind him with a splinter • .54
The agrarian revolts of

1905, therefore, oonstitutad more of a orime

wave than a revolution and were of 11 ttla help to the urban revolutionary
movement.

Order was tamporarily restored 1.."1 December. but in 1906, the .Empire

was sv;ppt by e•Mn more serio11s peasant revolts.
nothing.

However, these also came to

The lack of organized cooperation between the peasants and the urban

proletariat was one of the main causes or the failure of the revolution ot

1905.
vfuile the Bolsheviks u&re ooo~pied in 1nriltratine, soviet3, encoura~in5
the organization or peasant comm.ittass, agitating the soldiers. and, in
general. preparing for the armed uprising, the Menshevik-do:mina ted St. Peters-

n.

P• 773.

burg Soviet was pushing the workers and the government toward a ooll1s1ort
between themselves.

Early in November the workers began implementing the

eight hour day by revolutionary means, which meant that they just dropped their
work a:f'ter eight hours.

Hany of the Soviet• s deputies, and especially the Bol-

sbaviks hesitated to begin a struggle against the capitalists before they had
gotten rid of the tsar1st government.

The spontaneous pressure of the workers

for a struggle to better their eoonomio oondition, however, was so strong.
tha.t no elected body oould oppose it and retain the support of the workers.
Consequently, against the better judgement of most of the deputies, the Smet
decreed the eight-hour day in St. Petersburg. S.S

Moreover, prestige and

sympa. thy forced the Soviet into add1 tiol"al economic struggles against the
St. Petersburg industrialists.

On November 2, a political strike was called

to protest the government's treatment of tb.a mutineers in Kronstadt a:nd the
establishment of martial law in Warsaw.

The str1ke involved some 11,5,000

workers but it soon died out and had to be called off on November 7.

On

November 16, the St. Petersburg Soviet again became involved in a strike moTement when it declared its support of the All-Russian Post and Telegraph strike
though the strike had been initiated without prel.im1nary consultation With th.e
Soviet and c:ame too soon after the polit1oal strike in St. Petersburg which
had eneded on November

7.

Many in

the Soviet, especially Trotskii realized

that too frequent use of the general strike cheapened it as a political weapon
and weakened the proletariat tor its final struggle against the government.S6

In addition to the :fOlitioal strike, the Soviet had othermeans of

S.SB. Patrc.w-Radin, "Borba za Vosemoba.sov.nyi Raboohi Den," Istoriia Sove'b
Raboo!'Qkh Deputatov, 258-259.
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resisting government

authori~.

It exercised an effective resistance to the

lim1 ted government censorship which remained after October 17.

Printers were

ordered to strike against all papers conforming to the government's censorship
laws and the workers were all called on to boycott such papers.

In the mean-

time, the workers printed the Soviet• s "Bulletin" without government interferenoe.
Nor was the Soviet uninterested in revolution and absorbed tin an eeonomic
struggle against the St. Petersburg industrialists as most Communist historian
have maintained.

As a whole, the Soviet recognized the eventual need and in-

evitabili ty of an armed uprising.

Throughout its existence it aimed to organ-

ize and arm the workers by collecting arms and money and calling on all the
workers to make their own weapons of cold steel.

Some success was achieved.

Several hundred revolvers were distributed among the Soviet's deputies for
their own protection while about 6,000 workers did manage to arm themselves
with homemade pikes and bludgeons.

However, the St. Petersburg

t~rkers '~r•

certainly not so well armed that they could hope to successfully overthrow the
government.

Ac' t:1.a strike movement -4ragged on, contributions fo.r weapons were

reduced to a

trick~t+::

and it became evident tha. t the workers could hope to

revolt successfully only with the support of rebellious army units.57

If

Trotskii and many other deputies opposed an armed uprising at the time, it
was not that they were anti-revolutionary but that they ltere realistic.

Heanwhile, the Bolsheviks ware not idle.
ings were held.

More factory and street gather-

New political olubs were opened.

Ta.ld.n~ advantage of.' the new

liberties, granted with the October Manifest, the Bolsheviks began publishing

~

lf

57
G. Khr11stalev-Nosar•,

11

Istoriia Soveta Rabochikh Deputatov (do 26

.___o_ia_b_r_i_a_l:;.:9:_:0,.::5~g:od=a~·.:,>'_'_:I::s:::to;:r:;i:;i::;a::::S;:ov:::;e::;t;t=:R:;a::go=::oh:i::k::h:=De:=p:=u:.taato-.vw,:•:......t:P~P.:.•. :9~1; :-. : .98; ; ,;.·::....----J

their first legal newspaper, Hovaia Zhizn (New Life), under the editorship
of

~~xim

Gorkii, Leonid Krasin. and Maxim Litvinov.

The general format of

Novaie. Zhizn was similar to that of Vpered. and Proletaryii: lea.dine art1.eles
on current events and condemnations of the government or other parties; deciaions of the Central Committee; telegrams of disturbances in other towns
in

correspondence of party members and workers relating their axper-

Russ~:./'.;

iences

their work or the social conditions of the working peasants, and

L~

soldiers in their localities; and even some articles on the arts.

58

Tffben

Lenin arrived from S ritzerland to St. Petersburg by way of Sweden, Novaia
!h,.izn practically became the Bolsheviks' central organ.

It was a great tri-

urnph for Lenin to be able to edit his paper in the capital of Russia and he
soon set himself to the task of urging the enlargement of the Bolshevik organiza tion by including more workers in the party a.nd reaching some sort of

arrangement with the Mensheviks.
peared on

Novem~r

Lenin's first article in the new paper ap-

10, and called for the inclusion of more workers in the

party to give it some needed bulk.
By this

ti~q

he had lost his fAar that the swellinr, of the party's ranks

by any but the most 'ievoted and ideologically pure members might dilute the

strength of the party.
the older

par~

He hoped that 1 t would be the other way 11round--tha t

members might be able to eduoate the workers to a higher leveJ

of political consciousness if they were all in the same organization.

Lenin' s

support of a mass membership and elected leadership did not mean the abandonaent of a conspirator,y apparatus of the party. bgt that the Bolsheviks could
operate on the legal as well as the illegal level. However, coming events

-

·
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prevented the implementation of Lenin's ideas in most branches of the party

59

and it remained a substantially centralized and conspiratorial organization.
While both the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in St. Petersburg grew more
militant, neither the government nor the factory owners remained passive.

The

factory owners combatted the Soviet's campaign for an eight-hour d&y with a
general lock out which did much to weaken the ardor and strength of the mass
of St. Petersburg's industrial force.
direct action against the Soviet.

The government, meanwhile took more

Annoyed by the Soviet• s support of the

.r·os t and Telegraph opera tor's strike, whioh had begun on November 16, Count
~Iitte,

and the minister of the Interior, General TrepoY, had the president

of the Soviet, Khrusta.lev-Nosar', arrested.
the Soviet for a

II

Presidium'' composed

or

This step did not disorganize

Trotskii, Zlidiev' a Henshevik, and

the Bolshevik, SverchkOY was soon elected.

The arrest of Khrusta.lev-Nosar'

far from eased the situation but incited a. furor within the Soviet against
the government.
There was a brief argument in the Soviet.

The Bolshevik delegates and

many Mensheviks called for an immediate general strike.

Trotsldi, however,

sided with the Socialist--Revolutionary deputies who opposed an imm.edia. te UPrising at the time and feared that a general strike certainzy would bring
about a premature revolt.
sign of a military revolt.

The workers were poorly armed and there was no
Trotskii therefore wisely proposed that such dras-

tic action as a. general strike or an armed uprising be postponed until a more
favorable moment and hoped that the government might release Khrusta.lev-Nosar'
anyway thus giving the Soviet a great morll victory without an immediate con-·••-c._.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

59tenin, Collected Works, X, pp. 29-39·

flict. 60 No definite decision was yet taken on the question of an armed UPrising, but on December 2, the Soviet retaliated against the government by
issuing the

11

Finanoial Hanifest'' based on the idea of the :i•lenshevik, Helphand

(Parvus), that the government might be destroyed or very seriously weakened
by bankruptcy.

To prevent the governJUent from paying the large war debt

it had incurred against Japan and to paralyze it by depriving it of the revenue necessary to carr,/ out its regular funoti,ons, the 1111a.nifest" called en all
the people to withold taxes and all payments due to the government, demand
that all wages be paid in gold, or ooin for amounts of less than five rubl&s,
and that everyone withdraw their deposi tes from government banks.

The

"Hanifest" was signed by the Soviet and the central oommittees of the allRussian Peasants' Union, the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Soaialist-Ravolutionaries
and of the Polish Socialist Party.

e:

The "Uanifest" must certainly have touched the government in a sensitive
spot, for on the next day, Deoember J, Trotskii, the rest of the Soviet's
Presidium, and almost 2.50 deputies within the Soviet were arrested.

\oJ'hat was

left of the Soviet met a few days la tar and called for a general strike to
start on December 8 as the beginning of a struggle for a constituent assembly,
civil liberties, freedom of expression, the ending of martial law throughout
the Empire,

amnes~

for all political prisoners, the transference or all the

land to the people, and the eight-hour day.

were on strike in St.· Petersburg.

By December 9, llO,OOO workers

There. were nwnerous parades, demonstrations

revolutionar,y speeches, and isolated clashes with the police and Cossacks, but

-

,_

61

Ibid. I, pp. 2,5-26. D. Swertsohkoff, Im Morgenrot der Revolution,
\ .. :~:·1:.':1, Jugendintemationa.l, 1922.) pp. 38-89.

nothing decisive could be done by the workers without the news of an important
revolutionary victory elsewhere in Russia.

The news of a victorious uprising

in another important canter never oame, however.

TirEid try numerous demonstra-

tions and strikes in }lovamber and lacking firearr.1s, most of the workers gradually lost interest in the strike and by Decatlber 20, practically all of the
workers of St. Petersburg ware back at work.

62
~

Lenin and most of the other Bolsheviks of the Central and St. Petersburg
Committees, meanwhile, fled to Finland, where a Bolshevik conference was held
at, Tammenfors, December 12-17.

The most im.por:tant decisions reached were

rather inconsequential as far as the revolutionary movement of 1905
cerned.

~das

con-

The decision to fuse the3olshevik Central Cor.nuittee and the DHanshe-

vik Organizational Committee in order to arrange a fourth party oongress to
reunite the two factions had importance for the next year, while the command
to all local committees to prepare for an immediate armed uprising and to
notify the Central Committee when they were ready came rather late to have
any meaning. 63

Other cities in the Empire were already rising agiinst the

government though St. Petersburg was to remain quiet for the rest of 1905.
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CHAPTER V

TH!!: AruiED UPRISINGS
There would be no armed uprising in St. Petersburg in 1905, but many·
other Russian cities, especially .M.oscow, were to be the scene of clashes
betw"aen the government and revolutionary forces.

Rebellion among the garrison

troops signall&d the beginning of the conflict in Moscow.

The scene of this

beginning was the barracks of the Rostov regiment which made up part of the
garrison in 11oscow.
faction.

This military unit was already riddled with dissatis ...

It had bean used to :restore order in Sevastopol in November and this

experience had disgusted many of the men with the government.

1Jithin the reg-

ime.nt were a Bolshevik, a Henshevik, and a Socialist-Revolutionary circle,

each wf which held frequent meetings, distributed revolutionary literature,
and provoked the officers in taking ~requent discliplinary measures.

On

December 2, at the instigation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, part of the
regiment arrested three of its officers, forbade other officers to approach
the barracks, and elected a twenty-man commission representing each company to
aot as the regimental executive commission.

After taking possession of the

regimental arsenal and food stores, the soldiers announced they would no
longer carry out police duties against their own people, and demanded better
tre•tment, abolition of the death penaltzy', amnesty for aU political prisoners,
treedo.'!l of discussion of soldiers' needs. and the

sh

-1563srvice.

The next day, an

a~~

soviet representing the Rostov regiment, tha

Go:>sacks and artillery-men, and units from six other regiments was organize1.
Civilian 3olshevik agitators also atte.ndad the meeting of the army soviet
and urged cooperation and solidarity between the
For their

~~rt,

lllTv

and the proletariat.

most of the soldiers promised they would not take any action

.:t.gainst the workers if they revolted while some even promised to join and a"'Td
the workers if the Hoscow Soviet called for a general strike and uprising. ·
That same day, December 3, the news of the arrest of the St. Petersburg
Soviet arrived in Moscow and, of course, cau.sed an outburst of indignation
in the Moscow Soviet.

1r1ith the garrison in 1•evolt and the people in a revolu-

tionary mood, the fifteen-member Bolshevik }foscow Committee thought it time
to hold a conference and make a momentous decision on the question of a final
On December 4, the Moscow Committee, representatives from the

armed uprising.

Central Committee, and heads of the arirzy" agitation in department and the combat staff met secretly in a rented apartment.
was,

11

The question on everyone's mind

Is this the right moment to begin the uprising?"

One representative

of the Central Committee, I.A. Sammer, who had just come from St. Petersburg

with instructions. did not make it any easier to arrive at a. decision.

He

announced that the Central Committee suggested that the Moscow COllllllittee take
the initiative in beginning the armed uprising which was to sweep all Russia
since the Central Comid ttee had more confid.enca in the Moscow Conuni ttee than

in any other.

However, this was only a suggestion and the final decision still

rested with the Hoscow Committee.

And it was a difficult decision to make.

There was considerable division and debate among the Bolsheviks,

-
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and a lead~
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of the 3olshevik comba. t staff, !1oi. Vasil.Lev-Iuzhin, one of the Bol-

->hcvik representatives on the executive board of the Eoscow Soviet, urged
that the Hosco11f COF..t:Ltittee immediately call all the soldiers and workers to
join in an armad uprising.
executive
of the
~'lold

c~~ttee

anr~

V.L. Shantser, also a me:nber of the Soviet's

and the Bolshevik combat staff, doubted that the rest

would support the uprising and urged that the Moscow Bolsheviks

the soldiers and wo1•kers in readiness. but wait for instructions froiu

the Central Committee.

R.S. Zemliachka opposed an uprising at the time for

she thought the supply of

firearn1~

to be insufficient and suggested that the

Jolsheviks save their strength for another occasion.

Though this probably

would have been the correct decision, other factors made it difficult to
arrive at.

That vary day, the Soviet had called upon all the people of

Hoscow to prepare for a general strike and an uprising.
of 1'1oscow was in a mill tant mood.

The working class

It the Bolsheviks did not taka the lead

1n the matter of an armed uprising, the workers might stage a rising without
their leadership and bring disaster on the revolutionary movement and disgrace

to the party.

If the Bolsheviks did take the lead and initiated an uprising,

what wera the chances of a revolutionary victory?

Kudriavtsev, one of the

Bolshevik combat experts, provided some figures for encouragement.

He calcu-

lated the revolutionary forces to consist of 300 armed Bolsheviks, 300 Social...
1st-Revolutionaries, 100 Mensheviks, 150 students, and 150 or 200 armed men
of other or no groups at all. However, Kudriavtsev hoped that as the fight
went on, others would join.

}'lost of those at the conference had their doubts

&bout the success of the revolution.
6

Zemliaohka oast grave doubt on the

"'h-o:.t·1~ of the uprising by the soldiers and by the rest of Russia.

Many

......shared h&r doubts and the conference voted, twenty to seven to delay the call

for a general strike and an armed uprising and wait for further instructions
from the Central Committee or to see what course the mood of the workers would
taka.

2

Throughout the rest of December 4, the Bolsheviks even attempted to

delay the Moscow Soviet's decision on a general strike so that they could
discuss the matter further among the workers in the factories and wait for
an answer from the Central Committee.

They found the workers to be in an

angry mood over the arrest of the St. Petersburg Soviet and expecting the aid
of the army.

~vi th

the workers and the soldiers in such a revolutionary mood,

the Bolsheviks could not pass such an opportunity up.

H.I. Vasil'ev-Iuzbin

brought up the question of the situation in the army.

He estimated that of

the almost 15, 000 troops in the Moscow area, the government oould rely on only
Most of the rest would certainly refuse to shoot at the workers, but

4,000.

they would not join the revolutionary movement unless they were sure of a
strong and determined effort on the part of the workers.

If the Bolsheviks

passed up this opportunity, would the army ever be in such a mood again?

The soldiers would not rise unless they wre sure

was a difficult situation.

the workers bad really risen.
not sure of the soldier's

It

Yet how oould the workers rise i f they were

support?

Consequently, on Deoember 5th an all-

oi ty conferenoe of Bolsheviks deoided to reoOimllend to the Soviet that 1 t begin
the general strike on December 7 and to call for an armed uprising in the name
of the Moscow COimllittee. 3

It was their most fateful deoision of the year.

The Bolshevik decision

-
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to take up arms was also supported by the Mensha-
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-159viks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

All of them pressed for a resolution

which wa.s adopted unanimously in the Hoscow Soviet on December 6.
In Petersburg the Soviet of ~iorkers Deputies bas been arrested,
gatherings are being dissolved; we are prepared to answer this provocation by the government with a general strike, hoping that it can and

should turn into an armed uprising. The Moscow Soviet of l·lorkers•
Deputies, the Committee and Group of the Russian Sooial-Dtmocra tic Part;y •
and the Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party declare: To
announce in Moscow on December 7 at 1.2 o'clock a general political s triln~
and to strive to convert it into an armed uprlsing. 4
A leanet issued on the same day by the Moscow Soviet and the revolutionary
parties called the soldiers to join the movement.
Comrades Soldiers! You are our blood brothers and chUdren,
together w1 th us of the same mother, long-suffering Russia. You already
know of this and are confirming it by your participa. tion in the general
struggle • Today when the proletariat announces the deciding war to
the hateful enel!\Y of the people--the tsarist government--act with determination and courage. Refuse to submit to your bloodthirs~ commanders, chase them away and arrest them; elect from your own midst reliable leaders, and with arms in bands unite with the rising people!
Together with the working class obtain the dissolution of the standing
arm;y and obtain the arming of the people and the abo11tion of mi11tary
courts and martial law.

5

But even as the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary groups were commi ttin
themselves to a conflict with the government and calling on all the people to
join them, the favorable situation began to deteriorate.

4
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and other revolutionaries were deciding whether they should begin the armed
uprising or not, the revolutionary spirit in the army declined.

In many of

the regiments the officers promised to improve living oonditions, raised
monthly pay, and distributed liquor to partially satisfy the troops and get
them to betray the agitators among them.

Some battalions in even the most

rebellious regiments refused to join the movement and now the rest of the
units returned to duty.

Though they were still not considered reliable, there

was no longer a danger of a rising among the troops.

6

On the day that the general strike began another disaster struok the

revolutionary cause.

Two of the leading members of the Bolshevik combat

staff, Vasilievich-Iuzhin and Shantser, had previously worked out a plan to
seize the Governor-General's home, the Kremlin, and all the telegraph offices,
banks , and. railroad stations in order to take power in Moscow.

However, just

as these two Bolsheviks were conferring with Henshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary combat leaders, all of them were arrested by the police.

The two

Bolsheviks were jailed while the others were later released, thus depriving
the Bolsheviks of a coherent tactical plan and some of its best central
leadership. 7
~1/ithout

the support of the army the situation did not look too favorable

for the Bolsheviks or abe other revolutionaries.

Against the 4,000 or 5,000

reliable soldiers and 2,000 policemen the revolutionaries could muster about

250 Bolsheviks, 200 1-1ensheviks, 150 Sooialist-Revolutionaries, and 250 others
including a student organization, the Caucasian brotherhood, and some non-pa.rtJ
/
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volunteers and anarchist groups.

A l:Lenshevik source, Gimer, whose work was

published in 1906 and has since been lost, and Trotsld.i agree with these
figures for the most part though they add one or two hundred
utionaries and non-party volunteers.

8

Socialis~Revol-

At any rate there wre not more tb.a.n

1,000 armed and organized revolutionaries in 11oscow at the time.

Perhaps

),000 or even 6,000 others followed the combatants, hoping to pick up weapons
from fallen comrades or soldiers.

Litvin-Sedoi, the Bolshevik chief of s&aff

in the Presnia District on the west side of Nosoow, estimates that the arms

available to the rebels consisted of perhaps 200 rifles, soma of them Winchestars, and 500..600 revolvers, most of them Brow.n.ings, and about 30 low grade
bombs.9

This is a conservative estimate, but it was evident that the revolu-

tionary forces were badly armed.

This revolutionary

a~

was under the loose

control of a war council made up of combat leaders from the revolutionary
parties and headed by Litvin-Sedoi.

Attached to this

starr

were a medical

department, a financial department, arxi a mechanical department for the repair of weapons.
On December 7 the General strike started.
all stores

~

enterprises to be closed

b~

The Moscow Soviet ordered

the workers, except such essential

enterprises as the gas works and food stores.

Those enterprises which were

allowad to remain open ware warned not to charge the more than the usual prices and to grant the strikers cr!).:ii t.

To make the strike felt even more

widely the Soviet called on all tenants to stop paying rent. 10
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The fighting started on the day after the beginning of the general

strike.

It started off in a desultory fashion--nothing like the surprise

coup against all strategic points as Ve.sillevieh-Iuzhnin had planned.

Rather

than a concentrated effort against strategic points, the rebels carried out
a scattered and uncoordinated campaign of attacks on small groups of policemen and army officers and burglarized gun shops in the dark.

For the first

two days, they still sought to win the soldiers over to their side and tried
t.o tAlk to them and give them leaflets rather than attack them.

However,

Admiral Dubasov kept the :most unreliable elements of the garrison within the
barracks.

The soldiers who did patrol the streets did not usuallY fire at

the workers' gatherings or at the revolutionaries except in self defence,
but they refused to give the rebels their arms, accept their leaflets, or
even talk to them.
On

December 9, the first barricades began to appear in ::-fosoow.

!-1ost of

these were built in the i'tl.iusk Park, Tver Boulevard and Square, the Triumphal
Gate and Strastnaia Square in a rough pattern which seemed to indicate that
the revolutionaries W$re trying to aut off the center of the city from the
outer districts.
units.

11

However, there was no coordination between the rebel

The war council lost contact with the separate districts and no coo-

rdinated offensive could be taken against any strategic point.

The railroad

workers did take all the railroad s'vations except the Nikolaevsk Station which

11
Garvi, the leader of the Presnia }1ansheviks says there was a definite
Plan and order in the construction of the barricades. Vospanima~ SgtsialQ._emokrata., p. 629. V. Zenzinov, the leader of the Sooialist.-Revolutionary
detachments, says the barriaa.des were constructed haphazardly and spontaneously, more for moral effect than for actual use in defense, Parezhitoe, p. 225.
Perhap3 there was a vague plan in building the barricades, but the lack of
ooordination betwe~n the various districts did not allow the oonstruction of
a tidv net.wn"rk nf h,q,.....-l ... at"t.:o.,

was the terminal for the railroad connection with St. Petersburg.

Haphazard

attempt were made b,y the Bolsheviks and Socialist-Havolutionaries to seize
this station and several ilanks, but all these '!'Jere made in such a piecemeal
and disconnected manner, that they were easily repelled.

On

DitoeL'l.ht~r

9 and

10, some military units took the offensive, and, placing artillery on the
tver and Strastnaia squares, fired down the length of the boulevards clearing

or

barricades w1 th shells and caseshot.

course, the military and polioe for-

cas were too small to occupy the entire city and often barricades sprang up
in the same places where they had been cleared.
its successes.

However, the army also had

The "Aquarium" Theater was cleared of demonstrating crowds

and armed anarchists.

On December 9, the Fidler school, where hundreds of

revolutionaries had gathered for a general descent upon the police, was
surrounded by the army and shelled.

When the defenders surrendered after

some ineffective shooting and bomb-throwing. it was a grave defeat for the
revolutiona~J

forces for anywhere from 120 to

;oo

prisoners, most of them

Socialist-Revolutio..l'laries, were taken.
In such a situation, the revolutionaries adopted partisan tactics hoping
to wear down the army and eventually take over the stra tegio points in the
city.

On December 11, the Moscow Committee issued a leaflet advising the

revolutionaries to operate in small units:
1. The first rule--do not aot in crowds, work in small details
of three or four men, not mora. Let there be as many of these details
as possible and let them learn to attack quicklY and disappear quickly.
The police strives to shoot crowds of thousands of people with a hundred Cossacks. To fall on a hundred is easier than on one, especially
if that one shoots and escapes unnoticed. The pollee and army will be
helpless if all Moscow is covered with these small and elusive dete.ils.
2. In addition comrades, do not take up fortified positions.
The army always attempts to take them or si:rn.ply' destroy them with
artillery. Let our £ortresses be passable yards and all places from
which we oan shoot and escape easily. It they take such a place, they

will not find anyone there 1 and will lose many ot their own. It is
impossible to take them all, for to do that it wuld be necessary to
settle every heme with a Cossack.
3· Therefore, canrades, i t aeyone should call you to go in a
great crowd or to take a fortified place 1 can.sider him a fool or a
provoeator. It he is a fool, don't listen to him. If a provocator
--kill •••
The leaflet went on to suggest that the revolutibries attack soldiers only
in self-defence, but that they unhesitatingly kill officers, Cossacks, and

high-ranking policemen or those known to have been cruel to the workers •
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For the most part, the revolutionaries followed this advice 1 sniping, running,
and attacking individual officers and policemen.

Barricades were not serious

ly defended 1 but only used to slow UP cb.Srging troops so that they would pro•
vide better targets.

The revolutionaries did have

Bale

manents of success.

In one instance they captured an artillery piece but then found they did not
know how to operate it.

the rebels.

At the same time, costly mistakes were also made by

They paid a high IU"ice learning that soldiers were accurate

shots at a far greater distance than poUcemen.

To add to the rebels' mis•

fortunes, the town duma an December 13 armed 2800 volunteers to combat the
revolutionary forces and another 1000 to guard the strategic points in the
city.

By December 32 1 camnunicaticms between the rebel combat units in the

various districts bad practically dissolved and what was lett of the revolu•
tionary forces spontaneously drifted to Premia, one of the main warkers'
districts on the west side of town.

13 Here
1

z.

Litvin•Sedoi, who had lost

contact vith the Central Committee and most other revolutionary tmits in
Moseov, took charge of about 400 armed and 800 t.m8l'med men ot all parties,
including the units led by E. Desser 1 a Bolshevij., P. Oervi, a Menshevik,
l2
Vysshii Po§.
RIYQl~p,taii, I, P• 665.
1
3niueva 1 Moskqvsld.e Bol&hetlld, pp. 46-47 •

'a

and I. Dubrovinsk1i 1 a Soc1alist-Revolut101'.1.8.rY1 the Menshevik Pchelka group,
and the Socialist-Revolutionary Medvedev group.

Litv1n•Sedoi set up his

headquarters in Presn1a 1 complete with a military court vhich did have the
opportunity to pass a death sentence.

Other "executions" were less formal.

Lt.tvin•Sedoi himself led a band which d.isamed a Cossack colonel and shot
him.

Sakhar, a policeman regarded with great hatred among the workers 1was

shot without a trial by the Bolsheviks Who feared that the Mensheviks would be
too "soft" to carry out the execution.
who

other policemen, officers, and Cossack

were foolish enough to surrender met similar ends.
While the fighting was concentrating arOWld Presnia, M. Liadov was sent

by the Moscow Canmittee to st.. Petersburg to inform the Central Camnittee ot
events 1n Moscow.

On the way he saw that the St. Petersburg Moscow railroad •

was working at full capacity shipping troops to Moscow.

I
I

'I

When Lenin heard this

he exploded at Krasin, the head of' the Central Committees technical group
which had the duty of mining the tracks to Moscow.

Krasin came up with sane

lame excuse about his men losing their way 1n the dark end Vhat actualcy
happened was never cleared up.

The result was that Lenin and the Central Com•

mittee ordered that the action in Moscow be broken off' 1n an orderly manner
in order to save the Bolsheviks' strength for a future ris1ng.

'
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On the night of December 15 the Semenovsld and ladoga Regiments 1 both

completely reliable units, arrived in Moscow fran St. Petersburg. The next
day Presnia was cut off tran the rest of the city and shelled severely. Many

ot the men were demoralized not anly because they were surrounded and shelled
but also, the workers of many factories, newspapers, and electric plants were

l4

Liadov, Iz Zh1zn1i Pa£1ii1, p. 141.

'I
I,

I,

I

,

'

"

back at work since December 15 and it looked as if the defe11ders of Presnia
had been betrayed.

Dosser, one of Litvin•Sedoi's Bolshevik lieutenants,

urged him to order the men to hide the 1r arms and scatter so that they vould
be available for a future rising.

Litvin•Sedoi wanted to hold out a little

longer 1 hoping that the newly-arrived troops were tmreliable and fearing that

ending the struggle in Moscow might betray the other uprisings going on in
the empire at the t 1me.

But when late on December 16 he saw that most of

the Moscow proletariat was back at vork he saw the wisdom of the Mensheviks'

viewpoint and ordered bhe men to stash their arms w'.aere they could find them
again and to filter out of the district, througb. the troops, as best they
could.

The next day, amid heavy shelling, the rebels hid their arms in variou

places, and one by one, they stole away.

On December lB the soldiers charged

into the district as the revolutionaries had expected and found hardly anyone.
The uprising in Moscow was over.

On that day

the Soviet issued the leaflet

telling the workers they had not been supported by the rest of Russia nor by

15

the e.rrrr:1 and that they should return to work and prepareufor the next rising.
I£ the uprising was through the Bolsheviks were not.

A laat'let issued

by the MoscOW' Committee late 1n January of l9o6 struck a defiant note.

The

events of the past month had shown everyone that liberty could only be won by
an armed uprising.

In conclusion the leaflet read,

The December rising 1n Moscow has shown that the victory of the
working class iss possible and near.
It is necessary to prepe.re t:ar another struggle.
One more great, cooperative, ganeral effort of the Russian prole•
tariat and victory is ours.
Canrades, let us all tmite together, and step under the red

15

V~sshii

Pod' em Rew;y,utsii, I. pp. 713•715.

barmer of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party for the \mt'emitting struggle with the arbitrariness, force, and lawlessness of the
Tsa:!ist government.
Long live the ~d uprising~
Long live the popular constituent assembly and the democratic republic 1
Long live the Russian Soctal-Democratic Labor Party!
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Of'

course 1 the Moscow uprising could not avoid having its repercussions

in the rest of the lhptr..

Like ripples :frau a disturbance in the water 1 an

ever-widening circle of rebellion SPf."ead :from the heart of Russia, to the
rest of the .Qnp1re.

In N1zhni Novgorod a general strike vas called on Decem-

ber 7 in cooperation with the Moscow strike.

On December l2 workers clashed

with Cossacks and patriotic demonstrators. For the next tw days combat units
of Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries follom:rd the same tactics as the Mos•
cow revolutionaries-•sn1p:l.ng 1 attacking in mall groups, and running from
house to house.

Sane fortUied a three•story school building and repulsed

Cossack attacks inf'licting sane ninety casull.ties on them.

When tha army

trained artillery on the school on December 14, the rebels quickly evacuated
the school and the disorder quickl.;r died down. As :tn Moscow, the revolution•
aries, led by the BolShevik· $ema.Shko 1 failed to seize the strategic points in
1
the city such as the teJAgrapb. office, arsenal, ar a bank. 7
In the Urals, the Bolshevik stronghold, events followed the same general

pattenn.

In Ufa 1 the Bolshevik-dominated soviet called a general strike on

December 7 in support of the Moscow striloa. When sane of the Bolsheviks kid•
napped a hsndtul of Cossacks the troops outside of tovm. opened fire an the
shops and the rebels scattered into the hills. At the munitions plant in
Motovilikh, the Bolsheviks began hostilities by attacking and disarming police •
16
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men.

Hmrever, out of e.

wor?~

-

force of 10,000 they could only arm 300 men •

.As in Moscow the Bolsheviks built a few barricades and did a lot of sniping.

After they tried and failed to seize sane of the strategic poiuts in the area,
most of them were surrounded and captured.

In general, tr...e rising workers

in the Ural towns received no support from the army or the peasantry.

The

Bolsheviks were totally unprepared to lead an armed Ullt"ising in the Urals,

especially since they lacked firearms, yet they

~elt

they should show some

support of the Moscow uprising lest the workers be demoralized even it the
1
18
)
rising was hopeless.
In the Ukraine and the Don Basin, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks cooperated

in staging numerous and bloody uprisings.

In Kharkov the Bolsheviks and Men-

sheviks in the Federated Jtoviet could not agree when to start the general
strike and many Bolsheviks were arrested during the delay.

On December 12 a

crowd of workers preparing to seize the strategic points 1n the city were

,,
I

surrounded in the Gelferikh-Ba.de Factory. All attempts by large crowds to
save the workers were repelled by gunfire. '!his group of Bolsheviks

seemed

to have everything going against them. The Menshevik-contJJOlled railroad
workers refused to strike and let the soldiers in an the railroad.

The

troops which were thought to be lml"el1able fired at the workers despite report
aboat their loyalty. The peasants who were stagings revolt in nearby Kup11ansk and Lebedin did not come to help. Finally, of course, there was the
shortage of' arms.

So 1 the combat groUPs in the factory surrendered.

In

Roatov on the Don a combat group of 400 men, mostly Social-Democrats but also
including sane Socialist-Revolutionaries and students seized sane of' the
18
Bystrikh, Bolgvistskie Or1iiza.tsi1 Urals 1 pp. 226·235.
hsshi1 Pod 'ep Revollu.ts11, II. :p:p. 15::aiio.

'

railroe.d statio:.1s end
vicinity.

proe:eede'~

to d.isa:r"1 the :poliee

~nd

Cossacks 1n the

The army restored order on December 15 by using artillery though

Bolshevik grou:pn held the Temernik District and the suburb of Nakhichevani

on the other side of the Don mt 11 December 21.
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Even blood:i.Jrr co11flicts took. pla.ce on several stations on the rd.ilroad

from Kllarkov to Rostov.

One of t!1e bloodiest conf'licts of the revolution

tool"' place at Gorlovka.

Revolutionery combat units fran Debaltaevo, Enakievo,

Ianisovotaia, Avdecvka, and. Gr:tshino,il <reased' greatly
froiu Luga."l.sk 1 led by Klement! VoroshiloT

1

by a canbat group

the future World War II hero and

red marshal, swelled the number of the rebels to 4,000 of which about a 100
ha.J. rifles, 500 had revolvers and shotguns, and the rest were armed Yith
hon1emade pikes, leadpipes, daggers, and tools.

When this ho.rde charged the

railroad station and the barracks the garrison fled.

The soldiers returned

the next day 1 December 18 1 w:i.th reenforcements consisting of Cossacks and
dragoons and routed the rebels, killing about 200.

Similar seizures of rail•

rood atations by lare1! ccwoot groups took place all along the line vith s:bnila rresults.

It to noteworthy, ho'W'Ever, that this area was one of the few regions

:i..n which :pcosunts

coo~atea

rebels to several thousand.

with the workers thus swelling the numbers of the
By seizing the rtilroad stations, the rebels

planned to regulate traffic and especially to control the food supplies of

the cities, obstru.ct troop movements, and shift thetr <nm reentarcements where
they wre needed.

The region of the eastern Ukraine and the Don Basin, there•

tore presents a rare example of an nntire area, rather than one city, rebel•
ling as a. coordinated unit with cooperation between towns.

---------------------

, ...

However, they were

---------------------------------------------~

I'
I

too poorly armed to win.
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In the central Ukraine the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in Aleksandrovska

(today Zaporozhe) seized the railroad station and hospital. After heavy fir•
ing and plenty of banb throwing, the station was retaken on December 14 with

the death of' 300 workers making it one of' the bloodiest classes of the revolul&ion.
On the eastern coast of' the Black Sea the Bolsheviks participated in the

creation of' the "Novorossisk Republic." When news of' the Moscow general
strike arrived by telegraph on December 7 a soviet was organized.

The next

day it took over the town government, held new town duma elections in which
all classes were to be represented, and organized a "people's court." During
the next few days the Soviet taxed the rich to support the tmemployed 1 forcibly closed government liquor stores and other larger business enterprises
while it regulated the prices of those it lett open.

With a force of 300 to

500 men of which a few had revolvers while the rest were armed with cold
steel, the Soviet felt itself strong enough to begin requisitioning arms,
threatening Liberi.l and conservative newspipers, a:nd demanding the gold de•
posited in the local bank. However 1 either because its forces were too weak
or because most of' the members of the Soviet wanted to establish a purely
popular government, no attempt ws made to seize the bank, opposing newspepers,

or to disarm guard units made up of the middle classes.
arrived and a battleship trained its guns onNo\a'oS.sk

When a troop train
~December

25 1 however

the Soviet was its forces to be ridiculously weak and dissolved without resis20

.!2!S.· III. pp. 51-165. Iakovlev, Vooruzhe!J1e Vostap.nia., pp. 310-318.
L.M. Ivanov, "RevoliutsU.a 1905-1907 gg. na. Ukraine Ivanov, RJ1vol1utsUe 1905
r::.lfl__(JJ &.'UZ.. v Natsinna1nikn Rainonakh Ross11 1 (Gosudarstvermoe Izdatelstvo
Politicheskoi Literaturi, Moscow, 1955) pp. 111•116.

tance.
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The situation was not so quiet in the Transcaucasian area.

Hundreds and Bolshevik bands led by

s.

Peasant Red

Ordzhonokidze attacked small military

units, took over entire villages, raided government offices for arms and
money, and stopped trains throughout western and central Georgia, and especialy around Soch1 1 Sukhum, Poti 1 Kutaisi, and Gal:'i.

In 'l'Ulis a Central

strike Committee made up of eighteen Mensheviks and twi.lve Bolsheviks took ove !"
the city's railroads permitting only provision necessary to the workers to
enter the area.
vik,

s.

The entire Nadzal.adevi district was taken over by the Bolshe•

Ter•Petrosian (Kamo) who was later to become famous as the party's

leading "expropriator" as a result ot his engineering the Great Tiflis Bank
Robbery.

'l'b.e police we s chased out of the district and the administration

taken over.

However 1 troops returned to Titlis on December 15. 'rhough there

was no organized resistance there was plenty of sniping and ban"&-throwing
by all the revolutionaries 1n TU'lis and order vas not canpletely restored
there until December 29.

Meanwhile, an a1'1117 led by Alikha.nov-Avarski carried

out a ruthlsss suppression of the peasant revolt 1n Georgia.

22

In creating a revolutionary army and a provisional government the Bolshe •

viks achieved their greatest success in Siberia along the 'lrans•Siberian
Railroad.

In Kras:noiarak a Soviet of Soldiers and Workers vas formed in

early December.

Seeing that there was no power in the vicinity to oppose it,

the Soviet began to convert itself into a provisional government. All news•
papers were camaanded to defy the censorship laws. The eight-hour day was
\rtsshi P~'em Revoliutsii, II, pp. 574-580.
Vpsstannia, 261-2 1.
2
2

Iekovlev, VOQiFBHh!nnie

~issh11 Pod •em l!evoJ,iutsii, III. 768-877. G. V. Khachapurieze 1
~~~M~~~~ 1905-1907 v Gruzii,• Ivanov, Revoliutsiia v Natsionaln:f.kh Raionak :1

declared.

All liquor shops were closed.

The workers and soldiers themselves

regulated railroad traffic. As time went on the Soviet took on even more
governmental powers.

The police was disarmed.

Print shops were seized by

the Soviet to print workers • papers. Democratic elections to the town duma
were arranged. Finalq, the Soviet organized a workers' militia and levied
taxes to provide it with arms.

However, though the K'rasnoiarsk Soviet appro•

ached the Bolshevik ideal of' a revolutionary provisional government, it fell
short of the ideal in many respects. The soldiers, under the influence of
Ku.zmin, one of' the Socialist-Revolutionary agitators within the army, held
aloof' from the workers and refused to give them their arms, thus making it
impossible to form a truly powerful workers• militia.
the SOviet itself' hesitated before certain steps.
but not imprisoned.

On the other hand,

The police was disarmed

Instead of' spending more of its time and energy organiz•

ing and training the workers and seizing the bank, arsenal, and p.rison, the

Soviet spent most of its time arranging and campaigning in the town dtm'18 election 'Which it wanted to make a model democratic government.
The weakness of' the United Soviet of' Soldiers and Workers became apparent when the Krasnoiarsk Regiment returned tran duty in Western Siberia and
restored the town's print shops to its owners.

The rebellious soldiers rep•

resented in the Soviet either lost their nerve or did not wish to tire on
their fellow soldiers and most of' them surrendered their arms to the Krasnoi•
arsk Regiments.

The workers also lost their nerve and limited their action

to throwing leaflets at the newly-arrived troops.

Even the Bolshevik Melnikov

advised against violence because or the insufficiency of arms among the
workers.

The situation became even more impossible for the Soviet When the

defeat of the Moscow insurrection released more government troops against the

revolutionaries :1n Siberia.

On January 1, 1906, a strong expedit6onary column

under General Meller-Zakanelski arrived in Krasnoiarsk.

The Soviet diesolved

quickly enough but about 250 soldiers and 120 or the most revolutionary worker fl
took refuge in the railroad machine shop building.

T'u.ere they were pinned

down by rifle fire and cut off frau. water and heat while the temperature
dropped to --46° Centigrade. When they surrendered on January 3 1 the vorkers
2
were released but the soldiers were held for severe punishment. 3
In Chita sa similar associaticm of soldil:rs and workers took over the

regulation of traffic on the Trans-liberian Railroad.

In taking control of

the line, the Bolsheviks and their military allies hoped to spread dissatis•
faction among the troops returning fran Manchuria, let the most dissatisfied
and revolutionary elements pass into European Russia to aid the revolutionary
cause , and obstruct the pa asage of loyal troops to the west •

In contrast to

the situation at Krasnoiarsk, the vrorkers in Chita did not suffer fran any
shortage of arms.

On December 5 a railroad shipnent of 800 rifles had been

given by the soldiers to the railroad workers.

In January thirteen wagons

of arms and five of ammunitions were given to the railroad workers.

With

such an armed force the soldiers and workers defied not only the civil author•
ities but also the military authorities by freeing several imprisoned sd.ilors4
At the same time, the workers' militia policed the town and telegraph com•
I'
I

,li,'

mtUlications vith imperial authorities were cut off.
Despite the formidable power of the vrorkers and soldiers together, they
were not able to resist the government forces sent from Manchuria.

On Janual"J

6, 1906 1 General Rennelmmpf 1 who was to suffer the disaster at Masurian Lakes.
in 1914- 1 quickly arrested almost all the revolutionaries of all factions in

Harbin and immediately set ou.t far Chi.ta vith six tra:f.nloo.ds of troops picked
for their reliability, made up mostly of the 5th East Siberian Rifle division
and 11th Siberian corps which had been convinced by the officers that they

were not defending reaction but the tsarist goverment limited by the principles of October

17.

When the Chita rebels heard of the coming expedition,

they mined the railroad near Chits and hoped this might stop the approaching
force.

However, mines not covered by fire are almost useless and Rennenkampf''

sappers had little trouble detecting them and clearing the railroad.

The

rebellious troops had no desire to combat Rennenkampf' s large force.

The

vorkers, led by the Bolsheviks V.K. Kurnatovski, I.V. Be.bushldn, and A.A.
Kostiuzhko-Valiuzanich, sav themselves deserted by the troops and facing a
large and well-armed force.

The Bolshevik leaders, taking the size of the

government forces and the workers' lack of experience in fighting, advised
them to hide their weapons end scatter.

This they did but Rennenlmmpf' s

I'
'1,1

troops captured the Bolshevik leaders of the Chita Camnittee and shot most of
them with and v:tthout court martials.
revolution was thus snuffed out.

The last Bol.sbevik uprising of the

24

Besides the armed uprisings in which the Bolsheviks participtted 1 there

1

i'l

I

were outbreaks of violence in IB.tv:ta., Finland, and a troops revolt in central
Asia rlth which they had little or nothing to do.

In addition to the armed

24
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CONCWSIDN

As the year 1905 drew to a close 1 the Tsarist government was still
standing.

To be sure 1 it vas nat an absolute autocracy as it had been at the

beginning of the year but it was far from being the democratic republic the
Bolsheviks had aimed for.

The Bolsheviks had failed and when one looks over

their activity over the course of 1905 it is easy to see why.
One of the most evident weaknesses of the Bolsheviks and their revolu•

tions.ry allies was their lack of arms. An entire empire cannot be armed by
a series of smuggling operations, gun shop burglaries, or assaults on 1ndivid•
ual policemen.

'l'he defeat of the revolutionaries 1n almost every one of the

amed uprisings of 1905 can be attributed to the lack and poor quality of fire
arms.

'l'here was, however, very little either the Bolsheviks or any other

revolutionaries could do about it.
Another technical difficulty which cost all the revolutionary parties
dearly vas the inexperience of the members 1n actually fighting battles
against the government. Most of the men
fessional agitators or workers.

who

made up the canbat units were pro

They soon found that engaging the army was a

far cry from merely dodging the police.

The same lack of coordination be•

t;reen revolutionary units and the same failure to execute a well•pla:nned attac
against strategic points were evident not only 1n Moscow but repeated over
and over again 1n cOtmtless towns and villages.

The lack of mUitary ability

among the revolutianaries 1 in general, was exhibited on the strategic as well
a
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non-existent.

The eastern Ukraine offered a rare example ot cooperation be•

tween tCMls 1n a region, pooling resources and shirting farces to threatened
points in the area--too rare as tar as the Bolsheviks and the other revolu•
tiona.ry parties were concerned. Throughout the year the government reta:tned
effective control of commtmications and la!pt the initiative by attacking the
revolutionary forces when and where it pleased.

The grossest e:xsmple of this

is the passage of troops f'r<D st. Petersburg to Moscow in the most critical
times of the December rising while the railroad emplo,ees went about their
of operating the railroad.

The only real exception vas in Siberia W.L1.ere the

revolutionaries seized control of the line but this was

quic~

re:paired by

Rennenkampf and Meller•Zakanelski.
The wry size of the revolutionary farces made victory almost impossib
The snell number of' men who were actually able and willing to take up arms 1n

Moscow is representative of other centers 1n Russia. As yet 1 only a traction
of the proletariat ws actually revolutiOD.Bry.

In the second halt ot 1905

most workers' demands did tnelude political liberty and a representative
government. However 1 it is doubtful that aey great nl.ll1ber of the workers
were willing to fight and die tor these ideals or even tul.ly understood -what
they meant.
Only

Only a snall part of the proletariat participated in the mikes.

31.4;, of' Russia's factory workers participeted in the great October

strike, while in the December strike 1 which ws supposed to respresent the
peak of the revolutionary movement this figure dropped to 26.~.

1

It the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary parties had little support

among the proletariat, they had even less among the peasantry, the largest
class in Russia.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries were the only revolutionary

party Which had an:y real influence among the pea santa and though they did
rouse many to revolt, the peasant risings were scattered, unorganized, and
disconnected from the proletarian revolutionary movement.

The Bolsheviks,

understandably 1 concentrated most ot their et:fort on the proletariat and it
is difficult to see how such a snall party could influence and organize such
a large and dispersed class as the Russian peasantry. Yet, to get the
suppotrt of the peasantry 1 as Lenin had so of'ten emphasized, was essential for
a proletarian victory and the BolsheViks' failure to coordinate the peasant
movement with the proletarian movement was a major cause of their defeat.
Perhaps even more important was the failure to obtain the support of
the army. Again, this is partly due to the Bolsheviks' and other proletarian
parties' concentration of effort on the working classes. The bulk of the men
in the military forces seem to have belonged to no party at all or adhered

to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party 'Which appealed to the peasant majority in
the army. However, the failure to turn the army against the government was
due more to the difficulty of evading the army's security and disciplinary
measures against agitators and revolutionary- organizations than to anything
else. Furthermore, it was found that troops at the front are less susceptible
to revolutionary agitation.

The revolutionary parties failed to turn the Far

Eastern forces against the government.

General Rennenkampt was able to muster

a sufficient force to clear the 'l'rsns-Siberian Railroad of revolutionaries.
Most manifestations go to the front.

Even in those risings which resulted in

bloodshed, most of' the rebelling soldiers directed their anger sgd.inst their
officers and the army's disciplinary system while retaining a basic loyalty to
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God and their Tsar.

With the :&npire's large and well-armed military force

still basically loyal to the goverm.ent 1 the revolution had no chance of
success.
While the revolutionary parties Wluenced such a small part of all the
classes of the population, they were further weakened b1 division among
themselves.

There was no one leader who could marshal all the revolutionary

forces for one blow against the government.
cetmnanded the loyalty of only a small party.

Lenin -was a forceful leader but
The largest :party, the Socialist·

Revolutionary had many leaders and was not as well-organized as the Bolshevik
faction.

Meanwhile, there was little cooperation between the many parties.

Fa.ther Ge.pon's congress in early 1905 collapsed and resulted in no substantial
tm.ity between revolutionary :parties.

Bolshevik committees did often reach

local agreements with the Mensheviks and even the Socialist-Revolutionaries
as at Baku, Moscow., end Kharkov, but usually the parties could not agree on
when to start or end a general strike or an armed uprising or what tactics to
use.

Even during the Moscow uprising thel!f! was frequent bickering between

the canbat units of various parties.
Finally, one of the most important reasons for the Bolshevik failure in

1905 was that they let events control them and initiated the armed uprising
prematurely. The proletariat was as

~t

mostly disorganized and poorly armed.

The peasant masses 1 though in the midst of a violent upheaval, were still
disorganized and largely disconnected fran the proletaria.n movement. Most
important of all, the army was still generally loyal to the government, thus
ma1~in.g

a revolutionEtl'Y victory in 1905 virtually impossible. Faced with such

a iituation the Bolsheviks should. have postpoDed the uprising at least until
spring as Lenin suggested, or even far several more

~ars.

In a.Uowing them•

selves to be provoked by the arrest of the st. Petersburg Soviet and drawn in·
to action by a doubtful revolt in the Moscow garrison and by the fear that
the masses would be demoralized 1f they did not act immediately, the BolshevU s
relinquished their independence of action and failed 1n their role of "vanguard

of the proletariat."
But no revolution is a total loss.

The agitation of the Bolsheviks

and other political parties, the October General strike, and the armed up..
rising did serve to make the masses more conscious politically.

The soviet

was introduced into Russian politics and sprang up again 1n 1917 as soon as
the Tsar's authority was overthrown.

Judging by the way the Bolsheviks seized

power in 1917 they had learned scme valuable lessons fran their defeat 1n

1905.

I..?J. 1917 Lenin put little faith in the proletarian Red Gward and waited

for the army to support him against the Provisional Government. Nor did the
Bolsheviks allow the spontaneity of the masses to draw them into a conflict
with the Provisional Govermnent prematurely.

They withdrew their support froo

the July uprisings in 1917 and waited for additional casualties at the front
and the fear of a royalist reaction inspired by the Kornilov revolt to do the :I r
work before they dared to selze power in October.
One thing the Bolsheviks did not realize in 1905 was that they had been

defeated.

In the first week of January of 1906 Lenin wrote 1

Let the tasks of the workers' party stand clearly before it.
Dov.'ll with constitutional illusions. It is necessary to gather the new
forces joining the proletariat. It is necessary to "gather the experi•
ences" of' the two great months of revolution {November and December).
It is necessary age in to ad9Pt to the restored autocracy. It is
necessary to be able to crawl back into the underground wherever necess•
ary. It is necessary to establish practically and more definitely the
colossal tasks of' a new, active drive by preparing tor it more firmly,
more systematically, more persistently, gathering, wherever possible,
the strength of the proletariat, exhausted by the struggle of the strike~
Wave follows wave. After the capital the ].lE'OVinces. After the
border erea s the very heart of Russia. After the proletariat the tow
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petty bourgeoisie. After the town the countryside. The overthrow of
the reactionary government is inescapable in the execution of their
all-em.brac:irJ.g tasks. Mucl1 of the outcane of the first phase of the
great Russian revolution depends on our preparations for the s:pring of

1906.
2

Appendix I
RESOWTION OF III PARTY COHGRESS

OI'J THE ARNED UP.R ISirlG

1. Whereas the proletariat being, by virtue of its position, the foremost
and only consistently revolutionary class, is therefore called upon to play
the leading role in the general democratic revolutionary movement in Russia;
2. Whereas this movement at the present ti.'De has already led to the necessity
of an armed uprising;
3. Whereas the proletariat will inevitably taka the most energetic part in
this uprising, which participation will decide the destiny of the revolution
in Russia;
4. Whereas the proletariat can play the leading role in this revolution only
if it is united in a single and independent polltical force tmder the banner
of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, which directs its struggle both ideologically and practically; and
5:. Whereas only the performance of this role will ensure to the proletariat
the most advantageous conditions for the struggle for socialism against the
propertied classes of bourgeois-democratic Russia;Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.s.D.L.P. holds that the task of organising the proletariat for direct struggle against the autocracy by means of
the armed uprising is one of the major and most urgent tasks of the Party at
the present revolutionar.r moment.
Accordingly, the Congress instructs all Party organisations:
a) to explain to the proletariat by means of propaganda and agitation, not
only the political significance 1 but the practical organisational aspect of
the impending armed uprising,
b) to explain 1n that propaganda and agitation the role of mass political
strikes, which may be of great importance at the beginning and during tr:~e
pro~ss of the uprising, and
c) to take the most energetic steps towards arming the proletariat, as well
as drawing up a plan of the armed uprising and of direct leadership thereof 1
for which purpose special groups of Party workers should be formed as and
when necessary.

Trettii snezd, p. 4-50-451.

Appendix II
DEX: ISIOI~ OF III PARTY COifGRESS
PROVISIONAL

REVOLUTIOI~Y

mr

THE

GOV.TiRNl·1Erfl'

Whereas both the direct interests of the Russian proletariat and those of
its struggle for the ultimate aims of socialism require the fullest possible
measure of political freedom, and, consequently, the replacement of the autocratic form of government by the democratic republic;
2. Whereas the actualization of a democratic Republic in Russia 1s possible
only as a result of a victorious popular amed uprising of ~1ich a provisional
revolutionary government will be the organ,. which alone is capable of securing
complete freeda~ of agitation and of convening a Constituent Assembly that
will really express the will of the people, an Assembly elected on the basis
of universal, direct 1 and equal suffrage by secret ballot; and
3· Whereas this democratic revolution in Russia by its Socio-economic system,
rrill not weaken, but, on the contrary, will strengthen the domination of the
bourgeoisie 1 which, at a certain juncture 1 will inevitably go to all lengths
to take away from the Russian proletariat as many of the gains oi' the revolutionary period as possible;-Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves:
a) that w should spread among the working class the conviction that a
provisional revolutionar,y government is absolutely necessaey, and discuss at
workers' meetings the conditions required for the full and prompt realisation
of all the :Immediate political and economic demands of our progranrne;
b) that in the event of the victorious uprising of the people and the com•
plete overthrow of the autocracy, representatives of our Party may participate
in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against all counter-revolutionary attempts and of defending
the independent interests of the working class;
c) that essential conditions for such participation are strict control
of its representatives by the Party, and the constant safeguarding of the
independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which strives for the complete
socialist revolution, and, consequently, is irreconcilably opposed to all the
bourgeois parties;
d) that, irrespective of whether participation of Social-Democrats 1n the
provisional revolutionary government is possible or not, we must propagate
among the broadest sections of the prol.etatiat the idea that the armed proletariat, led by the Social-Democratic Party, must bring to bear constant pressure on the provisional government for the purpose of defending, consolidating
and extending the gains of the revolution.
1.

Trettii S"ezd, p. 451-452.
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Appendix III
DECISim: OF III PARTY COHGRESS

0:~

TH.E

1. V."h.ereas the growing peasant movement, though spontaMous and politically
unconscious, if.~ nonetheless inevitably directed against the existL'"lg order
and all remnants of serfdom in general,
2. l\l};.ereos it is one of the tasks of Social-Democracy to support every
revolutionary mov:?ment against the existing social and political order;
3. h'hereas, L'l vie"t-r of the aforesaid,. the Social-Democrats must strive to
purify the revolutionary-democratic features of the peasant movement of all
reactionary premises to develop the revolU'tiionary consciousness of the
peasontry and fulfill their democratic demands to their logical conclusion;
4. Whereas t:"l.e Social-Democratic Party, as the party of the proletariat, must
in all cases and under all circumstances work steadfastly for the independent
organisation of the rural proletariat and to clarUy for this class the irreconcils.ble antagonism between its interests and those of the peasant
bourgeoisie;-Therefore 1 the Third Party Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. instructs all
Party organisations:
a) To car:ey on propaganda among the wide masses of the people that Socialdemocracy considers it its task to support all revolutionary measures of the
peasantry 1 which are capable of bettering of its condition, even to the confiscation of patrimonial state church, monestary and private estates.
b) To put fo~-~Srd as a practical slogan for agitation among the peasantry·
a.'>l.d as a means of instilling the utmost political consciousness into the
peasant movement, the necessity of the immediate organisation of revolutionary
peasant committees that shall heve as their aim the carrying out of all revolutionary-democratic reforms in the interests of the peasantry ZL.'>l.d the liberation of the peasantry from the tyranny of the police, the officials, and the
landlords;
c)To the peasantry and rural proletariat, to non-performance of military
service 1 general refusal to pey taxes, and ref'ussl to recognise the authorities, in order to disorganise the autocratic regime and support the revolution
ary onset directed against it;
d) to work for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat
and for its fUsion with the urban proletariat under the banner of the SocialDemocratic Party and the inclusion of its representatives in the peasant
Committees.

Trettii S"ezd, p. 454.

Appendix IV
LENIN'S POSITI<li Vl!BSO'S LI.BPEAL

C<MPROMISE WITH AUTOCRACY

'.rllREE CottsriTUTIONS 00 'l'.HRD sYSTliMS
<F GOVIiRN'MKNT

What do the police
and officials want1

'lhe absolute monarchy.

lihat <!o the most
liberal of the bourgeois (the people
of the Osvobozhde•
niye 1 or the Constitutional-Demo•
cratic Parjty wanti
The constitutional

monarchy.

What do the classconscious workers
(the Social-Democrats) wantt

The democratic re-

public.

OJ!' WHAT DO TIIESE SYSI'EMS OF GOVERNMENT C<JiSISl'f

Absolute

Const; itutional
monarchy

monarchy

Democratic
Republic

1. The tsar--an
absolute monarch.

1. The tsar--a con•
stituliionAl monarch.

2. A Council of
State (officials appointed by the tsar) •

2. An Upper IIouse
2. No Upper House.
of popular representatives (indirect 1 not
quite equal and not quite
universal elections).

3 • A state Duma, or
consultative body- of
:popular representatives
(indirect 1 unequal, and
non-universal elections).

3.

A Lower House

(universal, direct, and
equal elections by
secret ballot) •

1. No tsar.

3· A single republican house ( 'lm.iver•
sal, direct 1 and
equal elections by
secret ballot) •
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WHAT IS TJE SI~TlFICA.I.""lCE OF THESE

SYSTm:lS OF GOVmNMm:TTY

Absolute

Constitutional

Monarchy

Monarchy

Democratic
Republic

1 and 2. Cor.1plete
power of the police
~~d the officials
over the people

1. One-third of
the power in the
hands of the police
and the officials,
headed by the tsar.

1. Uo independ ...
ent power for either
the police or the
officials; their com~
plete subordination
to the people •

3· Consultative
voice of the big
bourgeoisie and the
rich landlords.

2. One-third of
the power in the
hands of the big
bourgeoisie and the
rich landlords.

2. lie privileges
for either the capitalists or the lnndlords.

rio power for tlle people.

3. One-third of
the power in the
hands of the whole
people.

3· All power-wally, completely
and indivisibly-i."l. the l:umds of the
whole people •

WHAT PURPOSE SIALL THESE
SYS'lEMS fR GO~ SERVE!
Absolute
Monarchy

That the courtiers,
the police 1 and
the officials may
live on the rat of
the land;
that the rich may
rob the workers
and peasants at
their own free will;
that the people
may remain forever
without rights and
live in darkness
and ignorance.

Constitutional
Monarchy

That the police
and the officials
may be dependent
on the capitalists
and landlords;
that the capitalists, landlords, and
rich peasants may
freely and easily
rob the workers of
town and country1
by right and not
by arbitrary rule.

Lenin, Collected Works, v. 8.

Democratic
Republic

That the free and
enlightened people
may learn to run
things themselves,
and 1 principally 1
that the working
class may be free to
struggle for socialism, for a system
under which there
<t.rill neither be rich
nor poor and all the
land 1 all the factories and "WOrks 1 will
belong to all the
working people.

Appendix V

LEAFLET ISSUllD BY T.UE FEDERATIVE SOVIE'.r 00, MOOOOW
:EXll:.t:PLJFYn{G 'niE BOISHJWDCS' AriD I•tl!:tfS'IEVIICS'
CONDJ!l&TIO!r OF THE
OCTOBmt t~JA<.'llFEftt

Comrades!

Our terrible stril.a has delivered an awful blow to the hate-

ful (;0\"Crn::.'lent of the Tsar. In confusion, the autocracy grabs on to its last
remain.L."lg recourse: it struggles within the loving embrace of the bourgeoisie
and its servants, the moderate liberals. The co-wardly manifest of the Tsar
is a solei:m offering of hand and heart to our sworn enemies, OU't" eternal oppre stsors1 the bourgeois class. TOf:tha proletariat it insures nothing but cloudy
promises of all liberties and nev threats and coercions.--olr strike has de-

livered an s:wful blow to the Tsarist gowrnment, but it has also shrnm us
that it is impossible to kill it and. wipe it fran the face of the earth bymeans of a strike alone.--"weaponst" .,Give us wsponsH" tbat is the demand
that resounded frcrn all sides. The strike r.tas united and organized us, it
has shown the enitre world our strength, it has opened the eyes of our blind
canrsdes 1 it has sparked the thirst for liberty in all the proletariat. The
present strike has plaj"Sd its great role 1 it has given all it can give. We
can get nothing more from it • We propose that it be temporarily suspended.
Temporarily, cCil11'8des1 Because we will soon take the field again, we 'Will talm
the field 1n the decisive stl"UI;!le and for that decisive taking of the field
l~ should prepare as follows-- To arms!"·· That is our ir:'~diate call. Arm
yourselves, canrades1 with whatever you can 1 obtain -weapons wherever you can.
--we know that l.11Sny 'Who have aided us in thestrike t~re leaving us. Many of
these will become our enemies and vill kiss the hand 'Which only ~sterday
r
whipped them. But the terrible proletariat does not need false allies and is
not afraid of its enemies as many as there may be. Organize, canrades, close
your ranks tightly, and gather under our pure proletarian decisive struggle.
We swear by the blood of our fallen c0ll11"8des that we vill not lay down our
ams until we destroy the government and obtain the realization of our demands.
--we vill prove that contemporary society is supported only by the strength
of' proletarian a.ltoulders. And let the entire bourgeois world lmow that "le rtll
bring all our strength to bear against it if it thinks to stand 1n our way.
Suspending the general political strike for nov, we propose that those of our
comrades ~rh.o r...ave put forth economic demands, use all means to realize them.
Along 'With that, we call upon all canrades to champion the liberty of speech
and assembly w:tth all their strength, eveey"VThere 'Where we have obtained it.
And after that, we will quickly prepare ourselves, eanrades, for the armed
upris:tng. v!ith a.rmed hands we will overth.rov the tsarist government and then
the provisional revolutionary government will call together a popular constituent assembly, 'Which will legalize our immediate demands. Let our terrible
calls carry over aU of proletarian Russia like a storm. To amst Long live
the uprisingt Long live the popular constituent assemblyl Long live the
democratic republic t I..ong live the struggle for socialimllt L:mg live the
Russian Social-Democratic Partrl-

APPENDIX VI
ISTTZR OF OCTOB!i:R 27 TO ALL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
SHOtiDiJG THE BOLSH3VIK ATTITUDB:
TOl~RD

SOVIETS

The Russian Social-Democratic par~ must at the present time openly
step forward as the party of the Proletarian masses. In the way of such a
manifestation it meets politically vague and socialistically immature workers'
organizations created by the spontaneously revolutionary proletariat. Each
one of these organizations, presenting a certain stage in the political development of the proletariat in so much as this development stays within the
ranks of social-democracy. But objectively such an organization faces of
holding back the proletariat on a primitive political level and so subordinate
it to bourgeois parties.
One such organization is the Petersburg Soviet of '1lorkers' Deputies.
The tasks of Social-Democracy in its relation to the Soviet is to induce it
to adopt the Sooial-Damooratic program and tactical leadership. With these
aims it is necessary to immediately nobilize all the Social-Democratic forces
in the Soviet in order to put the Social-Democratic platform into practice
within the Soviet.
In its relations with such independent organizations, in as much as they
attempt to take upon themselves the role of the political leaders of the
proletarian masses, the tactics of the Sooial-Democra ts should.be such:
1) To persuade such organizations to adopt the program of the SooialDemocra tic Par~ as the party in accord w1th the true interests of the proletarian masses. In adopting this program, they should actually define their
relation to the Social-Democratic Party, recognize its leadership, and finally, dissolve itself into it. It these organizations should not strive for
political leadership but merely remain pure trade organizations, they fulfill
their definite purely technical role.
2) In the case of the refusal by such organizations to adopt our party
program or their adoption of some other program, Sooial-Demoorats should quit
them and expose their anti-proletarian oharacter.
J) Finally, when the organizations refuse to adopt this or that certain
program, but reserve for themselves the right to define their polioy in
each separate instance, Social-Democrats should remain within them and proving within these organizations as well as among the wide masses the absurdity
of such political leadership and amplifying their own program and tactics.
l1.I. VasU• ev-Iuzhin, "!1oskovskii Sovet Rabochikh Deputatov v 1905"
.f.roletarskaia B.tvoliutsiia, April 1925, PP• 89-90.
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A?PENDIX VII
RUSSIAN SOCIAL-JEl'10CRATIC LABOR PARTY
PROLETARIANS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE t

Regula t:i.Olls of the
"'Jorkers' Comba. t Company
of the Moscow Committee of the RSDLP
#1. The i'IC RSDLP imposes the following tasks on its comba. t company
First, it must protect all gatherings of organized workers from encroach
ments by the Black Hundreds, police, a:rxi Cossacks.
Second, it must take upon itself the protection or all citizens against
the pograoms and lawlessness organized by the police.
Finally, third, it must help the conscious proletariat organize itself
for the armed uprising and at the very moment of the uprising must take its
place in the front ranks of the proletariat in order to repel the last forces
of the autocracy.
One joining the company
:>hould calculate his abilities strictly.
He should remember that in all conflicts he will be in the forefront and
that he will always be threatened by death. A member of the company
must
be selfless and brave.
#2 Only those persons ms.y be members of the combat company who are
well-known by soma parcy organizations and are recommended by it as unconditionally conspiratorial, determined, a:rxi devoted to the party.
#J. The company is divided into the active and the reserve components.
#4. The members of the active company are those who have learned to
use weapons wlll, are acquainted with the necessary methods of combat operations , and are possessed of a spirit of strict discipline.
ffS. In the reserve are included those persons w1 th preliminary training
who wish to join the company but do not meet the requirements of #4.
Note. All local party workers possessing weapons may be included in
the reserve.
16. The active part of the company, constituting the main combat strang h
of the organization, is divided by districts into details headed by organizers
designated by the Committee and approved by the detail. Each detail is composed of several tens made up, if possible, of those working on one plant or
living alose to eaah other, and including an elected 11 Desiatsk1i" approved
b,y the organizer, a courier, and a scout.
Note. Each new ten of a detachment is recruited from. the district
reserve under the strict control of the foreman and the organizer.
#7. The responsiblli1;y to concern oneself with the prudent growth of
the detachment, correct distribution or weapons withint the detachment,
the correct procedure of m1litary exeraises, and so on, falls on the organizer
At times when the detachnent is acting or is performing soma service,

APPENDIX VII (Cont' d.)
submit themselves.
Note. For the combat training of each detachment a special instructor
may be designated; At the time when the entire company
takes the field,
the instructor may receive command of the detachment. This fact is to be
announced to the detachment by the organizer who from that moment places himself under his command in the role of his closest assistant.
Note. 2. The gathering of organizers, under the presidency of a repre~
senta.tive of the Committee constitutes the council of the company, managing
its internal affairs.
#8. The district organizer can be removed b,y the demand of a two-thirds
majority of a general assembly of the detachment, called together by the
representative of the Committee based on the demand of one fourth of the
detachment.
t9. It is the responsibility of the ffdesiatskii" to supervise the distribution of weapons. The responsibili~ of the distribution of weapons within the ten, the strict account of bullets and their distribution, the supervision of the conditions of the weapons of eadh member, the calling together
of the entire ten on the demand of the organizer, and so on, falls on the
"desiatskii." During a period when the ten has taken the field, for example
in protecting plant meetings, the 11 Desia tsldi, 11 in the basence of the organizer commands the ten, and eonsequently, the entire ten is to submit to his
orders.
#10. Weapons, given by the organization belong to the organization
and not to the individual members. Therefore,
1) No member has the right to arbitrarily dispose of the weapon
given to him, to transfer it to other hands, or exchange it with other comrades or give it away for repairs without permission, and so on.
2) Leaving the organization, even temporarily, each is oblighed,
~thout fail, to transfer the weapon to the organization, through the 11 desiatski •
#11. The right to carry weapons constantly is given only to the active
company. Members of the reserve may only have them during target practice
and during the fulfillment of some task, if necessary.
#12. In the handling of the weapons, each member is obliged to strictly
follow particular instructions and all the directives of the leaders: otherwise, the weapon may be taken away from him by the 11 desiatskii" or organizer.
#13. To preserve comradely relations members must conform to strict
discipline, by the force of which each member is obliged to:
1) To show up in the designated place and time at the first call.
2) During periods of combat activity and service, the company is to
submit unconditionally to all the dispositions of the leaders, even i f they
should seem to be incorrect.
3) Departing from the city for a time, it is obligatory to obtain
leave from the "desiatskii" or the organizer, and leave the weapons with him.
#14. Each member must hold the internal affairs of the company in
trictest secrecy, not speaking about them needlessly to even the closest
comrades.
#15. For a more or less serious breech of the regulations a member may
be excluded from the company and this exclusion is possible only b,y a decree
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of the comradely court.
Note. Each Desia tskii or organizer may temporarily remove a member
from the detachment.
Printing Department of the Moscow Committee.
Vysshii Pod'em Revoliuts11. I, pp. 600-601.

APPZNDIX VIII
LEAFLET OF TIE HOS CO~i

CALLING FOR THE

COH~'.liTT3Z

PREP~1ATION

ISSUED ON DZCZi11£R 4,

FOR A FINAL DZCISIVE

STRUGGLE AGAINST THE AUTOCRACY.

Comrades! Every day it gets harder for the Tsarist government. Its
last support--the a~--is also wavering and is beginning to rise directly
against it. After Savastopol, Kronstadt, Piatigorsk, Riga and SamaJa,, the
army has also rebelled here in Hoscow. In the Rostov Regiment all the officers have been expelled, all tha authorities' guards have bean seized, and
the barracks and weapons are in the hands of the rebelling regiment.
The rest of the arm;y is also restless.
Not today, but tomorrow, perhaps , the deoisive day will come, when the
army will not be in a condition to restrain itself and will come out on the
street. Perhaps, the day of the decisive struggle is near. Prepare your..
selves, comrades, that you ma.y provide help to your comrades, the soldiers.
Prepare yourselves, tba t we may, through the general strike and other means,
help our friends and comrades overthrow the common ene:uzy- by force. Organize,
prepare for the decisive struggle.
Moscow Committe• of the Russian SooialDemocratic Labor Party.
December 4.

APPENDIX IX

CALL OF THE IJJ.OSCOW SOVIET AND THE MAJOR REVOLUTIONARY
PARTIES IN MOSCOW TO PREPARE FOR THE ARMED UPRISING, ISSUED DlOC'EMBJm 6.
TO AU. WORKERS, SOLDIERS, AND CITIZENS
Since October 17 when the working class forcefully tore the promise of
various liberties and the "actual" inviolability of the person from the tsar1st government, violence on the part of the government did not only not cease
but even increased, and h\.UI1an blood is flowing as usual.
Free gatherings where free words can be heard are scattered with weapons
Trade and political 1.mions are cruelly persecuted. Free newspapers are closed
by tens. Prison is threatened for striking.
Such mockeries and violations are made of the actual "inviolability" of
the Russian citizen, that the blood freezes in one's veins.
Again the prisons are being crammed full of fighters for liberty.
Entire counties and provinces are being put under martial law.
litmgry peasants are being beaten and shot without mercy.
Sailors and soldiers not wanting to be fratricides and joining their
people fester 1n prisons and ere drowned and killed.
If a 11 the blood and tears spilled throug.l-J. the guilt of the government
only in October were gathered, the government would drown in them, comrades!
But with special hatefulness the tsarist government comes down on the
working class: concluding an agreement with the capitalists, it throws hundreds o:f thousands of workers out on the street, dooming them to pauperism
and a hungry death.
It places deputies and workers' leaders in prison by tens and hundreds.
It threa•ens to take "exceptional" measures against the representatives
of the Social-Democratic Labor Party and the party of Socialist-Revolutionaries
It has again organized the Black Hundreds and threatens new mass murders
and pogroms.
The revolutionary proletariat can no longer tolerate the mockeries and
crimes of the tsarist government and declares a decisive and 1.mrelenting war
against it.
Comrades workers! We, your elected deputies, the Moscow Committee,
the Moscow Group, the !·1oscow District Organization o:f the Russian SocialDemocratic Labor Party, and the Moscow Committee of the Party of SocialistRevolutionaries declare a general political strike and call you to drop and
stop your work at all factories and p lants and 1n all business and government
enterprises on Wednesday, December 7, at 12 o'clock.
Long live the unrelenting struggle with the criminal tsarist govern..rnent.
Comrades soldiers, you are our blood broth.ers, children, together with
us of the same mother, long-suffering Russia. You have already acknowledged
and confirmed this through your participation 1n the general struggle. Today
when the proletariat declares a decisive war on the hateful enemy of the
people--the tsarist government--you also act with determination and solidarity.
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Refuse to submit to your blood thirsty leadership, expell them and arrest
them. Elect reliable leaders froo among yourselves and with weapons in your
hands, unite with the rising people. Together with the working class, obtain
the abolition of the army and t~:1e general ::rming of the people. Obtain the
abolition of military courts and martial law.
Long live the union of the revolutionary proletariat with the revolutionary army!
Long live the struggle for general freedom!
And you citizens, wf.1o truly thirst for widespread freedom, help the
rising wurkers and soldiers as much as you can--by personal participation and
general means. The proletariat and tlle army struggle for the liberty and
happiness of all Russia and all the people. The entire future of Russia is
placed on a card; life or death, liberty or slavery!
With our tmited strength we will finally overthrow the criminal tsarist
government, convoke a constituent assembly based on general, equal, direct,
and secret suffrage, and asset a democratic republic which alone can guarantee
broad freedom and actual inviolability of the person.
Together into the struggle, comrades workers, soldiers, and citizens.
Down with the criminal tsarist government:
Long live the general strike and armed uprisingt
Long live the popular constituent assembly!
Long live the democratic republic!

The fvbscow Soviet of Workers Deputies
The Moscow Committee
RSDLP
The Moscow Group
The Moscow district Organization
The Moscow Connnittee of the Party of
Socialist-Revolutionaries

APPENDlX X

Instructions on Guerilla WBrt'are Issued by
tee Bolshevik Moscow Committee,
December 11, 19;5.

ADVICE TO THE R ISDiG WORK.l§iS
Comrades~

A street battle of rising workers against the army and
If' your do not adhare to certain rules 1 many of your brothei't'Hmhy pc;l.~ish.:in.'thi'; battle. The canbat organization of the Moscow Com-

police has begun.

mittee of the Social-Democratic Labor Party makes haste to point these rules
out and to urge you to follow them strictly.
1. The first Rule--do not act in crowds. Work in l:Dall details of
three or four men, not more. Let there be as many of these details as possible and let them learn to attack quickly and disappear quickly. The police
strives to shoot crowds of thousands of people with a hundred coasacks. You
must put one or two snipers against a hundred cossacks. To fall on a hlm•
dred is easier than on one, especially if that one shoots and escapes 1m•
noticed. The police and army will be helpless i f all Moscow is covered with
this small and elusive details.
2. In addition, comrades, do not take up fortified places. The army
always attmmpts to take them or simply destroy tham with artillery. Let
our fortresses be passable yards and all places from which we can shoot and
escape easily. If they take such a place, they will not find anyone there,
and will lose many of their own. It is impossible to take them all, for to
do that it would be necesS817 to settle every home with a cossack.
3· Th.efefore, comrades, if anyone should call you to go in a great
crowd or to taks a fortified place, consider him a fool or a provocator. If'
he is a fool, don't listen to him, if a provocator••kill •••
4. Also, avoid going to large meetings. We see them often in tree
states, but for now, it is necessary to struggle and only struggle. The
government understands this perfectly and makes use of our meetings to beat
and disarm us.
5. Rather, gather in small clusters for combat conferences 1 each in
his own district, and at the first appearance of the army, scatter throughout
the yards. From these yards, shoot and throw rocks at the Cossacks and after
thai, climb into the neighboring yard and leave.
6. strictly differentiate between your conscious enemies and your
unconscious and accidental enemies. Destroy the former and have mercy on the
latter. It 1 possible do not bother the infantry. Soldiers are the children
of the people and do not go against the people by their awn will. The otfi•
cera and the higher leadership set them on the people. Direct ;your energie a
against these officers and authorities. Every officer leading soldiers to
beat workers proelafms h:lmself an enemy of' the people and puts himself outside the law. Kill him unconditionally.
7. Do not spare the Cossacks. Much of the people's blood is upon
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awn lands, wh.ere they have their lands and families, or let them sit shut up
in their barracks. Do not bother them there. But as soon as they cane out
on the street--on foot or on horse 1 armed or tmarmed--consider them the most
evil enemies and destroy them t-'ithout pity.
8. Att&ck and destroy the dragoons and patrols.
9. !n conflict with the police, proceed in this way. Kill all higher
ranks whenever conditioi!s are favorable. Disarm and arrest the others. Also
ldll those 'Who are known for their cruelty and meanness. As tor the town
militia only take their weapons and canpel them to serve not the police but
us.
10. Forbid homeowners to lock their doors. This is very important.
Go after them and if they do not obey 1 beat them for the first offense 1 and
tor the second--kill them. Ccnpel the haneowners to serve us and not the
police. 'l'hen 1 each yard will be our refuge and place of ambush.
These then, are the most important rules, comrades. In forthcaning
leaflets the canbat organization will give you additional advice on how to
protect yourselves, attack, and construct barricades. Now we will say a
few words about sanething quite different.
Remember Ccmrades that we want not only to destroy the old order but
to build a new one 1 in 'Which each citizen will be tree fran all compulsion.
Therefore, immediately take upon yourselves the protection Of all citizens.
Protect them. Make unnecessary that police 1 which under the disguise of protector of the social peace and security exercises farce over the poor, puts
us in prison, and forms Black Hundred Pogroms:
Our immediate task, canrades is to transfer the city into the hands of'
the people. We will begin with the outskirts and seize one part after another
In the seized pert we will immediately establish our elected administration,
install our ow order, the eight-hour day, progressive taxes, and so on. We
will prove that under our administration social life will go on more justly,
and the life, liberty, and rights of each will be better protected than now.
Therefore, struggling and destroySng, rem.ember your future roles and
learn to be rulers.
Combat Organization of the Moscow Committee of the
Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party.
SPREAD 'miS LEAFLET EVERYWHERE, PASTE IT ON '.IHE 9m.E:R'J.S1 .HA.l-,.IJ .d' wl! •.rv
PA SSER6-BY.
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